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THE IMPACT OF DIVERSIFICATION ON BANK HOLDING 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
CHINPIAO LIU 
ABSTRACT 
Bank holding companies (BHCs) are hypothesized to achieve potential portfolio and 
synergistic benefits through various forms of diversification. On the other hand, 
diversification can generate new managerial problems or agency costs. This dissertation 
examines five issues. 1) Do all the various forms of diversification have the same 
favorable/unfavorable effects on BHCs’ performance?, 2) Are there any interaction 
effects among the various types of diversification?, 3) Since the business strategies of 
large BHCs are different from those of small BHCs, do the diversification effects vary by 
size?, 4) How did diversification impact BHC performance during the 2007-2008 
financial crisis?, and 5) What types of diversification-associated M&A should BHCs 
employ to take advantages of diversification benefits? 
Overall Results - The study finds that not all forms of diversifications have the same 
impacts on BHCs’ performance. Some types of diversification support the hypothesis of 
favorable portfolio benefits and cost synergies, while other findings support the 
hypothesis of unfavorable agency costs. Non-interest-income diversification has the 
strongest favorable impacts on BHCs’ performance as it both increases returns and 
reduces portfolio risk. Security diversification has unfavorable impacts on accounting 
returns but favorable impacts on market returns. Off-balance-sheet diversification has 
unfavorable impacts on risk and it does not contribute to BHCs’ returns. The largest 
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unfavorable impact is on derivatives losses.  
Moreover, for some diversification measures, the impacts depend on the scale of their 
associated activities. When the scale of the diversified activity is large enough, the net 
diversification impact may change its sign. In general, among the various diversified 
activities where the sign of the impacts switch with scales, loan diversification switches 
direction from favorable to unfavorable. BHCs might tend to make increasingly risky 
loans when their scale of loans expands. Moreover, agency problems might also become 
difficult to control. On the other hand, security diversification tends to switch the 
direction of impact from unfavorable to favorable. With larger security portfolios, BHCs 
are more capable of reducing risk and increasing returns with a wide selection of 
securities. 
Results for Various Size Banks - For small banks, larger community banks, and 
regional BHCs, non-interest-income and loan diversifications generally enhance 
performance while security portfolio and off-balance sheet diversifications reduce 
performance. For very large money center banks, diversification into off-balance-sheet 
activities generates the strongest performance benefit, while domestic geographic, loan 
and non-interest income diversifications also have favorable impacts. On the other hand, 
security portfolio diversification has a mix of both favorable and unfavorable effects. 
Focusing on BHCs with international loan portfolios, off-balance-sheet diversification 
creates the strongest performance benefits, followed by domestic geographic 
diversification. On the other hand, international geographic and loan diversifications, 
along with security portfolio and non-interest income diversifications reduce bank 
performance. 
Over all, it appears that larger banks (with the exception of international banks) 
achieve more favorable diversification benefits. On the other hand, the interaction effects 
of various forms of diversifications appear to benefit small BHCs the most. Smaller 
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BHCs may not benefit through single channel diversification because doing so likely 
increases operating costs while the bank remains unable to fulfill their target customers’ 
full range of service needs. However, by multi-channel diversification, the interaction 
benefits of diversifications can be achieved. On the other hand, larger BHCs can benefit 
through single channel diversification because they have more market power and are able 
to enjoy the benefits of diversified portfolios and cost synergies generated through 
economies of scale. However, multi-channel diversification may make larger BHCs more 
difficult to manage. For example, they might engage in unfamiliar and risky business 
where operating and agency costs offset potential portfolio benefits.  
Overall, diversification generally supports the hypothesis of favorable portfolio 
benefits and cost synergies. Furthermore, diversification has a consistently more 
favorable impact during the recent financial crisis. In general, BHCs with widely 
diversified activities will suffer less than other BHCs with concentrated activities when 
financial crisis occurs.  
Impact of Merger Activity - The study also finds that M&A activity associated with 
several forms of diversification improve BHC performance, while the other forms of 
diversification have insignificant impacts on performance. The overall implications for 
BHCs are that not all diversification-driven mergers generate benefits for BHCs. Hence, 
BHCs should choose the right mergers which meet their business goals. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Deregulations in recent decades have been believed to fundamentally change the U. S. 
banking industry. For example, Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 allows banks to have branches 
across the country rather than restricted to a single state. Smaller, less efficient 
community banks lose protection of the geographic restriction and face the competition 
from larger, more efficient banks. Calomiris (2000) suggests that geographic restriction 
creates smaller banks and inhibit diversification, thus making banks more vulnerable to 
economic downturns. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) removes many 
restrictions on financial service providers. GLBA allows banks to engage in a host of new 
activities like brokerage, underwriting, and advisory. Banks shift away from traditional 
lending activities and toward activities that generate fee income, service charges, trading 
revenue, and other types of non-interest income. This shift toward noninterest income 
activities substantially contribute to bank revenue and change the risk of bank portfolios. 
Risky off-balance sheet activities, such as loan commitments, letters of credit, derivatives, 
etc., have become popular. Such activities might bring banks huge profits but be beyond 
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regulatory control. The purpose of all the deregulations is to enable banks to expand 
business and gain financial benefits. 
With the potential of financial benefits, bank holding companies (BHCs) have 
incentives to initiate new activities to diversify their portfolios. The most common way 
for banks to expand business is to employ merger and acquisition (M&A). The aggregate 
impact of M&A on bank performance has been well documented in the literature. Pilloff 
(1996), Houston et al. (2001), and Penas and Unal (2004) show that M&A activities in 
the banking industry can achieve cost savings, synergy gains and market power increases. 
M&A activities are basically associated with several types of diversification, such as 
domestic and international geographic diversification, loan diversification, security 
diversification, noninterest income diversification and off-balance sheet diversification. 
The portfolio theory predicts that diversification could help banks reach economies of 
scope and scale that boost performance. Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992), Saunders and 
Walter (1994), and Stein (2002) suggest that banks can facilitate the efficient provision of 
other financial services, such as underwriting of securities and insurance, brokerage and 
mutual fund services, etc., by acquiring information about clients when they make loans. 
Similarly, these services can produce information that improve loan making. Thus, banks 
that engage in diversification of activities can enjoy economies of scope. Santomero and 
Eckles (2000) and Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000) suggest that bank 
branching can reduce costs as output expands. Banks that engage in geographic 
diversification can enjoy economies of scale. However, the agency theory predicts 
differently that diversification could intensify agency problems between bank insiders 
and shareholders. Aron (1988), Stulz (1990), and Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) indicate 
that diversification may make it more difficult to design efficient managerial incentive 
contracts and more difficult to align the incentives of outsiders with insiders. Insiders will 
still diversify if their marginal private benefits exceed the losses that they incur from the 
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drop in market valuation. Therefore, although a large body of literature tests the impact of 
M&A on bank performance, what types of M&A and their corresponding diversifications 
which incur better or worse performance is still an unsolved question. 
The adoption of an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to determining minimum 
capital requirement, proposed as part of the Basel II capital accord, also provides banks 
with incentives to increase their M&A activities and, then, diversify their activities. 
Because banks’ internal assessments of key risk considerations serve as primary inputs in 
the calculation of minimum regulatory capital requirements, it is likely that banks which 
adopt the IRB approach can create lower minimum regulatory capital requirements than 
the minimum regulatory capital requirements applied to the majority of banks that will 
not adopt the IRB approach. The disparity of minimum regulatory capital requirements 
between these two types of banks provides a competitive advantage to the initial adopters. 
Therefore, both the excess capital that would be created by IRB banks as a result of 
reduced capital requirements and the competitive advantage associated with those 
reduced requirements would fuel their acquisitions of non-adopting banks (Hannan and 
Pilloff, 2005). Therefore, for large banks, diversification is a way which may reduce risk 
and enhance their performance. 
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) argue that contagion of financial crises occurs because 
investment portfolios are diversified across countries. The fact that different countries 
share the same group of investors leads to the transmission of negative shocks from one 
part of the world to another. In the summer of 2007, the financial crisis emerging from 
the U.S. gradually spread to the rest of the world because international investors are 
heavily involved in asset-backed securities. The asset-backed securities composed of 
risky subprime mortgages were packaged and sold to investors worldwide. Mizen (2008) 
argues that the crisis originated from an increase in subprime mortgage defaults starting 
in February 2007. In April, New Century Financial, a subprime specialist, filed for 
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In early May 2007, the Swiss-owned investment bank UBS 
closed the Dillon Reed hedge fund after incurring $125 million in subprime 
mortgage-related losses. In the same month, Moody’s announced the reviewing of the 
ratings of 62 asset groups based on 21 U.S. subprime mortgage securitizations. In June 
and July 2007, three ratings agencies, Fitch Ratings, Standard & Poor‘s, and Moody‘s, all 
downgraded a wide range of subprime-related mortgage products. Thereafter, a U.S. 
mortgage bank experienced large losses and two European banks closed hedge funds in 
troubled situation. 
The stable macroeconomic condition in the late 1990s (reduced macroeconomic 
volatility), the global savings glut (lower long-term interest rates), and the sophisticated 
subprime mortgage-backed assets with relatively high yield and presumably good credit 
ratings provided supportive environment for excessive credit expansion. Among the 
various factors which give rise to the financial crisis, the new asset-backed financial 
products play the key roles. Because of the high risk of some asset-backed securities, the 
events of financial crisis during 2007-2008 might constitute indirect evidence that 
financial institutions which diversify into high risk activities, often perform much worse 
than BHCs which do not diversify as such (The current AIG crisis being a prime 
example). Thus diversification may not necessarily reduce risk as portfolio theory often 
suggests. Specifically, some activities may generate higher risk for the resulting firm 
rather than leading to a reduction in risk.  
The financial crisis provides a good opportunity to examine the effect of 
diversification on BHCs performance. The effect before the crisis should be different 
from that during the crisis period since the U.S. government has taken several dramatic 
steps to ease the credit crisis. In addition to reducing short-term interest rates, the Federal 
Reserve has taken additional steps to improve the functioning of the credit markets and to 
increase the supply of credit to households and businesses (Bernanke, 2009). First, the 
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Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began to ease monetary policy in September 
2007, reducing the target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points. Because the 
economic weakness persisted, the FOMC continued to bring down its target for the 
federal funds rate by 275 basis points by the spring of 2008. Unfortunately, the financial 
turbulence kept deteriorating. In October 2008 the Committee cut the target for the 
federal funds rate by additional 100 basis points, and in December it cut the target further, 
setting a range of 0 to 25 basis points. Second, the Fed provided massive short-term 
liquidity to both trouble and sound financial institutions, increasing the ability, if not the 
willingness, of these institutions to expand credit. Moreover, the Fed also approves 
temporary bilateral liquidity agreements with 14 foreign central banks to ease conditions 
in dollar funding markets globally. Improvements in global interbank markets, in turn, 
promote greater stability in money markets and foreign exchange markets. Third, the Fed 
provided liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets. For example, 
the Fed introduces facilities to purchase highly rated commercial paper at a term of three 
months and to provide backup liquidity for money market mutual funds. In addition, the 
Fed and the Treasury jointly announce a facility to lend against AAA-rated asset-backed 
securities. These approaches are expected to lead to lower rates and greater availability of 
consumer, business, and mortgage credit. Fourth, the Fed purchased long-term securities 
for the Fed’s portfolio, such as, the debt of government-sponsored enterprises and 
mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by federal agencies (e.g., Fannie Mae and Ginnie 
Mae). 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The impact of individual channel of diversification on bank holding companies’ 
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(BHCs) return and risk has been documented in the literature. However, their results are 
still mixed. Some papers show performance enhancement but some do not. Very few of 
prior papers consider the possibility of the interaction effects among different channels of 
diversification. Almost all of them examine the relationship between BHCs’ performance 
and diversification by either concentrating on a single diversification channel or running 
separate model for each channel. Interaction effects among channels of diversification are 
ignored. Interaction effects may play an important role in explaining BHCs’ performance. 
BHCs may expand their activities by employing different channels simultaneously to 
satisfy the specific needs of their target customers in different areas. For example, 
customers in area A need service “A”, while customers in area B need service “B”. 
Suppose that a BHC is headquartered in area A and provides service “A” to its customers 
in the area. There are two ways for the BHC to expand, geographically or multi-service. 
If the BHC only expands geographically, it still cannot provide services to the target 
customers in area B because they need service “B”, not “A”. However, costs will arise 
without generating any benefit due to operating a new branch. On the other hand, if the 
BHC only expands services to include “B”, it still cannot provide more services to 
customers in area A because the customers in area A do not need service “B”. Once again 
the bank experiences increased costs of providing service “B”. However, the BHC may 
adopt both geographic diversification and service diversification. It can provide service 
“A” to customers in area A and service “B” to customers in area B. The multi-channel 
diversification can decrease operating costs and increase synergies. Therefore, the 
interaction effect is theoretically existent. However, no prior papers integrate different 
types of diversification in a single model and examine their interaction effects. Although, 
in some papers, their empirical results for individual channels of diversification may not 
show financial benefits, we still cannot conclude that this channel has no effect on BHCs 
performance without examining other channels simultaneously. We cannot exclude the 
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possibility of the existence of interaction effect among channels of diversification. In fact, 
very few BHCs expand their activities only through one channel in the era of 
deregulation, especially through M&A. When prior papers studied a specific 
diversification mode but do not control for other channels which may also affect BHCs 
performance, their empirical results may be biased. Therefore, integrated tests of the 
effects of various types of diversification and their interaction are essential for resolving 
these research issues and become the main framework of this study.  
This study examines three broad traditional channels of diversification: geographic 
diversification, asset diversification and non-traditional banking activity diversification, 
and sub-divide them into six narrow sub-channels. First, geographic diversification is 
divided into domestic and international geographic diversification because opening a new 
branch in another city of its own country may have significantly less cost and risk 
compared to opening a new branch abroad. Moreover, the effects of portfolio 
diversification depend on the correlation between return distributions of individual 
securities which tends to be lower between- than within-countries. Therefore, the effects 
of diversification between domestic and international diversifications should be different. 
Second, because loans and securities are different assets with very different types of 
return and risk, asset diversification should be divided into loan diversification and 
security diversification. Third, this study adds off-balance-sheet activity diversification 
into analysis. Very few literatures examine the effect of off-balance-sheet diversification 
on BHCs performance. BHCs which engage in off-balance sheet activities may 
experience large returns but excessive risk. Thus, the effect of off-balance sheet 
diversification is still unknown and becomes another important issue. Therefore, 
non-traditional banking activity diversification is divided into non-interest-income 
diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification in this study. 
Wagner (2006) shows that even though diversification could reduce financial 
  
 
8 
institutions’ individual probability of failure, it makes systematic crises more likely. The 
result seems to be consistent with the 2007-2008 financial crises. The concern is that 
diversification may play different role before and during the financial crisis. Therefore, 
this study also examines the differences. 
The results of this study may be useful for management since the specific activities 
and business strategies of small and large BHCs may differ, and hence the effects of 
diversification might also be different. Small BHCs face challenges to their survival in 
the market from competition of large BHCs. However, small BHCs usually concentrate 
on selected market segments, which give them a distinct comparative advantage, for 
example, in relationship lending (Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007). Contrary to small 
BHCs, large BHCs have difficulty in filtering “soft information”. Thus, it is important to 
identify unique diversification strategies that make these BHCs successful. This study 
examines the effects of diversification for several groups of BHCs of different sizes to 
help identify the channels of diversification that BHCs can employ as tools to enhance 
their performance. 
In conclusion, four issues are examined in this study: (1) Do all the channels of 
diversification have the same effects on BHCs performance? (2) Are there any interaction 
effects among these various types of diversification? (3) Do the effects of diversification 
during the financial crisis change? and (4) What impact does BHC size have upon 
diversification benefits and risks? This study examines the effects of multi-channel 
diversification on BHCs performance to answer these questions. Diversification effects 
are examined using both accounting and stock market measures of return and risk. 
Accounting measures of return contain return on asset (ROA), risk-adjusted return on 
asset (RAROA), return on equity (ROE) and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). 
Market measures of return include stock return (SR) and risk-adjusted stock return 
(RASR). Accounting measures of risk are net charge-offs (NCO) for credit risk and 
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distance to default (Z score) for default risk. Market measures of risk contain maturity 
gap (MG), derivatives loss (DL), market beta (MB), interest rate beta (IRB), and value at 
risk (VaR). An integrated multiple regression model is estimated using panel data from 
1996 to 2008 for BHCs of a wide range of sizes. 
1.3 Contribution of the Dissertation 
This study contributes to the empirical literature regarding the impact of 
diversification on BHCs performance. A wider range of diversification is examined in 
this study compared to prior research. International geographic diversification is 
separated from domestic geographic diversification; security portfolio diversification is 
separated from loan diversification; off-balance-sheet diversification is separated from 
non-interest-income diversification. In addition, the effects of alternative channels of 
diversification are simultaneously tested in an integrated model, rather than in separate 
models as most previous work has done. These allow for a more comprehensive 
investigation and decrease the possibility of biased results.  
Multi-diversification activities are popularly employed by BHCs and expected to 
have impact on their performance. However, interaction effects of diversifications are 
usually ignored in the literature. This study also examines them in the model. 
This study examines the effect of diversification for BHCs of different sizes. This is 
important because there are differences among the policies and strategies of BHCs of 
various sizes. Most prior papers ignore these differences. This increases possibility of 
biased explanation for their testing results.  
Furthermore, because of the huge impact of the financial crisis 2007-2008 on the 
banking industry and the high degree of market intervention of the U.S. government, the 
relationship between diversification and BHCs performance might also be biased if the 
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data of 1996 to 2008 are polled to estimate the empirical model. Thus, this study breaks 
the data into two groups, before and during the crisis― to once again prevent biased 
results. 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the related literature; Chapter 
III develops the hypothesis; Chapter IV describes the model; Chapter V describes the 
variables and data; Chapter VI presents the empirical results; and Chapter VII concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
While many studies have addressed the issue of the financial benefits and risk 
associated with BHCs diversification, the results are still mixed. The literature for 
non-traditional bank activity diversification is much more extensive than the literature for 
geographic and asset diversifications. The literature is divided into three groups in terms 
of the types of diversification as follows: 
2.1 Geographic Diversification  
Morgan and Samolyk (2003) examine geographic diversification and find that 
diversification is not associated with greater returns (ROE or ROA) or risk reduction. 
Deng and Elyasiani (2005a) find that geographic diversification of BHCs is associated 
with a significant decline in equity risk. 
2.2 Asset Diversification  
Acharya et al. (2002) study loan portfolio diversity and show that diversification of 
loans does not typically improve performance or reduce risk in Italian banks. Deng and 
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Elyasiani (2005b) find that diversification of assets is associated with a significant 
decline in bank earning volatility.  
2.3 Non-traditional Bank Activity Diversification  
Templeton and Severiens (1992) examine 54 BHCs from 1979 to 1986 and find that 
diversification, measured by the share of market value not attributed to bank assets is 
associated with lower variance of shareholder returns. Saunders and Walter (1994) review 
18 studies that examine whether non-bank activities reduce BHC risk and report a 
widespread lack of consensus. For example, nine studies found reduced risk, six studies 
reported no reduction in risk, while three studies gave mixed results. Bhargava and Fraser 
(1998) examine stock returns of commercial banks around four Federal Reserve Board 
decisions to allow BHCs to engage in investment banking through Section 20 
subsidiaries. They find that commercial banks experience positive abnormal stock returns 
when the Federal Reserve initially allowed banks to engage in investment underwriting 
activities, but negative abnormal returns as the Federal Reserve expands banks’ abilities 
to underwrite corporate debt and equity. Kwan (1998) examines the returns of banks’ 
Section 20 subsidiaries and their commercial bank affiliates and finds that Section 20 
subsidiaries are typically more risky and not necessarily more profitable than their 
commercial bank affiliates. Allen and Jagtiani (1999) generate synthetic banks to 
simulate the impact of both insurance and securities activities and find that these 
nonblank activities reduce the firm’s total risk but serve to increase systematic market 
risk. Whalen (1999a) examines the overseas insurance activities of US BHCs for the 
period from 1987 to 1997 and finds that mean returns in insurance activities significantly 
exceed the returns to banking as well as the returns on other nonbanking activities. 
Whalen (1999b) examines the foreign securities activities of US banks and finds that the 
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average security returns are similar to the returns of traditional banking activities, while 
measures of risk are somewhat higher. Cubo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) in a study of 
mergers and acquisitions in European banking find significant positive abnormal returns 
associated with product diversification of banks into insurance. However, they also find 
that M&A with securities firms and foreign institutions did not result in a gain.  
Reichert and Wall (2000) form efficient portfolios of BHC with traditional activities 
(savings banks, savings and loan associations, personal, and business companies) and 
non-traditional activities (security brokers, commodity brokers/dealers, life insurance 
underwriters, insurance agents and brokers, investment companies, and developers) over 
three separate periods: a) pre-deregulation: 1974-1980, b) deregulation: 1981-1989, and c) 
post-deregulation: 1990-1997. Using both ROA and ROE as a measure of industry 
performance, the authors conclude that during the earlier two periods the benefits to bank 
diversification into nontraditional services were two-dimensional in that bank holding 
companies could achieve both a dramatic increase in expected return and a significant 
reduction in risk. Expansion into life insurance underwriting and regulated investment 
companies would have been particularly beneficial. On the other hand, during the later 
period (1990-1997) the benefits to diversification were limited to an increase in expected 
earnings with little or no risk reduction noticed. The authors conclude that while some 
consistent trends are evident over the entire 25 year period, the precise mix of return 
enhancing and/or risk reducing diversification is likely to vary over time. 
The most recent studies generally conclude that bank expansion into less traditional 
financial activities is associated with increased risk and lower returns. For example, De 
Young and Roland (2001) find that a shift toward fee based activities is associated with 
increased revenue volatility and a higher degree of total leverage, both of which imply 
greater earnings volatility for commercial banks. Cornett et al. (2002) examine banks’ 
Section 20 subsidiaries and find evidence that industry-adjusted operating cash flow 
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return on assets rises, while risk do not change significantly. Stiroh (2004) concludes that 
a greater reliance on non-interest income, particularly trading revenue, is associated with 
higher risk and lower risk-adjusted profits across commercial banks. Deng and Elyasiani 
(2005b) find that diversification of non-traditional activities is associated with a 
significant lower firm risk. Laeven and Levine (2005) find that, on average, diversity of 
activities by banks destroys value and reduces bank performance. Stiroh (2005) shows 
that increased exposure to non-interest income increases the volatility of equity market 
returns, but not the mean returns. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that risk-adjusted return 
is significantly and positively related to diversification of non-interest activities, but 
diversification of non-interest activities is associated with a significant increase in firm 
risk. 
Reichert, Wall, and Liang (2008) analyze the merits of allowing affiliation between 
bank holding companies and commercial firms during the 1994-2004 period. The paper 
examines the potential increase in return (or reduction in risk) from combining various 
industries into efficient portfolios. The paper finds potential gains to banking when 
diversification into the commercial sector is permitted and significant gains to the 
commercial sector when entering the banking sector. For example, when efficient 
portfolios were formed using10 major industry categories, a BHC’s historical average 
ROE of approximately 8.0% could be increased to 11% with no increase in risk by 
investing in a portfolio comprised of 15.4% of its assets in banking and the remaining 
shares invested in the following sectors: nonbank financial services (15.7%), retail 
(27.3%), wholesale (21.8%), and construction (11.7%). 
2.4 Limitations of the Literature  
The literature clearly does not find consistent results. This may be due to model 
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specification error or data discrepancies. For example, in a model with assets as the only 
diversification channel we may find that asset diversification alone has a significant 
impact on performance. However, it may be incorrect to draw such a conclusion because 
asset and geographic diversification are often employed simultaneously. The data used to 
calculate asset diversification may also contain some information on geographic 
diversification. It becomes difficult to explain the effect of asset diversification without 
controlling for geographic diversification and their interaction effects. Therefore, a more 
comprehensive study is needed for the diversification and performance issues. 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Individual Effects of Diversifications  
According to portfolio theory, BHCs might benefit from reduced portfolio risk 
through activity diversification if they diversified into activities with negative or low 
positively correlated returns. It is expected that the more diversified portfolio can create 
greater return, reduced risk, and greater risk-adjusted return. Therefore, 
H1a: Broadly diversified BHCs will have greater returns, lower levels of risk, and 
greater risk-adjusted returns. 
According to agency theory, when BHCs diversify their activities, they may incur 
more serious agency problems or exposure to more volatile activities which may not be 
necessarily more profitable. Therefore, the benefits of diversification may be offset by 
their costs. More diversified portfolios will result in lower returns, greater risks, or lower 
risk-adjusted returns. Therefore, 
H1b: Broadly diversified BHCs will have lower returns, greater levels of risk, or 
lower risk-adjusted returns.  
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3.2 Interaction Effects of Diversifications  
This study examines four interaction effects of diversifications. First, BHCs that 
simultaneously engage in geographic and loan diversifications may have positive 
interaction effects on their performance because BHCs can provide more exact services 
to fulfill specific needs of their target customers in different areas. Operating costs can be 
lowered because of the economies of scale and scope. Second, BHCs may also take this 
advantage by engaging in both geographic and non-interest-income diversifications. 
Third, off-balance-sheet activities are usually used as tools to hedge risk of security 
portfolios. Therefore, the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications 
should reduce risk and lead to an increase in risk-adjusted returns. Finally, large BHCs 
are more capable of well diversifying their portfolios to enhance their market power and 
reduce risk. Therefore, the interaction of all-activity diversifications should be negatively 
related to risk and positively related to return and risk-adjusted return. Therefore, 
H2a: Interactions of diversifications are expected to increase returns, reduce risk 
and increase risk-adjusted returns. 
However, the benefits of economies of scale and scope might be totally offset by 
agency costs. When BHCs are not efficiently managed, diversifying to multi-channel 
activities may reduce returns, increase risk and reduce risk-adjusted returns. Therefore, 
H2b: Interactions of diversifications are expected to reduce returns, increase risk 
and reduce risk-adjusted returns. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the link between diversifications of BHCs 
and performance. Activity diversification has become one of the important strategies that 
BHCs expand their business. BHCs usually diversify activities through multi-channels. 
The impact of individual diversification and their interaction effects are the major focus 
in this study. All measures of diversifications and interactions are integrated into a panel 
regression. This provides an opportunity to examine the whole phase of BHC 
diversification of activities rather than partial one. Three issues are examined in the 
model. First, the effect of individual diversification tells us whether diversity can improve 
performance. Second, the interaction effect of individual diversification and its 
underlying activity exposure tells us whether diversification with greater exposure is 
associated with higher performance. Third, the interaction effect of diversifications tells 
us whether multi-channel diversification can improve performance. Panel data give more 
information on variations within BHCs and time exposure. To resolve autocorrelation 
problems on residual, a panel regression with first-order autoregressive scheme, AR(1) is 
as follows and estimated by using quarterly data across recent ten-year period (1998 Q4 – 
2008 Q4). In addition, to resolve heteroskedasticity problems on residual, the White 
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Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are used to calculate the t-statistics. 
Performance
 ti,  = α  + β  DIV  ti,  + γ  SDIV ti,  + λ  IDIV  ti,  + δ C  ti,  +  ti,u  
 ti,u  = ρ 1- ti,u  +  ti,ε  
Where i is the i th  BHC. t is the observed quarter. Performance is a measure of 
performance. DIV is a vector of diversification index including domestic geographic 
diversification (DIV DG ), loan diversification (DIV L ), security diversification (DIV S ), 
non-interest-income diversification (DIV NII ) and off-balance-sheet diversification 
(DIV OBS ). SDIV is a vector of scale interaction of diversification to measure the 
interaction of diversification level and its underlying activity exposure. Because effects of 
diversifications could be positive or negative, the SDIV effects are not known. IDIV is a 
vector of interaction of diversifications including interaction of geographic and loan 
diversifications, interaction of geographic and non-interest-income diversifications, 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications, and interaction of all 
activities.  
C is a vector of control variables. Cross-border loan exposure to asset ratio (S1), 
domestic deposit to asset ratio (S2), loan to asset ratio (S3), security to asset ratio (S4), 
non-interest-income to asset ratio (S5) and off-balance-sheet to asset ratio (S6) are used 
to control for the size effect of activities. Risk spreads to the world due to international 
investment activities. International BHCs have advantages of diversifying their portfolios 
worldwide to search for investment opportunity of higher returns and lower risk. 
Cross-border exposure ratio is expected to be positively related to returns, negatively to 
risk and positively to risk-adjusted returns. Deposits provide BHCs with fund to expand 
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the levels of portfolios. High level of deposits should increase BHCs’ returns and reduce 
risk. Loans, securities and non-interest incomes are the major sources of income for 
BHCs. Greater amount of them should provide BHCs with higher returns. However, 
BHCs might expand to products with low or high risk. Therefore, it could be possible to 
induce lower or higher levels of portfolio risk. Off-balance-sheet activities might incur 
huge amount of returns or losses. Therefore, the levels of off-balance-sheet ratio could be 
positively or negatively related to returns and risk. The log of total assets (C1) is used to 
control for any systematic differences in performance across size classes. Because larger 
BHCs have competitive advantage to smaller BHCs, the size factor is expected to be 
negatively related to returns and risk. However, it also possible that larger BHCs may 
take more risky activities than smaller BHCs, and, thus, size is expected to be positively 
related to returns and risk. The equity to asset ratio (C2) may affect performance because 
risk-loving BHCs may hold less equity. Therefore, equity ratio is expected to be 
negatively related to return and risk. However, it is also possible that loan holders 
intensively monitor BHCs activities when BHCs have higher leverage ratio. It is expected 
that equity ratio is positively related to return and risk. The quarterly asset growth (C3) 
may affect performance because risk-loving BHCs may grow more rapidly. It is expected 
that asset growth is positively related to returns and risk and negatively to risk-adjusted 
returns. Merger dummy (C4) is used to control for mergers. Mergers may be negatively 
or positively related to BHC performance. C4*C3 controls for the size of merger. 
Moreover, a dummy variable for each year during the observing period is used to control 
for the economic environment in that year. 
 ti,u  is the disturbance. ρ  is the coefficient of autocovariance. ti,ε  is the stochastic 
disturbance term which satisfies the standard OLS assumption. 
The estimated 
∧β  measures the impact of individual diversification on performance 
  
 
21 
where 
∧β  > 0 if diversification is associated with improved performance. ∧γ  measures 
the interaction effect of diversification and activity exposure where
∧
γ  > 0 indicates that 
diversification with greater exposure is associated with higher performance. 
∧
λ  measures 
the interaction impact of diversifications where 
∧
λ  > 0 indicates that multi-channel 
diversification is associated with improved performance. 
To compare the impacts of diversifications among BHCs of different sizes, the panel 
regression is also estimated by sub-groups of BHCs. BHCs are divided into four groups 
based on their total asset at the last quarter of 2008: small BHCs with total asset less than 
$1 billion, larger community BHCs with total asset between $1 billion and $25 billion, 
regional BHCs with total asset between $25 billion and $150 billion, money center BHCs 
with total asset greater than $150 billion. Moreover, some BHCs are international BHCs 
with activities overseas. The regression is also estimated for international BHCs with the 
measure of international geographic diversification (IGD). 
To compare the impacts of diversifications between before and during the financial 
crisis 2007-2008, the regression is estimated for the sub-periods. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
5.1 Sample 
The observing sample is U.S. BHCs consistently filing quarterly FR Y-9C reports to 
the Federal Reserve Bank from 1996 Q1 to 2008 Q4. The total number of the sample 
BHCs is 442. The observing period is long enough to cover at least a whole economic 
circle to prevent any economic cycle bias. During the observing period, failed or merged 
BHCs are excluded from the sample because their domestic deposit data which are used 
to measure domestic geographic diversification are not provided by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This is expected to have little survivorship bias. For failed 
BHCs, although the exact number of failed BHCs is not recorded by the Federal Reserve 
Bank, it is expected that very few BHCs liquidate to bankruptcy. Before bankruptcy, 
BHCs are usually merged by other BHCs. For merged BHCs, the critical factor which 
affects BHC merger is not only bad performance. Besides efficiency improvement, there 
are several other reasons for a BHC to acquire another BHC (operating synergy, financial 
synergy, the hubris, agency problems etc.) A BHC with good performance is also possible 
to be merged. Therefore, without including failed or merged BHCs in the sample should 
not incur serious result bias. 
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Of the 442 sample BHCs, 184 are small BHCs, 239 are larger community BHCs, 10 
are regional BHCs and 9 are money center BHCs. Of the 442 sample BHCs, 119 are 
publicly traded BHCs (30 small BHCs, 70 larger community BHCs, 10 regional BHCs 
and 9 money center BHCs). Of the 442 sample BHCs, 6 are international BHCs reporting 
foreign loan exposures (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO, CITYGROUP, INC., BANK OF 
AMERICA CORPORATION, STATE STREET CORPORATION, COMERICA 
INCORPORATED and BANK OF HAWAII CORPORATION). 
5.2 Data Sources  
Accounting data used to calculate the dependent variables, diversification indices and 
control variables are from BHCs’ annual reports and FR Y-9C reports in the Bank 
Holding Company database of Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Domestic state-based 
deposits of BHCs which are used for calculating domestic geographic diversification 
index are from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) Summary of 
Deposits (SOD) database. Because cross-border deposits are not available in SOD or 
BHCs’ annual reports, diversification index based on cross-border loan exposure are used 
to proxy for international geographic diversification index. The data are from BHCs’ 
10-K reports. Value at risk (VaR) are from BHCs’ 10-K reports.  
Market stock prices, stock returns and S&P500 index returns are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 10-year Treasury rate is from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis database. 
5.3 Variables  
All the variables incorporated into the regression model are in quarterly basis. The 
definitions of independent and dependent variables incorporated in the regression model 
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are as follows: 
1. Activity diversification 
To measure the diversifications of a BHC’s activities, this study follows the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index approach used in Stir and Rumble (2006) and Deng, 
Elyasiani and Mao (2006). Herfindahl-Hirschman index ranges between zero and one, 
and increases with the degree of diversification. BHCs activity diversifications are 
divided into six groups: International geographic diversification, Domestic geographic 
diversification, Loan diversification, Security diversification, Non-interest-income 
diversification, and off-balance-sheet diversification. A Herfindahl-Hirschman index will 
be created to proxy for each of them. Detailed definitions of variables used to for 
calculating each diversification index are listed in table 1. 
The individual measures of diversification are defined as follows. 
(1) International geographic diversification index (DIV IG ): 
DIV IG  = 1-∑
∑j
j
j
j 2)
ExposureLoan border -Cross
ExposureLoan border -Cross(
        j = 1, 2,….                        
Cross-border Loan Exposure j  is total loan exposure for the BHC in the j th  foreign 
country and ∑
j
jExposure)Loan border -(Cross  is the sum of loan exposure over all 
of the foreign countries. The total loan exposure includes total cross-border asset 
outstanding and commitments. 
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Table 1: Variables Used for Calculating Diversification Indices 
*** In the parentheses are data sources or variable codes in FR Y9-C.  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
( I ) International geographic diversification (DIV IG ): 
 Total cross-border loan exposure (10-K) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
( II ) Domestic geographic diversification (DIV DG ): 
Deposit in each state of the U.S. (SOD) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
( III ) Loan diversification (DIV L ):  
1. Loans secured by real estate (BHCK1410) 
2. Loans to depository institutions and acceptances of other banks (BHDM1288) 
3. Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers (BHCK1590) 
4. Commercial and industrial loans (BHDM1766) 
5. Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures (BHDM1975) 
6. Loans to foreign governments and official institutions (BHCK2081) 
7. Loans for purchasing and carrying securities (BHCK1545) 
8. All other loans (BHCK1564) 
9. Lease financing receivables (BHDM2165) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
( IV ) Security diversification (DIV S ): 
1. U.S. Treasury securities (BHCK0211 + BHCK1287) 
2. U.S. government agency obligations (BHCK1289 + BHCK1294 + BHCK1293 + BHCK1298) 
3. Securities issued by states and political subdivisions in the U.S. (BHCK8496 + BHCK8499) 
4. Mortgage-backed securities (BHCK1698 + BHCK1703 + BHCK1709 + BHCK1714 + BHCK1718 + 
BHCK1733 + BHCK1702 + BHCK1707 + BHCK1713 + BHCK1717 + BHCK1732 + BHCK1736) 
5. Asset-backed securities (BHCKC026 + BHCKC027) 
6. Other debt securities (BHCK1737 + BHCK1742 + BHCK1741 + BHCK1746) 
7. Investments in mutual funds and other equity securities with readily determinable fair values 
(BHCKA511) 
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Table 1   (Continued) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
( V ) Non-interest income diversification (DIV NII ): 
1. Income from fiduciary activities (BHCK4070) 
2. Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices (BHCK4483) 
3. Trading revenue (BHCKA220) 
4. Fees and commissions from securities brokerage (BHCKC886) 
5. Investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions (BHCKC888) 
6. Fees and commissions from annuity sales (BHCKC887) 
7. Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities (BHCKC386) 
8. Income from other insurance activities (BHCKC387) 
9. Venture capital revenue (BHCKB491) 
10. Net servicing fees (BHCKB492) 
11. Net securitization income (BHCKB493) 
12. Other noninterest income (BHCKB497) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
( VI ) Off-balance-sheet diversification (DIV OBS ): 
1. Unused commitments (BHCK3814 + BHCK3815 + BHCK3816 + BHCK6550 + BHCK3817 + 
BHCK3818) 
2. Financial standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees (BHCK6566) 
3. Performance standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees (BHCK6570) 
4. Commercial and similar letters of credit (BHCK3411) 
5. Securities lent (BHCK3433) 
6. Credit derivatives (guarantor) (BHCKC968 + BHCKC970 + BHCKC927 + BHCKC974) 
7. Credit derivatives (beneficiary) (BHCKC969 + BHCKC971 + BHCKC973 + BHCKC975) 
8. Spot foreign exchange contracts (BHCK8765) 
9. All other off-balance-sheet items (exclude derivatives) (BHCK3430) 
10. Future contracts (BHCK8693 + BHCK8694 + BHCK8695 + BHCK8696) 
11. Forward contracts (BHCK8697 + BHCK8698 + BHCK8699 + BHCK8700) 
12. Written exchange-traded options (BHCK8701 + BHCK8702 + BHCK8703 + BHCK8704) 
13. Purchased exchange-traded options (BHCK8705 + BHCK8706 + BHCK8707 + BHCK8708) 
14. Written over-the-counter options (BHCK8709 + BHCK8710 + BHCK8711 + BHCK8712) 
15. Purchased over-the-counter options (BHCK8713 + BHCK8714 + BHCK8715 + BHCK8716) 
16. Swaps (BHCK3450 + BHCK3826 + BHCK8719 + BHCK8720) 
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(2) Domestic geographic diversification index (DIV DG ): 
DIV DG  = 1-∑
∑j
j
j
j 2)
Deposit
Deposit(        j = 1, 2,….                            
Deposit j  is deposit in the j th  state of the U.S. and ∑
j
jDeposit  is the sum of 
deposits over all of the states. 
FDIC reports only annual deposit data before 2002 and, thus, annual domestic 
geographic diversification indices are calculated during this period. Therefore, linear 
interpolation method is used to calculate quarterly domestic geographic 
diversification indices between 1998 Q4 and 2001 Q4. 
(3) Loan diversification index (DIV L ): 
DIV L  = 1-∑
∑j
2
j
j
j )
Loan
Loan(           j = 1, 2,….                           
Loan j  is the exposure of loan category j and ∑
j
jLoan  is the total exposure of 
loans which is the sum of loans to different economic sectors such as commercial 
and industrial, real estate, agriculture, financial institutions, individuals, and others. 
(4) Security diversification index (DIV S ): 
DIV S  = 1-∑
∑j
2
j
j
j )
Security
Security(            j = 1, 2,….                        
Security j  is the exposure of security category j and ∑
j
jSecurity  is the total 
exposure of securities which is the sum of securities traded such as U.S. treasury 
  
 
28 
securities, mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and other 
investments. 
(5) Non-interest-income diversification index (DIV NII ): 
DIV NII  = 1-∑
∑j
2
j
j
j )
Income
Income(            j = 1, 2,…..                         
Income j  is the exposure of non-interest-income activity category j and ∑
j
jIncome  
is the total exposure of non-interest-income activities which is the sum of 
non-interest incomes such as fiduciary income, service charges, trading revenue, 
foreign exchange transaction income, and other non-interest income. 
(6) Off-balance-sheet diversification index (DIV OBS ): 
DIV OBS  = 1-∑
∑j
2
j
j
j )
Off
Off(            j = 1, 2,…..                            
Off j  is the exposure of off-balance sheet activity category j and ∑
j
jOff  is the 
total exposure of off-balance sheet activities which is the sum of notional amounts 
of off-balance-sheet activities such as unused commitments, financial standby letters 
of credit and foreign office guarantees, credit derivatives, future contracts, forward 
contracts, options, swap contracts and other off-balance-sheet activities.  
2. Scale Variables 
Scale variables include cross-border loan exposure ratio S1 (Total cross-border loan 
exposure / Total asset), Deposit ratio S2 (Total domestic deposit / Total asset), Loan ratio 
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S3 (Total loan exposure / Total asset), Security ratio S4 (Total security exposure / Total 
asset), Non-interest-income ratio S5 (Total non-interest income / Total asset), and 
Off-balance-sheet ratio S6 (Total off-balance-sheet exposure / Total asset). These ratios 
are used to control for the size effects of activities. 
3. Scale interaction of diversification 
The scale interactions of diversification are defined as the product of specified 
diversification index and the exposure ratio of its underlying activity. They are DIV IG * 
S1, DIV DG * S2, DIV L * S3, DIV S * S4, DIV NII * S5 and DIV OBS * S6. 
4. Activity interaction 
The measures of interaction of diversifications are defined as the product of the 
specified diversification indices. For example, the measure of interaction between 
international geographic and loan diversifications (DIV L IG, )is calculated as follows: 
DIV L IG,  = DIV IG  *  DIV L                                            
5. Control variables 
C 1 : Log of total asset 
C 2 : Equity to assets ratio 
C 3 : Quarterly growth of asset 
C 4 : Dummy variable with value 1 if the BHC engages in M&A in that quarter, 
otherwise 0. 
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C 4 * C 3 : Interaction of merger and asset growth 
Y99 – Y08: Dummy variables for each year during the observing period of 1998 - 
2008 
6. Measures of BHC performance 
To sufficiently get insight into the effects of diversifications, both accounting and 
market performances are measured as dependent variables in this study. They 
contain accounting returns, market returns, credit risk, market risk and default risk. 
(1) Accounting returns: 
Several measures of accounting returns are calculated as BHC performance 
variables, including return on asset (ROA), risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA), 
return on equity (ROE) and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). The 
definitions of RAROA and RAROE are 
RAROA
 ti,  =
 ti,ROA
 ti,ROA
σ
        
RAROE
 ti,  =
 ti,ROE
 ti,ROE
σ
                                                                                      
The rolling standard deviations of ROA and ROE for BHC i at time t (
 ti,ROAσ  and 
 ti,ROE
σ ) are calculated by using three-year quarterly ROAs and ROEs before time t. 
(2) Market returns: 
Market returns are measured as BHC performance including stock return 
with dividends (SR) and risk-adjusted stock return with dividends (RASR). 
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RASR
 ti,  =
 ti,SR
 ti,SR
σ
                                                    
 ti,SRσ is a rolling standard deviation of SR calculated by using three-year quarterly 
SRs before time t. 
(3) Credit risk: 
Credit risk arises from the fact that counterparties may be unwilling or 
unable to fulfill their contractual obligations. It is measured by the cost of 
replacing cash flows if the other party defaults. Net charge-offs are calculated to 
measure credit risk of BHCs. Net charge-off is defined as the absolute value of 
difference between total charge-off and total recovery (FR Y-9C: BHCK4635, 
BHCK4605, respectively). Net charge-off ratio (Net charge-off / Total asset) is 
used as one of the BHC performance variables in the regression model. 
(4) Market risk 
Market risk arises from movements in the level or volatility of market prices. 
It is the danger of changing market values of bank assets, liabilities and equity that 
may bring about loss. Several measures of market risk are calculated, including 
maturity gap, derivatives loss, market beta, interest rate beta and VaR.  
Shifting interest rates may adversely affect a BHC’s net income. Maturity 
gap is used to measure such interest rate risk and defined as the difference 
between earning assets that are repriceable within one year or mature within one 
year and the sum of interest-bearing deposit liabilities that reprice within one 
year or mature within one year and long-term debt that reprices within one year 
(FR Y-9C: BHCK3197 – BHCK3296 – BHCK3298). Maturity gap ratio 
(Maturity gap / Total asset) is used as one of the BHC performance variables in 
the regression model. 
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Derivatives are instruments designed to manage financial risks. Its value is 
derived from some underlying asset price, reference rate, or index. Therefore, 
derivatives loss can be used as a measure of market risk. Derivatives losses are 
obtained from FR Y-9C (BHCKA251). Derivatives loss ratio (Derivatives loss / 
Total asset) is used as one of the BHC performance variables in the regression 
model. 
Market beta and interest rate beta are measures of exposure to market price 
and interest rate movements, respectively. They both are usually used as 
measures of market risk. Rolling market beta and interest rate beta are used as 
ones of the BHC performance variables in the regression model and estimated 
from the following market model by using daily BHCs stock returns without 
dividends, S&P500 index returns without dividends and 10-year treasury rates 
over three-year period before current time. 
SR
 ti,  = α  + i m,β  R   tm,  + i r,β  R   tr,  + tε    
SR
 ti,  is stock return without dividend for BHC i at time t. R   tm,  is S&P500 
index return without dividend. R
  tr,  is 10-year Treasury rate. The coefficients 
i m,
∧β
 and i r,
∧β
 are the estimated market beta and interest rate beta for BHC i, 
respectively. 
Value at risk (VaR) measures an aggregate view of a portfolio’s risk. It 
summarizes the worst loss over a target horizon with a given level of confidence. 
VaR has being used to control and manage BHCs’ market risk. The VaR which is 
obtained from BHCs’ annual reports are average annual data. Therefore, the VaR 
is treated as the value at the center of each year. Quarterly VaRs are calculated 
by linear interpolation method between consecutive annual VaRs. The final 
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available quarterly VaR data for the regression model are from 1998 Q4 to 2008 
Q2. VaR ratio (VaR / Total asset) is used as one of the BHC performance 
variables in the regression model. 
(5) Default risk 
Distance to default (Z-score) is used as one of the BHC performance 
variables in the regression model. Following Stir and Rumble (2006), z-score 
measures the number of standard deviation that profits must fall to drive the 
BHC into insolvency. The larger the Z-score, the less default risky for BHCs. 
The Z score for BHC i at time t is defined as follows: 
Z
 ti,  = 
 ti,ROA
 ti, ti, E/A  ROA
σ
+
                                          
ROA
 ti,  is return on asset. E/A  ti,  is equity to total asset ratio. 
 ti,ROA
σ  is rolling 
standard deviations of ROA. 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 – 7 present summary statistics of performance and diversification measures 
for sub-groups and all sample BHCs across the whole observing period (1998 Q4 – 2008 
Q4).  
1. Accounting returns: 
(1) ROA and RAROA - For small BHCs, the mean return on asset (ROA) is 
0.0027, with standard deviation of 0.0021 and mean risk-adjusted return on 
asset (RAROA) of 6.4105. For larger community BHCs, the mean ROA is 
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0.0029, with standard deviation of 0.0047 and mean RAROA of 7.5221. For 
regional BHCs, the mean ROA is 0.0025, with standard deviation of 0.0031 
and mean RAROA of 6.8614. For money center BHCs, the mean ROA is 
0.0032, with standard deviation of 0.0017 and mean RAROA of 7.4152. For 
international BHCs, the mean ROA is 0.0028, with standard deviation of 
0.0016 and mean RAROA of 5.0667. For all BHCs, the mean ROA is 0.0028, 
with standard deviation of 0.0037 and mean RAROA of 7.0422.  
Money center BHCs have the best performance with the largest mean ROA, 
small standard deviation on ROA and high RAROA. Regional BHCs have the 
worst performance on ROA and international BHCs have the worst 
performance on RAROA. 
(2) ROE and RAROE - For small BHCs, the mean return on equity (ROE) is 
0.0292, with standard deviation of 0.0323 and mean risk-adjusted return on 
equity (RAROE) of 6.3942. For larger community BHCs, the mean ROE is 
0.0308, with standard deviation of 0.0417 and mean RAROE of 7.4609. For 
regional BHCs, the mean ROE is 0.0305, with standard deviation of 0.0444 
and mean RAROE of 7.2680. For money center BHCs, the mean ROE is 
0.0383, with standard deviation of 0.0211 and mean RAROE of 7.4225. For 
international BHCs, the mean ROE is 0.0376, with standard deviation of 
0.0229 and mean RAROE of 5.1609. For all BHCs, the mean ROE is 0.0303, 
with standard deviation of 0.0378 and mean RAROE of 7.0117.  
Money center BHCs still have the best performance with the largest mean ROE, 
smallest standard deviation on ROE and high RAROE. Small BHCs have the 
worst performance on ROE. International BHCs have the worst performance 
on RAROE. 
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2. Market returns: 
For small BHCs, the mean stock return (SR) is 0.0110, with standard deviation 
of 0.1522 and mean risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) of 0.0849. For larger 
community BHCs, the mean SR is 0.0196, with standard deviation of 0.1552 
and mean RASR of 0.1544. For regional BHCs, the mean SR is 0.0039, with 
standard deviation of 0.1651 and mean RASR of 0.0180. For money center 
BHCs, the mean SR is 0.0166, with standard deviation of 0.1556 and mean 
RASR of 0.1293. For international BHCs, the mean SR is 0.0177, with 
standard deviation of 0.1636 and mean RASR of 0.1170. For all BHCs, the 
mean SR is 0.0159, with standard deviation of 0.1554 and mean RASR of 
0.1235.  
Larger community BHCs have the best performance with the largest mean SR, 
small standard deviation on SR and the highest RASR. Regional BHCs have 
the worst performance on SR and RASR. 
3. Credit risk: 
For small BHCs, the mean net charge-offs (NCO) is 0.0004, with standard 
deviation of 0.0012. For larger community BHCs, the mean NCO is 0.0007, 
with standard deviation of 0.0025. For regional BHCs, the mean NCO is 
0.0009, with standard deviation of 0.0015. For money center BHCs, the mean 
NCO is 0.0010, with standard deviation of 0.0009. For international BHCs, the 
mean NCO is 0.0009, with standard deviation of 0.0008. For all BHCs, the 
mean NCO is 0.0006, with standard deviation of 0.0020. 
Small BHCs have the lowest credit risk with the lowest net charge-offs. Money 
center BHCs have the highest credit risk. The results show that the larger the 
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BHCs, the higher the credit risk. 
4. Market risk: 
(1) Maturity gap (MG) - For small BHCs, the mean MG is 0.1414, with standard 
deviation of 0.1142. For larger community BHCs, the mean MG is 0.1577, 
with standard deviation of 0.1326. For regional BHCs, the mean MG is 0.2380, 
with standard deviation of 0.1090. For money center BHCs, the mean MG is 
0.2101, with standard deviation of 0.0974. For international BHCs, the mean 
MG is 0.1934, with standard deviation of 0.1020. For all BHCs, the mean MG 
is 0.1538, with standard deviation of 0.1253. 
Small BHCs have the lowest interest rate risk with the lowest maturity gap. 
Regional BHCs have the highest interest rate risk. 
(2) Derivatives loss (DL) - Mean derivatives losses are not significantly different 
for all BHC groups. Larger community BHCs report a largest range of DL 
from -0.0085 to 0.0097. The other groups have similarly small standard 
deviations of DL. 
(3) Market beta (MB) - For small BHCs, the mean MB is 0.3892, with standard 
deviation of 0.4661. For larger community BHCs, the mean MB is 0.7663, 
with standard deviation of 0.4751. For regional BHCs, the mean MB is 0.9230, 
with standard deviation of 0.2826. For money center BHCs, the mean MB is 
1.1186, with standard deviation of 0.2512. For international BHCs, the mean 
MB is 1.1504, with standard deviation of 0.2926. For all BHCs, the mean MB 
is 0.7111, with standard deviation of 0.4932. 
The results show that the larger the BHCs, the higher the market risk they 
have. 
(4) Interest rate beta (IRB) - For small BHCs, the mean IRB is -0.0062, with 
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standard deviation of 0.1516. For larger community BHCs, the mean IRB is 
-0.0082, with standard deviation of 0.1543. For regional BHCs, the mean IRB 
is 0.0002, with standard deviation of 0.1271. For money center BHCs, the 
mean IRB is 0.0012, with standard deviation of 0.1166. For international BHCs, 
the mean IRB is -0.0055, with standard deviation of 0.1243. For all BHCs, the 
mean IRB is -0.0063, with standard deviation of 0.1501. 
The results show that money center BHCs have the largest interest rate risk. 
(5) VaR – Only 8 money center BHCs report VaR. The mean VaR is 0.0001. 
5. Default risk: 
For small BHCs, the mean Z-score is 215.1264, with standard deviation of 
161.1679. For larger community BHCs, the mean Z-score is 234.6115, with 
standard deviation of 174.4938. For regional BHCs, the mean Z-score is 
189.2316, with standard deviation of 170.6882. For money center BHCs, the 
mean Z-score is 186.0960, with standard deviation of 178.5651. For 
international BHCs, the mean Z-score is 126.9590, with standard deviation of 
79.0468. For all BHCs, the mean Z-score is 224.4855, with standard deviation 
of 169.5014. 
The results show that larger community BHCs have the lowest default risk, 
while international BHCs and money center BHCs have the highest default 
risk. 
6. Diversifications: 
(1) International geographic diversification (DIV IG ) – International BHCs have 
mean DIV IG  of 0.6410 and a range of DIV IG  from 0 to 0.9136. 
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(2) Domestic geographic diversification (DIV DG ) - For small BHCs, the mean 
DIV DG  is 0.0198, with standard deviation of 0.0930. For larger community 
BHCs, the mean DIV DG  is 0.0703, with standard deviation of 0.1597. For 
regional BHCs, the mean DIV DG  is 0.2519, with standard deviation of 0.2897. 
For money center BHCs, the mean DIV DG  is 0.1937, with standard deviation 
of 0.2364. For international BHCs, the mean DIV DG  is 0.1647, with standard 
deviation of 0.1995. For all BHCs, the mean DIV DG  is 0.0559, with standard 
deviation of 0.1494. 
Regional BHCs have the largest level of domestic geographic diversification, 
while small BHCs have the smallest one. 
(3) Loan diversification (DIV L ) - For small BHCs, the mean DIV L  is 0.4202, 
with standard deviation of 0.1470. For larger community BHCs, the mean 
DIV L  is 0.4456, with standard deviation of 0.1428. For regional BHCs, the 
mean DIV L  is 0.4748, with standard deviation of 0.2074. For money center 
BHCs, the mean DIV L  is 0.5755, with standard deviation of 0.1281. For 
international BHCs, the mean DIV L  is 0.5466, with standard deviation of 
0.1408. For all BHCs, the mean DIV L  is 0.4383, with standard deviation of 
0.1480. 
The results show that the larger the BHCs, the higher level of loan 
diversification they have.  
(4) Security diversification (DIV S ) - For small BHCs, the mean DIV S  is 0.4139, 
with standard deviation of 0.2626. For larger community BHCs, the mean 
DIV S  is 0.4585, with standard deviation of 0.2243. For regional BHCs, the 
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mean DIV S  is 0.3482, with standard deviation of 0.2132. For money center 
BHCs, the mean DIV S  is 0.4710, with standard deviation of 0.1662. For 
international BHCs, the mean DIV S  is 0.4179, with standard deviation of 
0.2264. For all BHCs, the mean DIV S  is 0.4377, with standard deviation of 
0.2412. 
Money center BHCs have the largest level of security diversification, while 
regional BHCs have the smallest one.  
(5) Non-interest-income diversification (DIV NII ) - For small BHCs, the mean 
DIV NII  is 0.4656, with standard deviation of 0.2090. For larger community 
BHCs, the mean DIV NII  is 0.4937, with standard deviation of 0.2019. For 
regional BHCs, the mean DIV NII  is 0.5727, with standard deviation of 0.1831. 
For money center BHCs, the mean DIV NII  is 0.6550, with standard deviation 
of 0.1616. For international BHCs, the mean DIV NII  is 0.6397, with standard 
deviation of 0.1678. For all BHCs, the mean DIV NII  is 0.4871, with standard 
deviation of 0.2061. 
The results show that the larger the BHCs, the higher level of 
non-interest-income diversification they have. 
Off-balance-sheet diversification (DIV OBS ) - For small BHCs, the mean 
DIV OBS  is 0.1350, with standard deviation of 0.1533. For larger community 
BHCs, the mean DIV OBS  is 0.1838, with standard deviation of 0.1839. For 
regional BHCs, the mean DIV OBS  is 0.5347, with standard deviation of  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Small BHCs and Total Period (1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4) 
      
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Accounting returns      
ROA 0.0027 0.0028 0.0492 -0.0348 0.0021 
Risk-adjusted ROA 6.4105 5.4069 54.5359 -3.2872 5.1576 
ROE 0.0292 0.0303 0.4029 -1.1121 0.0323 
Risk-adjusted ROE 6.3942 5.5470 46.7039 -3.4232 4.9290 
Market returns      
Stock return 0.0110 0.0036 1.0188 -0.7397 0.1522 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.0849 0.0322 3.4473 -3.2170 1.0873 
Credit risk      
Net charge-off ratio 0.0004 0.0002 0.0232 -0.0110 0.0012 
Market risk      
Maturity gap ratio 0.1414 0.1153 0.7873 0.0000 0.1142 
Derivatives loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0011 0.0000 
Market beta 0.3892 0.2293 2.1484 -0.2126 0.4661 
Interest rate beta -0.0062 0.0076 0.8186 -0.6974 0.1561 
Default risk      
Z - score 215.1264 177.5312 1472.5090 -0.2725 161.1679 
Diversifications      
DIV DG  (Domestic geographic) 0.0198 0.0000 0.6770 0.0000 0.0930 
DIV L  (Loan) 0.4202 0.4271 0.7587 0.0229 0.1470 
DIV S  (Security) 0.4139 0.5153 0.7974 0.0000 0.2626 
DIV NII  (Non-interest-income) 0.4656 0.4998 0.8193 0.0000 0.2090 
DIV OBS  (Off-balance-sheet) 0.1350 0.0778 0.7785 0.0000 0.1533 
Control variables      
S2 (Domestic deposit ratio) 0.8126 0.8259 0.9987 0.2540 0.0781 
S3 (Loan ratio) 0.6597 0.6712 0.9590 0.3055 0.1101 
S4 (Security ratio) 0.1863 0.1806 0.6476 0.0000 0.1290 
S5 (Non-interest-income ratio) 0.0023 0.0019 0.0538 0.0001 0.0018 
S6 (Off-balance-sheet ratio) 0.1513 0.1353 1.1761 0.0016 0.0952 
C1 (Log asset) 5.6946 5.7033 6.5645 4.9984 0.1646 
C2 (Equity ratio) 0.0918 0.0902 0.2316 0.0171 0.0238 
C3 (Asset growth) 0.0190 0.0152 0.8488 -0.4752 0.0451 
Accounting results are for 184 BHCs      
Market results are for 30 BHCs       
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Larger Community BHCs and Total Period  
        (1998 Q4 – 2008 Q4) 
      
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Accounting returns      
ROA 0.0029 0.0028 0.2613 -0.0507 0.0047 
Risk-adjusted ROA 7.5221 6.1142 65.2686 -3.3662 6.3231 
ROE 0.0308 0.0325 0.4273 -2.0215 0.0417 
Risk-adjusted ROE 7.4609 6.0716 76.8496 -3.4351 6.1132 
Market returns      
Stock return 0.0196 0.0133 1.2100 -0.8269 0.1552 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.1544 0.1227 3.2640 -3.5516 1.0704 
Credit risk      
Net charge-off ratio 0.0007 0.0003 0.1121 -0.0051 0.0025 
Market risk      
Maturity gap ratio 0.1577 0.1238 0.8525 0.0000 0.1326 
Derivatives loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 -0.0085 0.0002 
Market beta 0.7663 0.6595 2.2597 -0.1786 0.4751 
Interest rate beta -0.0082 0.0082 0.6720 -0.8749 0.1543 
Default risk      
Z - score 234.6115 196.1783 1591.9660 -1.6871 174.4938 
Diversifications      
DIV DG  (Domestic geographic) 0.0703 0.0000 0.8284 0.0000 0.1597 
DIV L  (Loan) 0.4456 0.4573 0.7495 0.0000 0.1428 
DIV S  (Security) 0.4585 0.5251 0.8171 0.0000 0.2243 
DIV NII  (Non-interest-income) 0.4937 0.5336 0.8706 0.0000 0.2019 
DIV OBS  (Off-balance-sheet) 0.1838 0.1219 0.8313 0.0000 0.1839 
Control variables      
S2 (Domestic deposit ratio) 0.7753 0.7951 0.9970 0.0272 0.1085 
S3 (Loan ratio) 0.6707 0.6834 0.9593 0.1520 0.1156 
S4 (Security ratio) 0.1902 0.1823 0.6517 0.0000 0.1191 
S5 (Non-interest-income ratio) 0.0035 0.0023 0.3607 0.0000 0.0089 
S6 (Off-balance-sheet ratio) 0.2230 0.1812 18.1125 0.0022 0.2839 
C1 (Log asset) 6.2363 6.1635 7.3838 5.2880 0.3811 
C2 (Equity ratio) 0.0912 0.0872 0.6114 0.0214 0.0344 
C3 (Asset growth) 0.0290 0.0188 1.1681 -0.7814 0.0658 
Accounting results are for 239 BHCs      
Market results are for 70 BHCs      
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Regional BHCs and Total Period (1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4) 
      
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Accounting returns      
ROA 0.0025 0.0030 0.0060 -0.0320 0.0031 
Risk-adjusted ROA 6.8614 5.3271 35.8644 -3.2487 6.6266 
ROE 0.0305 0.0377 0.0965 -0.6135 0.0444 
Risk-adjusted ROE 7.2680 5.1846 48.1197 -3.3477 8.1229 
Market returns      
Stock return 0.0039 0.0119 0.8033 -0.7366 0.1651 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.0180 0.0756 2.8414 -3.1274 1.1355 
Credit risk      
Net charge-off ratio 0.0009 0.0006 0.0161 -0.0001 0.0015 
Market risk      
Maturity gap ratio 0.2380 0.2428 0.6132 0.0013 0.1090 
Derivatives loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Market beta 0.9230 0.8879 2.2482 0.4248 0.2826 
Interest rate beta 0.0002 0.0104 0.3890 -0.4529 0.1271 
Default risk      
Z - score 189.2316 129.1392 990.7549 2.0469 170.6882 
Diversifications      
DIV DG  (Domestic geographic) 0.2519 0.0080 0.8009 0.0000 0.2897 
DIV L  (Loan) 0.4748 0.5320 0.7546 0.0004 0.2074 
DIV S  (Security) 0.3482 0.2927 0.7865 0.0403 0.2132 
DIV NII  (Non-interest-income) 0.5727 0.6160 0.8568 0.0000 0.1831 
DIV OBS  (Off-balance-sheet) 0.5347 0.6159 0.8090 0.0000 0.2221 
Control variables      
S2 (Domestic deposit ratio) 0.5946 0.6158 0.9969 0.2159 0.1276 
S3 (Loan ratio) 0.6763 0.6971 0.8796 0.3454 0.1109 
S4 (Security ratio) 0.1572 0.1345 0.4574 0.0455 0.0816 
S5 (Non-interest-income ratio) 0.0045 0.0035 0.0282 0.0001 0.0037 
S6 (Off-balance-sheet ratio) 1.0321 0.7093 6.0774 0.0185 1.0745 
C1 (Log asset) 7.5464 7.5579 8.0783 6.2423 0.3169 
C2 (Equity ratio) 0.0843 0.0805 0.1379 0.0521 0.0171 
C3 (Asset growth) 0.0304 0.0175 1.1821 -0.1477 0.1019 
Accounting results are for 10 BHCs      
Market results are for 10 BHCs      
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Money Center BHCs and Total Period (1998 Q4 – 2008 
        Q4) 
      
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Accounting returns      
ROA 0.0032 0.0035 0.0151 -0.0089 0.0017 
Risk-adjusted ROA 7.4152 4.8824 55.7339 -2.3097 7.5401 
ROE 0.0383 0.0423 0.1379 -0.1219 0.0211 
Risk-adjusted ROE 7.4225 4.7307 64.5508 -2.1600 10.1283 
Market returns      
Stock return 0.0166 0.0144 0.6956 -0.6689 0.1556 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.1293 0.1420 3.1074 -2.9280 1.0849 
Credit risk      
Net charge-off ratio 0.0010 0.0009 0.0109 -0.0004 0.0009 
Market risk      
Maturity gap ratio 0.2101 0.2117 0.6335 0.0025 0.0974 
Derivatives loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Market beta 1.1186 1.0912 1.9042 0.6844 0.2512 
Interest rate beta 0.0012 0.0112 0.3810 -0.5019 0.1166 
VaR ratio 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Default risk      
Z - score 186.0960 118.2877 1054.0930 16.6398 178.5651 
Diversifications      
DIV DG  (Domestic geographic) 0.1937 0.0824 0.7953 0.0000 0.2364 
DIV L  (Loan) 0.5755 0.6075 0.7535 0.0493 0.1281 
DIV S  (Security) 0.4710 0.4827 0.7911 0.0637 0.1662 
DIV NII  (Non-interest-income) 0.6550 0.7120 0.8628 0.2202 0.1616 
DIV OBS  (Off-balance-sheet) 0.6529 0.6612 0.8592 0.2010 0.1273 
Control variables      
S2 (Domestic deposit ratio) 0.4605 0.5491 0.6982 0.0899 0.1989 
S3 (Loan ratio) 0.5277 0.6022 0.7911 0.0481 0.2071 
S4 (Security ratio) 0.1564 0.1432 0.6175 0.0300 0.0930 
S5 (Non-interest-income ratio) 0.0059 0.0055 0.0144 0.0010 0.0026 
S6 (Off-balance-sheet ratio) 9.4391 2.3207 63.7491 0.2829 13.1230 
C1 (Log asset) 8.4157 8.2852 9.3726 7.5369 0.4889 
C2 (Equity ratio) 0.0823 0.0833 0.1202 0.0435 0.0158 
C3 (Asset growth) 0.0469 0.0222 1.1043 -0.3839 0.1453 
Accounting results are for 9 BHCs      
Market results are for 9 BHCs      
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for International BHCs and Total Period (1998 Q4 –  
        2008 Q4) 
      
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Accounting returns      
ROA 0.0028 0.0031 0.0056 -0.0089 0.0016 
Risk-adjusted ROA 5.0667 4.2460 23.2171 -2.3097 4.0567 
ROE 0.0376 0.0408 0.0997 -0.1219 0.0229 
Risk-adjusted ROE 5.1609 4.0527 48.1197 -2.1600 6.3583 
Market returns      
Stock return 0.0177 0.0172 0.6599 -0.6689 0.1636 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.1170 0.1435 2.6943 -2.9280 1.0685 
Credit risk      
Net charge-off ratio 0.0009 0.0008 0.0071 -0.0001 0.0008 
Market risk      
Maturity gap ratio 0.1934 0.1881 0.6335 0.0025 0.1020 
Derivatives loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Market beta 1.1504 1.1569 1.9042 0.5938 0.2926 
Interest rate beta -0.0055 -0.0085 0.3810 -0.3449 0.1243 
Default risk      
Z - score 126.9590 103.2607 502.2505 16.6398 79.0468 
Diversifications      
H1 (International geographic) 0.6410 0.7628 0.9136 0.0000 0.2861 
DIV DG  (Domestic geographic) 0.1647 0.0758 0.5708 0.0000 0.1995 
DIV L  (Loan) 0.5466 0.5721 0.7535 0.0493 0.1408 
DIV S  (Security) 0.4179 0.4362 0.7911 0.0403 0.2264 
DIV NII  (Non-interest-income) 0.6397 0.7025 0.8628 0.2202 0.1678 
DIV OBS  (Off-balance-sheet) 0.5739 0.6076 0.8051 0.1582 0.1510 
Control variables      
S1 (Cross-border loan exposure ratio) 2.4263 0.0528 45.2932 0.0000 8.7476 
S2 (Domestic deposit ratio) 0.3981 0.3747 0.7985 0.0899 0.2247 
S3 (Loan ratio) 0.4632 0.4599 0.8596 0.0481 0.2288 
S4 (Security ratio) 0.1644 0.1277 0.6175 0.0300 0.1180 
S5 (Non-interest-income ratio) 0.0056 0.0050 0.0144 0.0010 0.0029 
S6 (Off-balance-sheet ratio) 13.2779 9.3343 63.7491 0.2515 14.6332 
C1 (Log asset) 8.2879 8.5050 9.3726 6.9721 0.7851 
C2 (Equity ratio) 0.0757 0.0752 0.1235 0.0435 0.0152 
C3 (Asset growth) 0.0344 0.0183 0.9569 -0.3839 0.1263 
VaR is for 4 BHCs      
The others are for 6 BHCs      
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for All BHCs and Total Period (1998 Q4 –  
        2008 Q4) 
      
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Accounting returns      
ROA 0.0028 0.0028 0.2613 -0.0507 0.0037 
Risk-adjusted ROA 7.0422 5.7513 65.2686 -3.3662 5.9271 
ROE 0.0303 0.0318 0.4273 -2.0215 0.0378 
Risk-adjusted ROE 7.0117 5.7926 76.8496 -3.4351 5.8451 
Market returns      
Stock return 0.0159 0.0108 1.2100 -0.8269 0.1554 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0.1235 0.1020 3.4473 -3.5516 1.0819 
Credit risk      
Net charge-off ratio 0.0006 0.0002 0.1121 -0.0110 0.0020 
Market risk      
Maturity gap ratio 0.1538 0.1248 0.8525 0.0000 0.1253 
Derivatives loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 -0.0085 0.0002 
Market beta 0.7111 0.6365 2.2597 -0.2126 0.4932 
Interest rate beta -0.0063 0.0087 0.8186 -0.8749 0.1501 
Default risk      
Z - score 224.4855 184.1123 1591.9660 -1.6871 169.5014 
Diversifications      
DIV DG  (Domestic geographic) 0.0559 0.0000 0.8284 0.0000 0.1494 
DIV L  (Loan) 0.4383 0.4485 0.7587 0.0000 0.1480 
DIV S  (Security) 0.4377 0.5187 0.8171 0.0000 0.2412 
DIV NII  (Non-interest-income) 0.4871 0.5223 0.8706 0.0000 0.2061 
DIV OBS  (Off-balance-sheet) 0.1810 0.1070 0.8592 0.0000 0.1943 
Control variables      
S2 (Domestic deposit ratio) 0.7803 0.8043 0.9987 0.0272 0.1157 
S3 (Loan ratio) 0.6634 0.6780 0.9593 0.0481 0.1176 
S4 (Security ratio) 0.1871 0.1790 0.6517 0.0000 0.1224 
S5 (Non-interest-income ratio) 0.0031 0.0022 0.3607 0.0000 0.0068 
S6 (Off-balance-sheet ratio) 0.3991 0.1638 63.7491 0.0016 2.2992 
C1 (Log asset) 6.0848 5.9215 9.3726 4.9984 0.5759 
C2 (Equity ratio) 0.0911 0.0882 0.6114 0.0171 0.0298 
C3 (Asset growth) 0.0252 0.0173 1.1821 -0.7814 0.0623 
Accounting results are for 442 BHCs      
Market results are for 119 BHCs      
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0.2221. For money center BHCs, the mean DIV OBS  is 0.6529, with standard 
deviation of 0.1273. For international BHCs, the mean DIV OBS  is 0.5739, with 
standard deviation of 0.1510. For all BHCs, the mean DIV OBS  is 0.1810, with 
standard deviation of 0.1943. The results show that the larger the BHCs, the 
higher level of off-balance-sheet diversification they have. 
Table 8 summarizes the mean values in order of magnitude. Smaller BHCs seem to 
perform worse on returns but have lower risk on returns, while larger BHCs have larger 
returns but higher risk on returns. Larger community BHCs perform the best on both 
risk-adjusted accounting returns and market returns while money center BHCs perform 
the second best. Therefore, the results show that it is beneficial for small BHCs expand to 
larger community BHCs and for regional BHCs expand to money center BHCs. However, 
larger BHCs have higher credit risk, market risk and default risk.  
Table 9 and 10 present correlation coefficients among variables which are 
incorporated in the panel regression. The larger correlation coefficients for dependent 
variables are -0.63 between loan ratio and security ratio, 0.59 between international 
geographic diversification and security diversification, 0.56 between international 
geographic diversification and log asset, and -0.54 between domestic geographic 
diversification and log asset. Table 11 reports multicollinearity tests for dependent 
variables. The variance inflation factors (VIF) show that there is no perfect 
multicollinearity among dependent variables in the regression. 
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Table 8: Order of Mean Values for BHC Groups   
      
    Small BHCs 
Larger 
community 
BHCs 
Regional 
BHCs 
Money center 
BHCs 
Accounting returns      
Risk on asset ROA 2 3 1 4 
risk-adjusted return on asset RAROA 1 4 2 3 
return on equity ROE 1 3 2 4 
risk-adjusted return on equity RAROE 1 4 2 3 
Market returns      
Stock return SR 2 4 1 3 
Risk-adjusted stock return RASR 2 4 1 3 
Credit risk      
Net charge-offs NCO 4 3 2 1 
Market risk      
Maturity gap MG 4 3 1 2 
Derivatives loss DL 1 1 1 1 
Market beta MB 4 3 2 1 
Interest rate beta IRB 3 4 2 1 
Default risk      
Distance to default Z-score 3 4 2 1 
Diversifications      
Domestic geographic Div. DIV DG   1 2 4 3 
Loan Div. DIV L  1 2 3 4 
Security Div. DIV S  2 3 1 4 
Non-interest-income Div. DIV NII  1 2 3 4 
Off-balance-sheet Div. DIV OBS  1 2 3 4 
      
For performances 
   1 indicates the worst  - -  4 indicates the best 
For diversifications 
   1 indicates the smallest  - -  4 indicates the largest 
   
 
 
 
 
 
IG
  
 
48 
Table 9: Correlation Coefficients for Dependent Variables 
         
               
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
ROA RAROA ROE RAROE SR RASR NCO MG DL MB IRB Z VaR 
International Geographic Div. H1 -0.23 -0.26  -0.08 -0.36  0.09 0.11  0.05  -0.36 0.10 0.33 -0.13 -0.24 0.45  
Domestic Geographic Div. H2 -0.02 -0.03  -0.03 -0.03  0.00 0.00  0.01  0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.29  
Loan Div. H3 0.03 0.00  0.04 0.02  0.03 0.04  0.03  0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.22  
Security Div. H4 -0.01 0.02  -0.04 -0.01  0.05 0.05  0.02  -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.21  
Non-interest-income Div. H5 -0.08 0.05  -0.06 0.02  0.00 0.00  -0.02  0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.06  
Off-balance-sheet Div. H6 -0.06 -0.05  -0.04 -0.06  -0.04 -0.04  0.04  0.15 0.03 0.21 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 0.25 0.21  0.24 0.03  0.04 0.08  -0.19  -0.02 -0.05 -0.40 0.13 0.08 0.37  
Domestic Deposit Ratio S2 -0.03 0.02  0.02 0.03  0.03 0.03  -0.06  -0.10 -0.02 -0.32 0.05 0.03 -0.20 
Loan Ratio S3 -0.03 -0.01  -0.03 -0.02  -0.05 -0.06  0.08  0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.20 
Security Ratio S4 0.02 0.05  0.00 0.03  0.08 0.10  -0.05  -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.07 -0.21 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 0.60 -0.07  0.14 -0.07  0.00 0.01  0.53  0.09 0.01 0.24 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 -0.01 -0.04  0.00 -0.05  0.00 -0.01  0.02  0.03 0.01 0.21 0.00 -0.06 0.51  
Log Asset C1 -0.03 0.07  -0.01 0.05  -0.03 -0.03  0.07  0.13 0.02 0.49 -0.04 0.02 0.27  
Equity Ratio C2 0.43 0.04  0.05 0.01  -0.01 -0.01  0.25  0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.14 -0.20 
Asset Growth C3 -0.02 0.00  0.06 0.01  0.03 0.02  -0.03  0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00  
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity     RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity     
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return     NCO: net charge-offs     MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: 
market beta     IRB: interest rate beta     VaR: value at risk     Z: distance to default 
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Table 10: Correlation Coefficients for Independent Variables            
 
                
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 C1 C2 C3 
International Geographic Div. H1 1.00               
Domestic Geographic Div. H2 0.09 1.00              
Loan Div. H3 0.15 0.10 1.00             
Security Div. H4 0.59 0.08 -0.08 1.00            
Non-interest-income Div. H5 -0.09 0.05 0.02 0.53 1.00           
Off-balance-sheet Div. H6 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.30 1.00           
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 -0.08 -0.22 -0.10 -0.20 0.08 -0.61 1.00          
Domestic Deposit Ratio S2 -0.72 -0.15 -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.40 0.34  1.00         
Loan Ratio S3 -0.63 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.16  0.26  1.00        
Security Ratio S4 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.46 0.32 0.11  0.29  -0.16 -0.63 1.00       
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.09  -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 0.07  1.00      
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 0.52 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.23  -0.21 -0.36 -0.18 -0.05 0.04  1.00     
Log Asset C1 0.56 0.35 0.13 0.16 0.32 0.55  -0.43 -0.54 -0.09 0.10  0.09  0.44  1.00    
Equity Ratio C2 -0.38 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.08  0.41  -0.06 -0.06 1.00   
Asset Growth C3 0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.00  -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.03  0.06  -0.07 1.00  
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Table 11: Multicollinearity Tests    
        
  Variable 
Abbreviation 
R-Squared VIF 
International Geographic Div. H1 0.75  3.98  
Domestic Geographic Div. H2 0.15  1.18  
Loan Div. H3 0.06  1.07  
Security Div. H4 0.48  1.91  
Non-interest-income Div. H5 0.43  1.76  
Off-balance-sheet Div. H6 0.35  1.55  
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 0.53  2.14  
Domestic Deposit Ratio S2 0.38  1.62  
Loan Ratio S3 0.64  2.80  
Security Ratio S4 0.70  3.33  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 0.21  1.27  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 0.31  1.46  
Log Asset C1 0.55  2.24  
Equity Ratio C2 0.20  1.26  
Asset Growth C3 0.02  1.02  
    
VIF: Variance inflation factor    
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The effects of diversifications are estimated for several BHC groups and sub-periods 
(the whole observing period, before the crisis and during the crisis). Performances are 
examined in terms of accounting returns, market returns, credit risk, market risk and 
default risk. 
6.1 Individual Diversification and Interaction Effect Analysis 
1. SMALL BHCs 
1.1 Accounting returns 
(a) Return on asset (ROA) – Appendix 1 reports the statistical results 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. The impact of security 
diversification is negative while the impact of non-interest-income diversification is 
positive. The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -0.0010. However, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0053. Therefore, greater security 
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diversification could still improve ROA with positive net impact of –0.0010 + 0.0053 * 
S4 if S4 is greater than 0.1887. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 0.0025. However the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -1.1756. Therefore, 
greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce ROA with negative net 
impact of 0.0025 – 1.1756 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0022. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the scale of 
non-interest-income ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to 
negative. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Loan diversification (H3) has no impact on ROA before the financial crisis 2007 – 
2008 but it has significant positive impact (0.0113) during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively 
related to ROA with the coefficient of -0.0132 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan 
diversification could still reduce ROA with negative net impact of 0.0113 – 0.0132 * S3 
if S3 is greater than 0.8561. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan 
diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large 
enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly negative (-0.0007) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0024 before the crisis. Therefore, 
greater security diversification could still improve ROA with positive net impact 
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of –0.0007 + 0.0024 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.2917. The results show that the sign of 
the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio before the 
crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(0.0028) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -1.3594 before the 
crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce ROA with 
negative net impact of 0.0028 – 1.3594 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0021. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from positive to negative. 
For interaction effects of diversifications, none of them are significant before the 
crisis. However, during the crisis the coefficient on all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is significantly positive (0.2547). 
(b) Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) - Appendix 2 reports the statistical results 
Total period: 
Only security diversification (H4) has significant impact on RAROA. The impact is 
negative with the coefficient of -1.5584.  
Sub-period analysis: 
Before the crisis, none of diversifications and interactions is significant. During the 
crisis, the coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(3.3148). However, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and negatively related to RAROA with 
the coefficient of -648.5177 during the crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income 
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diversification could still reduce ROA with negative net impact of 3.3148 – 648.5177 * 
S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0052. The results show that the sign of the impact of 
non-interest-income diversification depends on the scale of non-interest-income ratio 
during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
(c) Return on equity (ROE) - Appendix 3 reports the statistical results 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on ROE. The impact of security 
diversification is negative while the impact of non-interest-income diversification is 
positive. The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -0.0157. However, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.0787. Therefore, greater security 
diversification could still improve ROE with positive net impact of –0.0157 + 0.0787 * 
S4 if S4 is greater than 0.1995. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 0.0232. However the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to ROE with the coefficient of -10.7006. Therefore, 
greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce ROE with negative net 
impact of 0.0232 – 10.7006 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0022. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the scale of 
non-interest-income ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to 
negative. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Loan diversification (H3) has no impact on ROE before the crisis but it has significant 
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positive impact (0.1641) during the crisis. However the interaction of loan diversification 
and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to ROE with the coefficient 
of -0.1882 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce ROE 
with negative net impact of 0.1641 – 0.1882 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.8720. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio 
during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
Although the impacts of non-interest-income diversification (H5) before and during 
the crisis are both positively significant with the coefficients of 0.0260 and 0.0288, 
respectively, the coefficient on the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly negative (-12.2575) before the crisis 
but it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income 
diversification could still reduce ROE with negative net impact of 0.0260 – 12.2575 * S5 
if S5 is greater than 0.0022. The results show that the sign of the impact of 
non-interest-income diversification depends on the scale of non-interest-income ratio 
before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
 (d) Risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE) - Appendix 4 reports the statistical 
results 
Total period: 
Only security diversification (H4) has significant impact on RAROE. The impact is 
negative with the coefficient of -1.4671. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly negative 
(-14.2084) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The 
coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is insignificant before the crisis 
but it becomes positively significant (3.2811) during the crisis. In addition, during the 
  
 
56 
crisis the coefficient on the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and largely negative (-689.7074). 
Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification during the crisis could still reduce 
RAROE with negative net impact of 3.2811 – 689.7074 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0048. 
The results show that during the crisis the sign of the impact of non-interest-income 
diversification depends on the scale of non-interest-income ratio. If the ratio is large 
enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
Summary for accounting returns - Table 12 reports the summary of significant 
effects of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 13 reports the summary 
of significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
1.2 Market returns  
(a) Stock return (SR) –Appendix 5 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only non-interest-income diversification (H5) has significant impact on SR. The 
impact is negative with the coefficient of -0.0642. However the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is 
significantly and positively related to SR with the coefficient of 40.2470. Therefore, 
greater non-interest-income diversification could still improve SR with positive net 
impact of -0.0642 + 40.2470 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0016. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the scale of 
non-interest-income ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to 
positive. 
Although individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact 
on SR, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -0.4783.  
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Table 12: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs 
 
         for Total Period 
    
            
                Accounting Returns  
  Variable Abbreviation ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. 
(DGD) 
H2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
    
Security Div. (SD) H4 - - - - 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 +  +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. 
(DGD) 
H2*S2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +  +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -  -  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
    
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
    
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
 
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity  
 
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity      
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Table 13: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs    
         for Sub-periods         
                    
 
               Accounting Returns     
            Before The Crisis            During The Crisis 
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
ROA RAROA ROE RAROE ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   -      
Loan Div. (LD) H3     +  +  
Security Div. (SD) H4 -         
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 +  +    + + + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6                 
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
         
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -  -  -  -  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +         
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -  -  - -  - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6                 
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 
         
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
         
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
         
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         +   +   
 
    
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity      
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity            
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Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still reduces SR. 
Sub-period analysis: 
There are no differences on the effects of diversifications between the before- and 
during-the-crisis periods. 
 (b) Risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) –Appendix 6 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on RASR. The impact of 
security diversification is positive while the impact of non-interest-income diversification 
is negative. The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is 0.5725. The coefficient on 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) is -0.5936. However, the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is 
significantly and positively related to RASR with the coefficient of 182.2321. Therefore, 
greater non-interest-income diversification could still improve ROA with positive net 
impact of –0.5936 + 182.2321 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0033. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the 
ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Although domestic geographic diversification (H2) and loan diversification (H3) 
individually have no significant impact on RASR, the interaction of them (H2*H3) has 
significant negative impact on RASR with the coefficient of -8.8037.  
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly positive (0.7162) and 
the coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly negative 
(-0.3902) before the crisis. During the crisis, both of them become insignificant. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant 
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during the crisis. In addition, the negative impact (-1.5439) of the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) before the crisis becomes insignificant during 
the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly negative (-9.4214) before the crisis while it becomes 
insignificant during the crisis. However, the coefficient on the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is insignificant before the crisis but it becomes 
negatively significant (-163.8264) during the crisis.  
Summary for market returns - Table 14 reports the summary of significant effects 
of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 15 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
1.3 Credit risk 
Net charge-offs (NCO) –Appendix 7 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on NCO. The impact of 
non-interest-income diversification is negative while the impact of off-balance-sheet 
diversification is positive. The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H4) is 
-0.0005. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification is 0.0015. However the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and negatively related to NCO with the coefficient of -0.0023. Therefore, 
greater off-balance-sheet diversification could still reduce NCO with negative net impact 
of 0.0015 – 0.0023 * S6 if S6 is greater than 0.6522. The results show that the sign of the 
impact of off-balance-sheet diversification depends on the scale of off-balance-sheet ratio. 
If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
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Table 14: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs 
         for Total Period   
        
          Market Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR 
Activity diversification    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 - - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 + + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 -   
Activity interaction    
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 - 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return     
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Table 15: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs  
         for Sub-periods      
            
 
 
   Market Returns 
 
      Before The Crisis    During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR SR RASR 
Activity diversification       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
     
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
     
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 +    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
     
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 -    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
     
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction       
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 -    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
     
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
     
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6       - 
 
  
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return      
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The interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has 
significant negative impact on NCO with the coefficient of -0.0014. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes positively significant (0.0018). The interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and negatively related to NCO with the coefficient 
of -0.0058. Therefore, greater security diversification could still reduce NCO with 
negative net impact of 0.0018 – 0.0058 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.3104. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of 
security ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive 
to negative. 
Both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) before and during 
the crisis are significantly negative (-0.0005 and -0.0019, respectively). However, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and positively related to NCO with the coefficient of 0.2326 during the 
crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still increase NCO 
with positive net impact of –0.0019 + 0.2326 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0082. The 
results show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on 
the scale of non-interest-income ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from 
negative to positive. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 0.0012 during the crisis 
hut it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Before the crisis, the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and 
negatively related to NCO with the coefficient of -0.0021. Therefore, greater 
off-balance-sheet diversification could still reduce ROA with negative net impact of 
0.0012 – 0.0021 * S6 if S6 is greater than 0.5715. The results show that the sign of the 
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impact of off-balance-sheet diversification depends on the scale of off-balance-sheet ratio. 
If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The interaction of all-activity diversification is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes significantly negative with the coefficient of -0.1171 during the crisis. 
Summary for credit risk - Table 16 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 17 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
1.4 Market risk 
(a) Maturity gap (MG) –Appendix 8 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only loan diversification (H3) has significant impact on MG. The impact is positive 
with the coefficient of 0.2695. However the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to MG with the coefficient of 
-0.3913. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce MG with negative net 
impact of 0.2695 – 0.3913 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.6888. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio. If the ratio is 
large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on MG, 
the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
negatively related to MG with the coefficient of -0.2125. Therefore, security 
diversification still reduces MG. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes positively significant with the coefficient of 1.1787 during the  
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Table 16: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs 
         for Total Period  
      
  Credit Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + 
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 - 
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 - 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
NCO: net charge-offs  
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Table 17: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs 
         for Sub-periods    
        
 
 
               Credit Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO NCO 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 - - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 +   
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 +   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 - 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 -   
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 - - 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   - 
 
NCO: net charge-offs     
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crisis. Moreover, during the crisis the interaction of domestic geographic diversification 
and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and negatively related to MG with the 
coefficient of -1.8348. Therefore, greater domestic geographic diversification could still 
reduce MG with negative net impact of 1.1787 – 1.8348 * S2 if S2 is greater than 0.6425. 
The results show that the sign of the impact of domestic geographic diversification 
depends on the scale of domestic geographic ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from positive to negative. 
Similarly, the coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes positively significant with the coefficient of 0.1767 during the 
crisis. Moreover, during the crisis the interaction of security diversification and security 
ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and negatively related to MG with the coefficient of 
-0.6044. Therefore, greater security diversification could still reduce MG with negative 
net impact of 0.1767 – 0.6044 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.2924. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the 
ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
Both the coefficients of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) before and during the 
crisis are insignificant. However, before the crisis the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to MG with the coefficient of -0.1794. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still 
reduces MG before the crisis. 
The interaction impact of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is 
insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant with the coefficient 
of 0.9353. 
(b) Derivatives loss (DL) –Appendix 9 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has significant impact on DL. The impact 
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is negative with the coefficient of -0.00002. However, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to DL with the coefficient of 0.0001. Therefore, greater off-balance-sheet diversification 
could still increase DL with positive net impact of –0.00002 + 0.0001 * S6 if S6 is 
greater than 0.2. The results show that the sign of the impact of off-balance-sheet 
diversification depends on the scale of off-balance-sheet ratio. If the ratio is large enough, 
the impact turns from negative to positive. 
The interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has 
significant positive impact on DL with the coefficient of 0.00003. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient of non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly negative 
(-0.0000001) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Although 
the coefficient of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the crisis, 
the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and positively related to DL with the coefficient of 0.0000008. Therefore, 
off-balance-sheet diversification still increases DL before the crisis. On the contrary, the 
coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification is significantly negative (-0.0001) during 
the crisis. However, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related to DL with the 
coefficient of 0.0003. Therefore, greater off-balance-sheet diversification could still 
increase DL with positive net impact of –0.0001 + 0.0003 * S6 if S6 is greater than 
0.3334. The results show that the sign of the impact of off-balance-sheet diversification 
depends on the scale of off-balance-sheet ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from negative to positive. 
Although the interaction impact of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications 
(H4*H6) on DL is insignificant before the crisis but it becomes positively significant 
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with the coefficient of 0.0001. 
 (c) Market beta (MB) –Appendix 10 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has significant impact on MB. The impact 
is positive with the coefficient of 0.6332. However the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to MB with the coefficient of -1.6673. Therefore, greater off-balance-sheet diversification 
could still reduce MB with negative net impact of 0.6332 – 1.6673 * S6 if S6 is greater 
than 0.3798. The results show that the sign of the impact of off-balance-sheet 
diversification depends on the scale of off-balance-sheet ratio. If the ratio is large enough, 
the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has 
significant negative impact on MB with the coefficient of -0.6017. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes positively significant with the coefficient of 0.7266 during the crisis. Although 
both the coefficients of non-interest-income diversification (H5) before and during the 
crisis are insignificant, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively related to MB with the 
coefficient of 130.0089. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still increases MB 
during the crisis. 
Before the crisis, the coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 
significant 0.5493. However the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related to MB with the 
coefficient of -1.1921. Therefore, greater off-balance-sheet diversification could still 
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reduce MB with negative net impact of 0.5493 – 1.1921 * S6 if S6 is greater than 0.4608. 
The results show that the sign of the impact of off-balance-sheet diversification depends 
on the scale of off-balance-sheet ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from positive to negative. However, the coefficient on off-balance-sheet 
diversification is insignificant during the crisis. 
The interaction impact of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively 
significant with the coefficient of -12.0160 during the crisis. Similarly, the interaction 
impact of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis but it becomes positively significant with the coefficient of 47.3209 during the 
crisis. 
 (d) Interest rate beta (IRB) –Appendix 11 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant negative impact on IRB with the coefficient of -0.8298. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Domestic geographic diversification (H2) has no impact on IRB before the crisis but 
it has significant negative impact (-17.0736) during the crisis. However, the coefficient 
on the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly positive (21.2335). Therefore, greater domestic geographic diversification 
could still increase IRB with positive net impact of –17.0736 + 21.2335 * S2 if S2 is 
greater than 0.8041. The results show that the sign of the impact of domestic geographic 
diversification depends on the scale of domestic geographic ratio during the crisis. If the 
ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Although individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact 
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on IRB before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification 
and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related to IRB with the 
coefficient of 2.2531 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still 
increases IRB during the crisis. 
Summary for market risk - Table 18 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 19 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
1.5 Default risk 
Distance to default (Z-score) –Appendix 12 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on Z, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to Z with the coefficient of 231.80. Therefore, security diversification 
still increases Z. 
The interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant 
positive impact on Z with the coefficient of 1105.41. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient of non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(41.52) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. In addition, the 
interaction impact of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) is negatively significant (-185.56) before the crisis while it becomes 
insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for default risk - Table 20 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 21 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
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Table 18: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs  
         for Total Period     
            
               Market Risk  
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +    
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   - +   
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 -    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   + -   
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 + -  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
  
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta   
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Table 19: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs 
   
         for Sub-periods     
    
                   
 
        Market Risk 
   
             Before The Crisis           During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2     +   - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
         
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    +  +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 -        
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     +     -     
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    -   + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
         
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
    -    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
       +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 - + -     +   + 
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 
  -  +  -  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
       -  
SD * OBSD H4*H6   -    + -  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6             +   
 
    
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta      
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Table 20: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs 
         for Total Period  
      
  Default Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation Z 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + 
 
Z: distance to default  
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Table 21: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Small BHCs 
         for Sub-periods    
        
 
 
            Default Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation Z Z 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 +   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 -   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
Z: distance to default   
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SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERACTION 
EFFECTS FOR SMALL BHCs 
a. Total period: Table 22 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, security diversification (H4) and the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Security diversification (H4) and the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) benefit BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts. However, non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction 
of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversification (H2*H3) hurt BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable 
impacts. 
For credit risk – Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification, off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) and the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with the(+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
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Table 22: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Small BHCs for Total Period        
                                                  
    (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)    (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns       Credit Risk        Market Risk        Default Risk    All Performances  
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 4 4  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 4 5  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 2 0 2  0 2 2  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  3 2 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 2 3   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  4 0 4  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 2 2  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 2 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  2 2 4   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  2 1 3  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1   
                                                  
    Accounting Returns     Market Returns      Credit Risk       Market Risk      Default Risk      All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 100 100 0.00 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 33 42 0.24 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 50 0 50 X 0 100 100 0.00 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 17 42 1.47 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 100 0 100 x 33 0 33 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 17 33 1.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 x 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 17 17 33 1.00 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 8 0 8 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item.  
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.           
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".     
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For market risk – The interaction of loan and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, loan diversification (H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - The interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4) and the interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts.  
b. Before the crisis: Table 23 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), security diversification 
(H4), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Security diversification (H4) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating 
that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
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Table 23: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Small BHCs Before The Crisis     
                                                 
   (n=4)   (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)    (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk        Market Risk      Default Risk    All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 2 0 2  0 1 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  5 1 6  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 2 2   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 3 3  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 1 0 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  2 1 3  0 0 0  3 1 4   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0   
                                                 
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk       Market Risk      Default Risk    All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 25 25 0.00 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 50 0 50 X 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 100 0 100 x 42 8 50 5.25 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 25 0 25 X 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 50 25 75 2.00 0 0 0 . 25 8 33 3.13 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 8 8 0.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 x 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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For credit risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction 
of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) and the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of security 
and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
c. During the crisis: Table 24 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) and the interaction of non-interest-income 
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diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns – No diversifications relatively advantage BHCs. However, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) and the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security 
diversification (H4) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
security diversification (H4), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification 
and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk – No diversifications or their interactions advantage BHCs. 
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Table 24: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Small BHCs During The Crisis     
                                               
   (n=4)   (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)   (n=1)    (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk    Default Risk    All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 3 3  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 3 0 3  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  4 0 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 3 3  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 5 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 2 2   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 1 2  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  2 1 3  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 2 0 2  0 1 1  1 0 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  3 2 5   
                                               
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk    All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 75 0 75 x 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 33 0 33 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 75 75 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 42 42 0.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 50 0 50 x 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 x 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 25 17 42 1.47 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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2. LARGER COMMUNITY BHCs 
2.1 Accounting returns 
(a) Return on asset (ROA) –Appendix 13 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
All types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. The impact of domestic 
geographic diversification is negative, the impact of loan diversification is positive, the 
impact of security diversification is negative, the impact of non-interest-income 
diversification is positive, and the impact of off-balance-sheet diversification is negative. 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is -0.0218. However, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0190. Even if S2 
were 1, the net impact of –0.0218 + 0.0190 * S2 would still be negative. Therefore, the 
impact of domestic geographic diversification is negative. 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is 0.0095. However the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to ROA with 
the coefficient of -0.0143. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce ROA 
with negative net impact of 0.0059 – 0.0143 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.4126. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio. 
If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -0.0028. However, the interaction 
of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively 
related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0060. Therefore, greater security diversification 
could still improve ROA with positive net impact of –0.0028 + 0.0060 * S4 if S4 is 
greater than 0.4667. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the 
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impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 0.0036. The coefficient 
on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is -0.0018. There are no significant scale 
interaction effects for them. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant positive impact on ROA with the coefficient of 0.0077. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Both the coefficients of domestic geographic diversification (H2) before and during 
the crisis are significantly negative (-0.0173 and -0.0281, respectively). However, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0302 during the crisis. 
Therefore, greater domestic geographic diversification could still increase ROA with 
positive net impact of –0.0281 + 0.0302 * S2 if S2 is greater than 0.9305. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of domestic geographic ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
Both the coefficients of loan diversification (H3) before and during the crisis are 
significantly positive (0.0115 and 0.0087, respectively). However the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to ROA with 
the coefficient of -0.0178 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification could 
still reduce ROA with negative net impact of 0.0115 – 0.0178 * S3 if S3 is greater than 
0.6461. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on 
the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from 
positive to negative. 
The coefficient of security diversification (H4) is significantly negative (-0.0027) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
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interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0057 during the crisis. Therefore, 
greater security diversification could still increase ROA with positive net impact 
of –0.0027 + 0.0057 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.4737. The results show that the sign of 
the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio during the 
crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Both the coefficients of non-interest-income diversification (H5) before and during 
the crisis are significantly positive (0.0038 and 0.0033, respectively). However the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -0.3337 before the 
crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce ROA with 
negative net impact of 0.0038 – 0.3337 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0114. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from positive to negative. 
Although both the coefficients of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to ROA with the coefficient of -0.0071 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still reduces ROA during the crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) –Appendix 14 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
Only non-interest-income diversification (H5) has significant impact on RAROA. The 
impact is positive with the coefficient of 1.6173. 
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Sub-period analysis: 
Both the coefficients of domestic geographic diversification (H2) and security 
diversification (H4) are insignificant before the crisis while they become positively 
significant during the crisis (14.4625 and 6.1264, respectively). 
Although the interaction impact of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) and the interaction impact of all-activity diversification (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) 
on RAROA are insignificant before the crisis but they becomes negatively significant 
(-59.9694). 
(c) Return on equity (ROE) –Appendix 15 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on ROE. Both the impacts of 
domestic geographic diversification and security diversification are negative. The 
coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is -0.0887. However, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.0861. Even if S2 
were 1, the net impact of –0.0887 + 0.0861 * S2 would still be negative. Therefore, the 
impact of domestic geographic diversification is negative. The coefficient on security 
diversification (H4) is -0.0113 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant positive impact on ROE with the coefficient of 0.0372. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-0.2591) during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.2704 during the crisis. 
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Therefore, greater domestic geographic diversification could still improve ROE with 
positive net impact of –0.2591 + 0.2704 * S2 if S2 is greater than 0.9583. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of domestic geographic diversification depends on the 
scale of domestic geographic ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly negative (-0.0073) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficient of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to ROE with the coefficient of -0.1320 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still reduces ROE during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction effect of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversification (H2*H5) is significantly positive (0.0191) before the 
crisis while it become insignificant during the crisis. 
(d) Risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE) –Appendix 16 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
Only non-interest-income diversification (H5) has significant impact on RAROE. The 
impact is positive with the coefficient of 1.5922. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficients of domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan diversification 
(H3), security diversification (H4) and non-interest-income diversification (H5) are 
insignificant before the crisis while they become positively significant during the crisis 
(11.0993, 14.6937, 4.8504 and 2.4995, respectively). 
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For interaction effects of diversifications, none of them are significant before the 
crisis. However, during the crisis the coefficient on all-activity diversification 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is significantly negative (-51.0833). 
Summary for accounting returns - Table 25 reports the summary of significant 
effects of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 26 reports the summary 
of significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
2.2 Market returns 
(a) Stock return (SR) –Appendix 17 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
None of the diversifications have significant impacts on SR. In addition, all 
interaction effects of diversifications are insignificant. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Similarly, all individual diversifications and interactions of diversifications are 
insignificant. 
(b) Risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) –Appendix 18 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only loan diversification (H3) has significant impact on RASR. The impact is 
positive with the coefficient of 1.4598. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (1.7786) before 
the crisis, while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to 
RASR with the coefficient of -2.8768 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan 
diversification could still reduce RASR with negative net impact of 1.7786 – 2.8768 * S3  
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Table 25: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger 
  
         Community BHCs for Total Period 
    
            
            Accounting Returns  
  Variable Abbreviation ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 -  -  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +    
Security Div. (SD) H4 -  -  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + +  + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 -       
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 +  +  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +  +  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
    
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity  
 
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity  
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Table 26: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger     
         Community BHCs for Sub-periods        
                    
 
                 Accounting Returns    
              Before The Crisis             During The Crisis 
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
ROA RAROA ROE RAROE ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. 
(DGD) 
H2 -    - + - + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +    +   + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 -  -    +  + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + +   + +  + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6                 
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. 
(DGD) 
H2*S2 
    +  +  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -         
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +         
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -      + + + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         -   -   
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 
      -   
DGD * NIID H2*H5   +       
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
         
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6               - 
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity      
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity           
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if S3 is greater than 0.6183. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan 
diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large 
enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on the interaction effect of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversification (H2*H5) is significantly positive (1.2065) before the 
crisis while it becomes significantly negative (-5.9382) during the crisis. 
Summary for market returns - Table 27 reports the summary of significant effects 
of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 28 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
2.3 Credit risk 
Net charge-offs (NCO) –Appendix 19 reports the statistical results.   
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on NCO. The impact of 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) is negative (-0.0013) while the impact of 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is positive (0.0009).  
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has 
significant positive impact on NCO with the coefficient of 0.0038. The interaction of 
domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) also has 
significant positive impact with the coefficient of 0.0026. However, the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has significant negative impact 
with the coefficient of -0.0017. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) before the crisis is insignificant while it 
becomes negatively significant during the crisis (-0.0081). Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to NCO  
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Table 27: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger 
         Community BHCs for Total Period   
        
    Market Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR 
Activity diversification    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction    
DGD * LD H2*H3 
  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return     
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Table 28: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger   
         Community BHCs for Sub-periods     
            
 
 
        Market Returns 
 
   Before The Crisis   During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR SR RASR 
Activity diversification       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
     
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 +    
Security Div. (SD) H4 
     
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
     
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
     
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 -    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
     
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
     
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction       
DGD * LD H2*H3 
     
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 +   - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
     
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
  
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return      
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with the coefficient of 0.0110 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still increase NCO with positive net impact of –0.0081 + 0.0110 * S3 if S3 is 
greater than 0.7364. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification 
depends on the scale of loan ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on the interaction effect of domestic geographic and loan 
diversification (H2*H3) is significantly positive (0.0035) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for credit risk - Table 29 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 30 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
2.4 Market risk 
(a) Maturity gap (MG) –Appendix 20 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. The impacts of 
domestic geographic diversification and non-interest-income diversification are negative, 
while the impact of off-balance-sheet diversification is positive. The coefficient on 
domestic geographic diversification (H2) is -0.2527. Although individual 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) and off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) have 
no significant impact on MG, they still have impacts on MG. The interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is 
significantly and negatively related to MG with the coefficient of -1.7185. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still reduces MG. The interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to MG with the coefficient of 0.0719. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still  
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Table 29: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger 
         Community BHCs for Total Period  
      
  Credit Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + 
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 + 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 - 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
NCO: net charge-offs  
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Table 30: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger  
         Community BHCs for Sub-periods   
        
 
 
           Credit Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO NCO 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 - 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 -   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 + 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 +   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + + 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
NCO: net charge-offs    
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increases MG. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has 
significant positive impact on MG with the coefficient of 0.1655. The interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has significant negative impact 
with the coefficient of -0.1072. The interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) also has significant negative impact on MG with the coefficient of 
-1.0025. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant during the crisis (0.5034). Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to MG 
with the coefficient of -0.7812 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still reduce MG with negative net impact of 0.5034 – 0.7812 * S3 if S3 is greater 
than 0.6444. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends 
on the scale of loan ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns 
from positive to negative. 
Both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before and 
during the crisis. However, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to MG with the coefficient of 0.4964 
during the crisis. Therefore, security diversification still increases MG. 
The interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6) is significantly and positively related to MG with the coefficient of 0.0952 
before the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still increases MG. However, 
the impact of off-balance-sheet diversification becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction effect of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly positive (0.2570) before the 
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crisis. In addition, the coefficients on the interaction effect of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) and on the interaction effect of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) are significantly negative (-0.1210 and -1.2204, 
respectively) before the crisis. However, all of them become insignificant during the 
crisis. 
(b) Derivatives loss (DL) –Appendix 21 reports the statistical results.    
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on DL. They are security 
diversification, non-interest-income diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification. 
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to DL with the coefficient of 0.0001. Therefore, security diversification 
still increases DL. Although individual non-interest-income diversification (H5) has no 
significant impact, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and negatively related to DL with the 
coefficient of -0.0020. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still reduces DL. In 
addition, the coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is -0.0001. However, 
the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and positively related to DL with the coefficient of 0.0004. Therefore, 
greater off-balance-sheet diversification could still increase DL with positive net impact 
of –0.0001 + 0.0004 * S6 if S6 is greater than 0.25. The results show that the sign of the 
impact of off-balance-sheet diversification depends on the scale of off-balance-sheet ratio. 
If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
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crisis while it becomes positively significant (0.0003) during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and negatively related to DL with the coefficient of -0.0006 during the crisis. 
Therefore, greater domestic geographic diversification could still reduce DL with 
negative net impact of 0.0003 – 0.0006 * S2 if S2 is greater than 0.5. The results show 
that the sign of the impact of domestic geographic diversification depends on the scale of 
domestic geographic ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns 
from positive to negative. 
Although both the coefficients of security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to DL with the coefficient of 0.0001 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still increases DL before the crisis. 
(c) Market beta (MB) –Appendix 22 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on MB. Both impacts of 
non-interest-income diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification are negative. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is -01240. Although 
individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact, the interaction 
of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly 
and negatively related to MB with the coefficient of -0.1091. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still reduces DL. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes negatively significant during the crisis (-2.9451). Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to MB 
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with the coefficient of 4.8295 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still increase MB with positive net impact of –2.9451 + 4.8295 * S3 if S3 is greater 
than 0.6099. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends 
on the scale of loan ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns 
from negative to positive. 
Although both the coefficients of non-interest-income diversification (H5) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively 
related to MB with the coefficient of 89.4688 during the crisis. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still increases MB during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to MB with the coefficient of -0.2247 before the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still reduces MB before the crisis. 
For interaction effects of diversifications, none of them are significant before the 
crisis. However, during the crisis the coefficient on the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is significantly negative (-2.0104) and the 
coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly positive (1.3731). Therefore, the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications and the interaction of domestic geographic 
and non-interest-income diversifications still have impact on MB during the crisis. 
(d) Interest rate beta (IRB) –Appendix 23 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on IRB. They are loan 
diversification and security diversification. Although individual loan diversification (H3) 
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has no significant impact, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is 
significantly and negatively related to IRB with the coefficient of -0.7688. Therefore, 
loan diversification still reduces IRB. In addition, although individual security 
diversification (H4) has no significant impact, the interaction of security diversification 
and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to IRB with the 
coefficient of 0.3981. Therefore, security diversification still increases IRB. 
The interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant 
negative impact on IRB with the coefficient of -0.8023. 
Sub-period analysis: 
There are no significant differences on the effects of diversifications and interactions 
before and during the crisis. 
Summary for market risk - Table 31 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 32 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
2.5 Default risk 
Distance to default (Z-score) –Appendix 24 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only non-interest-income diversification (H5) has significant impact on Z. The 
impact is positive with the coefficient of 45.73. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) and the coefficient on 
loan diversification are insignificant before the crisis while they become positively 
significant during the crisis (573.78 and 197.38, respectively).  
The interaction impact of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is 
insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-910.83) during the  
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Table 31: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger  
         Community BHCs for Total Period     
            
              Market Risk  
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 -    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
    
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  -  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   -     
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
   - 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 +  + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 - -   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 + + -   
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +    
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -    
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 -       
  
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta  
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Table 32: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger 
   
         Community BHCs for Sub-periods    
    
                    
 
     Market Risk 
   
            Before The Crisis         During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 -    - +   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
    +  -  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
         
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
    -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   -             
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
      -   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
    -  +  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 +  + +   + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -    -  +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 + + -     +     
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 
      + -  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + -     + +  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -         
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 -         -     
 
    
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta     
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crisis. 
Summary for default risk - Table 33 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 34 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
SUMMARY OF DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERACTION EFFECTS FOR 
LARGER COMMUNITY BHCs 
a. Total period: Table 35 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and 
the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), 
security diversification (H4), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), and the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Loan diversification (H3) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratio 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of domestic geographic 
and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than  
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Table 33: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger 
         Community BHCs for Total Period  
      
  Default Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation Z 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
Z: distance to default  
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Table 34: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Larger 
         Community BHCs for Sub-periods   
        
 
 
         Default Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation Z Z 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 - 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
Z: distance to default   
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one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction 
of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For default risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. 
b. Before the crisis: Table 36 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable 
impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic geographic diversification 
(H2), security diversification (H4), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio 
(H3*S3), and the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, 
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Table 35: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Larger Community BHCs for Total Period  
                                              
   (n=4)   (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)   (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 3 0 3  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  6 0 6  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 2 3   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 2 3  0 0 0  1 2 3   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  2 2 4  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1   
                                              
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 25 0 25 X 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 75 0 75 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 100 0 100 x 50 0 50 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 50 75 0.50 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 17 17 33 1.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 x 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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Table 36: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Larger Community BHCs Before The Crisis   
                    
   (n=4)   (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)   (n=12)  
    Accounting Returns   Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  4 0 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 2 3  0 0 0  1 2 3   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 1 0 1  1 0 1  0 1 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  3 2 5  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1   
                                               
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 25 0 25 X 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 33 0 33 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 25 25 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 50 75 0.50 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 25 0 25 x 50 0 50 x 0 100 100 0.00 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 25 17 42 1.47 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 x 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Loan diversification (H3) and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) hurt 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) and the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable 
impacts. 
For default risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. 
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c. During the crisis: Table 37 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Loan diversification (H3), security diversification (H4), 
non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), and the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and 
the interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns – No diversifications or interactions advantage BHCs. However, 
the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Loan diversification (H3) and the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
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Table 37: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Larger Community BHCs During The Crisis  
                                                
   (n=4)   (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)   (n=12)  
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns    Credit Risk      Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 2 2 4  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  1 0 1  4 3 7  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  4 1 5  
Security Div. (SD) H4 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  3 0 3  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 3 0 3  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  5 0 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 0 3  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 3 0 3  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 1 2  1 0 1  6 1 7  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 3 3   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 1 1  1 3 4  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 4 4  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2   
                                                
    Accounting Returns     Market Returns      Credit Risk       Market Risk     Default Risk    All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 50 50 100 1.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 100 0 100 x 33 25 58 1.32 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 33 8 42 4.13 
Security Div. (SD) H4 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 75 0 75 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 100 0 100 x 42 0 42 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 75 0 75 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 25 25 50 1.00 100 0 100 x 50 8 58 6.25 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 0 100 100 0.00 8 25 33 0.32 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 33 33 0.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), security diversification 
(H4), non-interest-income diversification (H5), and the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
3 REGIONAL BHCs 
3.1 Accounting returns 
(a) Return on asset (ROA) –Appendix 25 reports the statistical results.   
Total period: 
Only off-balance-sheet diversification has significant positive impact on ROA. 
Although individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact on 
ROA, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6) is significantly and positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0035. 
Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still improves ROA. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The net impacts of non-interest-income and off-balance-sheet diversifications are 
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positively significant before the crisis while they become insignificant during the crisis. 
Although individual non-interest-income diversification (H5) and off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) have no significant impact on ROA, the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) and the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) are 
significantly and positively related to ROA with the coefficients of 0.1294 and 0.0020, 
respectively. Therefore, both non-interest-income diversification and off-balance-sheet 
diversification still improve ROA. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly positive (0.0070) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) –Appendix 26 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on RAROA. They are 
domestic geographic diversification, loan diversification and security diversification. The 
coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is 24.3230. The coefficient on 
loan diversification (H3) is 34.9827. However the interaction of loan diversification and 
loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to RAROA with the coefficient 
of -43.8865. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce RAROA with 
negative net impact of 34.9827 – 43.8865 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.7972. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio. 
If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. In addition, the 
coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -22.5666. However, the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related 
to RAROA with the coefficient of 135.3170. Therefore, greater security diversification 
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could still improve RAROA with positive net impact of –22.5666 + 135.3170 * S4 if S4 
is greater than 0.1668. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
(40.1485) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The 
coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (56.1155) before the 
crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to RAROA 
with the coefficient of -63.0398 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still reduce RAROA with negative net impact of 56.1155 – 63.0398 * S3 if S3 is 
greater than 0.8902. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification 
depends on the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from positive to negative. In addition, the coefficient on security diversification (H4) 
is significantly negative (-23.9513) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during 
the crisis. However, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to RAROA with the coefficient of 154.0378 during 
the crisis. Therefore, greater security diversification could still improve RAROA with 
positive net impact of –23.9513 + 154.0378 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.1555. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of 
security ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative 
to positive. 
Although both the coefficients of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
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to RAROA with the coefficient of -24.8881 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still decreases RAROA during the crisis. 
(c) Return on equity (ROE) –Appendix 27 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only off-balance-sheet diversification has significant positive net impact on ROE. 
Although individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact on 
ROE, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6) is significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.0237. 
Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still improves ROE. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(0.0277) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Although both 
the coefficients of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are insignificant before and 
during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet 
ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.0295 
before the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still improves ROE before 
the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction effect of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3) is significantly positive (0.0910) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
(d) Risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE) –Appendix 28 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on RAROE. The impact of 
domestic geographic diversification (H2) is positive (32.0934). The impact of security 
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diversification (H4) is negative (-21.4558). However, the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to 
RAROE with the coefficient of 144.3751. Therefore, greater security diversification 
could still improve RAROE with positive net impact of –21.4558 + 144.3751 * S4 if S4 
is greater than 0.1487. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant negative impact on RAROE with the coefficient of -28.0217. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
(34.6007) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (53.0765) before 
the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to 
RAROE with the coefficient of -77.1311 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan 
diversification could still reduce RAROE with negative net impact of 53.0765 – 77.1311 
* S3 if S3 is greater than 0.6882. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan 
diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large 
enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly negative (-25.3459) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to RAROE with the coefficient of 167.9160 before the crisis. Therefore, 
greater security diversification could still improve RAROE with positive net impact 
of –25.3459 + 167.9160 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.1510. The results show that the sign 
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of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio before the 
crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Although both the coefficients of off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to RAROE with the coefficient of -17.7129 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still reduces RAROE during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly negative (-37.2144) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis 
Summary for accounting returns - Table 38 reports the summary of significant 
effects of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 39 reports the summary 
of significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
3.2 Market returns 
(a) Stock return (SR) –Appendix 29 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on SR. Both the impacts of 
domestic geographic diversification (H2) and non-interest-income diversification (H5) 
are positive (0.5900 and 0.2409, respectively). 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant negative impact on SR with the coefficient of -0.4984. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
(0.7857) before the crisis. However, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and negatively related to SR  
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Table 38: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs 
 
          for Total Period 
    
            
              Accounting Returns  
  Variable Abbreviation ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 +  + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 +   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 -  - 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 -   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 +  + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 +   +   
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
    
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
 
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity  
 
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity   
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Table 39: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs    
         for Sub-periods         
                    
 
                      Accounting Returns    
               Before The Crisis              During The Crisis 
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
ROA RAROA ROE RAROE ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 +  +      
Loan Div. (LD) H3  +  +      
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 -  -      
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  +      + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6                 
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
         
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 -  -      
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 +  +      
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 +         
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 +   +     -   - 
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 +  +       
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   -      
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
         
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6                 
 
     
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity      
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity          
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with the coefficient of -0.9679. Therefore, greater domestic geographic diversification 
could still reduce SR with negative net impact of 0.7857 – 0.9679 * S2 if S2 is greater 
than 0.8118. The results show that the sign of the impact of domestic geographic 
diversification depends on the scale of domestic geographic ratio before the crisis. If the 
ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. During the crisis, 
although the coefficient on domestic geographic diversification are insignificant, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -2.7269. Therefore, 
domestic geographic diversification still reduces SR during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -12.7389 during the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still reduces SR during the crisis. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(0.3059) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -20.8306 before the 
crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce SR with 
negative net impact of 0.3059 – 20.8306 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0147. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from positive to negative. 
The interaction impact of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is 
insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (5.2748) during the 
crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) –Appendix 30 reports the statistical results. 
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Total period: 
Only non-interest-income diversification (H5) has significant impact on RASR. The 
impact is positive with the coefficient of 1.4488. However the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is 
significantly and negatively related to EASR with the coefficient of -109.6352. Therefore, 
greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce RASR with negative net 
impact of 1.4488 – 109.6352 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0133. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the scale of 
non-interest-income ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to 
negative. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant negative impact on RASR with the coefficient of -3.4354. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
(5.3683) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of -3.9497 before the 
crisis. Even if S2 were 1, the net impact of 5.3683 – 3.9497 * S2 would still be positive. 
Therefore, the impact of domestic geographic diversification is positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(1.5178) before the crisis, while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of -116.8884 before 
the crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce RASR 
with negative net impact of 1.5178 – 116.8884 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0130. The 
results show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on 
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the scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from positive to negative. 
The interaction impact of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is 
insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (40.4919) during the 
crisis. 
Summary for market returns - Table 40 reports the summary of significant effects 
of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 41 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
3.3 Credit risk 
Net charge-offs (NCO) –Appendix 31 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. They are security 
diversification, non-interest-income diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -0.0033. However, the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related 
to NCO with the coefficient of 0.0108. Therefore, greater security diversification could 
still increase NCO with positive net impact of –0.0033 + 0.0108 * S4 if S4 is greater than 
0.3056. The results show that the sign of the impact of security diversification depends on 
the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to 
positive. 
Although individual non-interest-income diversification (H5) has no significant 
impact on NCO, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively related to NCO with the 
coefficient of 0.2033. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still increases NCO. 
Similarly, although individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no  
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Table 40: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional 
         BHCs for Total Period   
        
     Market Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR 
Activity diversification    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 +  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction    
DGD * LD H2*H3 
  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 - - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return     
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Table 41: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs  
         for Sub-periods      
            
 
 
         Market Returns 
 
   Before The Crisis  During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR SR RASR 
Activity diversification       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 + +    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
     
Security Div. (SD) H4 
     
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + +    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 - - -  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
     
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  -  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 - -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 + + + + 
Activity interaction       
DGD * LD H2*H3 
  + + 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 -   - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
     
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
  
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return      
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significant impact on NCO, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related to NCO with the 
coefficient of -0.0021. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still reduces NCO. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (0.0034) before 
the crisis while it becomes significantly negative (-0.0950) during the crisis. The 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively 
related to NCO with the coefficient of -0.0033 before the crisis. Even if S3 were 1, the 
net impact of 0.0034 – 0.0033 * S3 would still be positive. Therefore, the impact of loan 
diversification is positive before the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to NCO with 
the coefficient of 0.1372 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification could 
still increase NCO with positive net impact of –0.0950 + 0.1372 * S3 if S3 is greater than 
0.6925. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on 
the scale of loan ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from 
negative to positive. 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to NCO with the coefficient of0.0037 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still increases NCO before the crisis. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly negative 
(-0.0010) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of on-interest-income diversification and on-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is 
significantly and positively related to NCO with the coefficient of 0.1569 before the crisis. 
Therefore, greater on-interest-income diversification could still increase NCO with 
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positive net impact of –0.0010 + 0.1569 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0064. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of on-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of on-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from negative to positive. 
Both the coefficients on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3) and on the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) are significantly negative (-0.0038 and -0.0133, respectively) 
before the crisis while they become insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for credit risk - Table 42 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 43 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
3.4 Market risk 
(a) Maturity gap (MG) –Appendix 32 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on MG. They are domestic 
geographic diversification, loan diversification and security diversification. The 
coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is 0.9364. 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is 0.9617. However the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to MG with 
the coefficient of -1.1174. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce MG 
with negative net impact of 0.9617 – 1.1174 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.8607. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio. 
If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on MG, 
the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and  
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Table 42: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs 
         for Total Period  
      
  Credit Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 - 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 - 
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
NCO: net charge-offs  
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Table 43: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs 
         for Sub-periods    
        
 
 
           Credit Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO NCO 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 + - 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 -   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 - + 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 +   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 -   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 -   
 
NCO: net charge-offs    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
131 
negatively related to MG with the coefficient of -1.3805. Therefore, security 
diversification still reduces MG. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
have significant negative impact on MG with the coefficient of -1.3623 and -0.6106, 
respectively. In addition, the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant positive impact on MG with the coefficient of 
1.1377. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (1.2797) before 
the crisis, while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to MG 
with the coefficient of -1.6577 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still reduce MG with negative net impact of 1.2797 – 1.6577 * S3 if S3 is greater 
than 0.7720. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends 
on the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns 
from positive to negative. 
Although both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively 
related to MG with the coefficient of 18.2519 before the crisis. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still increases MG before the crisis. 
The interaction impact of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is negatively significant (-0.5556) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
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(b) Derivatives loss (DL) –Appendix 33 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only domestic geographic diversification (H2) has significant impact on DL. The 
impact is positive with the coefficient of 0.00011. Moreover, the interaction of domestic 
geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and negatively 
related to DL with the coefficient of -0.000102. Even if S2 were 1, the net impact of 
0.00011 - 0.0000102 * S2 would still be positive. Therefore, the impact of domestic 
geographic diversification is positive. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to DL with the coefficient of 0.000015 before the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still increases DL before the crisis. 
(c) Market beta (MB) –Appendix 34 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. They are loan 
diversification and security diversification. The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is 
-1.4669. However, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is 
significantly and positively related to MB with the coefficient of 1.9253. Therefore, 
greater loan diversification could still increase MB with positive net impact of –1.4669 + 
1.9253 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.7620. The results show that the sign of the impact of 
loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on MB, 
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the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
negatively related to MB with the coefficient of -2.2782. Therefore, security 
diversification still reduces MB. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has 
significant positive impact on MB with the coefficient of 1.4508. In addition, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversifications (H2*H5) has significant negative 
impact on MB with the coefficient of -0.5980. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes negatively significant (-5.8761) during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to MB 
with the coefficient of 10.7722 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still increase MB with positive net impact of –5.8761 + 10.7722 * S3 if S3 is 
greater than 0.5455. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification 
depends on the scale of loan ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from negative to positive. 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and negatively related to MB with the coefficient of -0.9215 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still reduces MB before the crisis. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(0.1252) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to MB with the coefficient of -1.6649 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
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diversification still reduces MB during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly positive (07830) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is significantly negative (-1.4149) before the crisis 
while it becomes significantly positive (14.3740) during the crisis. 
(d) Interest rate beta (IRB) –Appendix 35 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only domestic geographic diversification (2) has significant impact on IRB. The 
impact is negative with the coefficient of -0.9318. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has 
significant positive impact on IRB with the coefficient of 0.7850. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly negative (-1.1391) before 
the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to IRB 
with the coefficient of 1.2808 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still increase IRB with positive net impact of –1.1391 + 1.2808 * S3 if S3 is greater 
than 0.8894. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends 
on the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns 
from negative to positive. 
Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to IRB with the coefficient of -0.8426 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
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diversification still reduces IRB during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly positive (1.0751) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic 
and security diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes 
positively significant (2.3430) during the crisis. 
Summary for market risk - Table 44 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 45 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
3.5 Default risk 
Distance to default (Z-score) –Appendix 36 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Four types of diversification have significant impacts on Z. They are domestic 
geographic diversification, loan diversification, security diversification and 
non-interest-income diversification. The coefficient on domestic geographic 
diversification (H2) is 576.24. However the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and negatively related to Z with 
the coefficient of -458.89. Even if S2 were 1, the net impact of 576.24 – 458.89 * S2 
would still be positive. Therefore, the impact of domestic geographic diversification is 
positive. 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is 817.23. However the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to Z with the 
coefficient of -1091.70. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce Z with 
negative net impact of 817.23 – 1091.70 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.7486. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio.  
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Table 44: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs  
         for Total Period     
            
                 Market Risk  
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 + +  - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +  -  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 -   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -  +  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 -  -  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 -  + + 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 -  -  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
    
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 +       
 
 
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta  
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Table 45: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs 
  
         for Sub-periods     
    
                    
 
       Market Risk 
   
           Before The Crisis           During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 +   - +   - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +   -    -  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
         
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  +       
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6                 
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
         
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -   +    +  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  -       
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 +         
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   +         - - 
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 -  + + -    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 -       - + 
SD * OBSD H4*H6          
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     -       +   
 
    
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta    
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If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. The coefficient on 
security diversification (H4) is -456.09. However, the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to Z with 
the coefficient of 3157.85. Therefore, greater security diversification could still increase 
Z with positive net impact of –456.09 + 3157.85 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.1445. The 
results show that the sign of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of 
security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Although individual non-interest-income diversification (H5) has no significant 
impact on Z, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and negatively related to Z with the 
coefficient of -13723.74. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still reduces Z. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
(1217.58) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and negatively related to Z with the coefficient of -975.76 before the crisis. 
Even if S2 were 1, the net impact of 1217.58 – 975.76 * S2 would still be positive. 
Therefore, the impact of domestic geographic diversification is positive before the crisis. 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (1534.27) before 
the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to Z 
with the coefficient of –1869.44 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still reduce Z with negative net impact of 1534.27 – 1869.44 * S3 if S3 is greater 
than 0.8208. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends 
on the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns 
from positive to negative. 
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The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly negative (-468.46) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to Z with the coefficient of 3788.70 before the crisis. Therefore, greater 
security diversification could still increase Z with positive net impact of –468.46 + 
3788.70 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.1237. The results show that the sign of the impact of 
security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio before the crisis. If the ratio 
is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related 
to Z with the coefficient of -476.12 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still reduces Z during the crisis. 
Summary for default risk - Table 46 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 47 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
SUMMARY OF DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERACTION EFFECTS FOR 
REGIONAL BHCs 
a. Total period: Table 48 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan 
diversification (H3), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
and the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable 
impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security diversification (H4), the  
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Table 46: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional 
         BHCs for Total Period  
      
  Default Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation Z 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 - 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 - 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
Z: distance to default  
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Table 47: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Regional BHCs 
         for Sub-periods    
        
 
 
          Default Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation Z Z 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 +   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +   
Security Div. (SD) H4 -   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 -   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   - 
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
Z: distance to default   
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interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2) and 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable 
impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Security diversification (H4) and the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) and the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - The interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and 
the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), the 
interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction 
of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less 
than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan diversification  
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Table 48: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Regional BHCs for Total Period     
                                                  
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)    (n=12)  
   Accounting Returns   Market Returns    Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 2 0 2  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 2 3  1 0 1  5 2 7  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  1 0 1  3 1 4  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 2 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 3 4  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 1 1  1 1 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 1 1  1 3 4  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  2 0 2  1 0 1  5 1 6  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 3 3  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  3 0 3   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 2 3  0 0 0  1 2 3  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 1 1  0 2 2  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  2 3 5  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1   
                                                  
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk    Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 50 0 50 x 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 25 50 75 0.50 100 0 100 x 42 17 58 2.47 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 100 0 100 x 25 8 33 3.13 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 8 25 33 0.32 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 100 100 0.00 8 8 17 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 0 100 100 0.00 8 25 33 0.32 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 50 0 50 X 100 0 100 X 42 8 50 5.25 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 50 75 0.50 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 25 25 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 17 25 42 0.68 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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(H3), and the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) benefit 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts. However, security diversification (H4), the interaction of domestic 
geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
b. Before the crisis: Table 49 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan 
diversification (H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction 
of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, security diversification (H4), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), and the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction 
of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), and the  
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Table 49: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Regional BHCs Before The Crisis    
                                                 
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)   (n=12)  
    Accounting Returns   Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk    All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 2 0 2  2 0 2  0 0 0  1 1 2  1 0 1  6 1 7  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 1 2  1 0 1  4 2 6  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 3 3  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 1 0 1  2 0 2  1 0 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  4 1 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 3 3  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 2 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 1 2  0 1 1  2 4 6  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  4 1 5  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 1 0 1  0 2 2  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 4 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 2 0 2  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  4 1 5   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 2 3  0 0 0  4 2 6  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 2 3  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2   
                                                 
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns       Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 50 0 50 x 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 100 0 100 x 50 8 58 6.25 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 25 25 50 1.00 100 0 100 x 33 17 50 1.94 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 25 0 25 X 100 0 100 x 100 0 100 X 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 33 8 42 4.13 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 25 25 50 1.00 0 100 100 0.00 17 33 50 0.52 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 25 0 25 X 100 0 100 x 33 8 42 4.13 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 25 0 25 X 0 100 100 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 33 42 0.24 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 50 0 50 X 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 33 8 42 4.13 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 50 75 0.50 0 0 0 . 33 17 50 1.94 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 25 25 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, loan diversification (H3), 
the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction 
of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For market risk - The interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4), the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts. However, non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction 
of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and 
the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable 
impacts. 
For default risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan diversification 
(H3), and the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) benefit 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts. However, security diversification (H4), security diversification (H4), 
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and the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) hurt BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
c. During the crisis: Table 50 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating 
that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - The interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) and the interaction of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of 
domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Loan diversification (H3) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratio greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio 
less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Loan diversification (H3), the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) and the interaction of  
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Table 50: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Regional BHCs During The Crisis    
                                                
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)   (n=1)   (n=12)  
   Accounting Returns   Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 2 2  2 0 2  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 1 1  4 3 7   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 0 3  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 2 3  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1   
                                                
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk       Market Risk      Default Risk    All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 X 0 100 100 0.00 33 25 58 1.32 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 25 25 50 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less 
than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk – No diversifications or interactions advantage BHCs. However, the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
4 MONEY CENTER BHCs 
4.1 Accounting returns 
(a) Return on asset (ROA) –Appendix 37 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only security diversification has significant impact on ROA. The impact is negative. 
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on ROA, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0287. Therefore, security 
diversification still reduces ROA. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to ROA 
with the coefficient of 0.0604 during the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still increases ROA during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
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insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0010 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still increases ROA during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively 
significant (0.0761) during the crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) –Appendix 38 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
No diversifications or interactions have significant impacts on RAROA. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to RAROA with the coefficient of 67.5535 before 
the crisis. Therefore, security diversification still increases RAROA before the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly negative (-116.0786) before the crisis while it becomes 
insignificant during the crisis. 
(c) Return on equity (ROE) –Appendix 39 reports the statistical results.   
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on ROE. The impacts of 
security diversification and non-interest-income diversification are positive while the 
impact of off-balance-sheet diversification is negative.  
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on ROE, 
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the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.4663. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still increases ROE. 
Although individual non-interest-income diversification (H5) has no significant 
impact on ROE, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively related to ROE with the 
coefficient of 13.0321. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still increases 
ROE. 
Although individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact 
on ROE, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related to ROE with the coefficient of -0.0047. 
Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still reduces ROE. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-2.0301) during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.5878 during the crisis. 
Even if S2 were 1, the net impact of –2.0301 + 0.5878 * S2 would still be negative. 
Therefore, the impact of domestic geographic diversification is negative during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively 
significant (1.2153) during the crisis. 
(d) Risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE) –Appendix 40 reports the statistical 
results.   
Total period: 
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Only domestic geographic diversification has significant impact on RAROE. The 
impact is positive. Although individual domestic geographic diversification (H2) has no 
significant impact on RAROE, the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and 
deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to ROA with the coefficient 
of 23.1115. Therefore, domestic geographic diversification still increases RAROE. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
(73.3471) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly negative (-127.3256) before the crisis while it becomes 
insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for accounting returns - Table 51 reports the summary of significant 
effects of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 52 reports the summary 
of significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
4.2 Market returns 
(a) Stock return (SR) –Appendix 41 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on SR. The impacts of 
domestic geographic diversification, non-interest-income diversification and 
off-balance-sheet diversification are positive. The coefficient on domestic geographic 
diversification (H2) is 0.8567. The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) 
is 0.4247. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 0.3423. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant negative impact on SR with the coefficient of -0.6034. 
Sub-period analysis: 
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Table 51: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Money Center BHCs 
         for Total Period 
    
            
         Accounting Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
    
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +  +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
  +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     -   
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
    
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
    
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
 
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity  
 
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity     
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Table 52: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Money Center BHCs   
         for Sub-periods         
                    
 
                     Accounting Returns     
                Before The Crisis               During The Crisis 
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
ROA RAROA ROE RAROE ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   +    -  
Loan Div. (LD) H3          
Security Div. (SD) H4 
         
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
         
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6                 
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    +  +  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
         
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 +  +     + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
         
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         +       
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 -  -      
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
    +  +  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
         
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6                 
 
     
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity       
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity      
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The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
(1.0403) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -0.4766 before the crisis. 
Even if S2 were 1, the net impact of 1.0403 - 0.4766 * S2 would still be positive. 
Therefore, the impact of domestic geographic diversification is positive before the crisis. 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes negatively significant (-3.1628) during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to SR 
with the coefficient of 5.8509 during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still improve SR with positive net impact of –3.1628 + 5.8509 * S3 if S3 is greater 
than 0.5406. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends 
on the scale of loan ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to 
positive during the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes positively significant (5.6179) during the crisis.  
Both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) before and during 
the crisis are significantly positive (0.4824 and 2.1498, respectively). Moreover, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -68.4760 before the 
crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce SR with 
negative net impact of 0.4824 – 68.4760 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0071. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the 
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crisis while it becomes positively significant (3.3744) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly negative (-0.7594) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is insignificant before the crisis 
while it becomes negatively significant (-10.8434) during the crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) –Appendix 42 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on RASR. The impacts of 
domestic geographic diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification are positive. 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is 6.2490. The coefficient on 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 2.4766. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has 
significant negative impact on RASR with the coefficient of -7.0782. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to RASR with the coefficient of 34.1975 during the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still improves RASR during the crisis. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(2.6929) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of -402.3415 before 
the crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce RASR 
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with negative net impact of 2.6929 – 402.3415 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0067. The 
results show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on 
the scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes positively significant (22.2708) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant 
(-233.3023) during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic 
and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly negative (-4.1821) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. In addition, the 
coefficient on the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) 
is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-66.0235) during 
the crisis. 
Summary for market returns - Table 53 reports the summary of significant effects 
of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 54 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
4.3 Credit risk 
Net charge-offs (NCO) –Appendix 43 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. The impact of loan 
diversification is negative while the impact of non-interest-income diversification is 
positive. The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is -0.0016. The coefficient on 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 0.0028. 
Sub-period analysis: 
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Table 53: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications  
         for Money Center BHCs for Total Period  
        
     Market Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR 
Activity diversification    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 + + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + + 
Scale interaction    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction    
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 - 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 -  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return     
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Table 54: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Money Center BHCs  
         for Sub-periods      
            
 
 
         Market Returns 
 
   Before The Crisis  During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR SR RASR 
Activity diversification       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 + +   + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
  -  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
  +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + + +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     + + 
Scale interaction       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 -     
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
  +  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
    + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 - -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     + + 
Activity interaction       
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    - 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 - -    
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  - - 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
  
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return      
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The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-0.0241) during the crisis. The coefficient 
on loan diversification (H3) is significantly negative (-0.0017) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of loan diversification 
and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to NCO with the coefficient 
of 0.0030 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still increase 
NCO with positive net impact of –0.0017 + 0.0030 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.5667. The 
results show that the sign of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of 
security ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative 
to positive. 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to NCO with the coefficient of 0.0077 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still increases NCO before the crisis. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(0.0026) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications 
(H4*H6) is significantly negative (-0.0045) before the crisis while it becomes 
insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for credit risk - Table 55 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 56 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
4.4 Market risk 
(a) Maturity gap (MG) –Appendix 44 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
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Table 55: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications 
         for Money Center BHCs for Total Period 
      
  Credit Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 - 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
NCO: net charge-offs   
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Table 56: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Money Center BHCs 
         for Sub-periods    
        
 
 
           Credit Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO NCO 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 -   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 +   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 +   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
NCO: net charge-offs    
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Four types of diversification have significant impacts on MG. The impacts of 
domestic geographic diversification and loan diversification are positive while the 
impacts of security diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification are negative. 
Although individual domestic geographic diversification (H2) has no significant impact 
on MG, the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) 
is significantly and positively related to MG with the coefficient of 0.3992. Therefore, 
domestic geographic diversification still increases MG. 
Although individual loan diversification (H3) has no significant impact on MG, the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively 
related to MG with the coefficient of 0.6492. Therefore, loan diversification still 
increases MG. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -0.6013. The coefficient on 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is -0.2735. 
The interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has 
significant positive impact on MG with the coefficient of 0.7665. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-2.5801) during the crisis. However, the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and positively related to MG with the coefficient of 0.3610. Therefore, 
domestic geographic diversification still increases ROE. Moreover, the interaction of 
domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and 
positively related to MG with the coefficient of 1.8465during the crisis. Even if S2 were 
1, the net impact of –2.5801 + 0.1.8465 * S2 would still be negative. Therefore, the 
impact of domestic geographic diversification is negative during the crisis. 
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The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (0.3044) before 
the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly negative (-0.6971) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. However, the interaction 
of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and negatively 
related to MG with the coefficient of -1.6011 during the crisis. Therefore, security 
diversification still reduces MG during the crisis. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is significantly negative 
(-0.3379) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. However, the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and negatively related to MG with the coefficient of -0.0198 during the 
crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still reduces MG during the crisis 
The coefficient on the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications 
(H4*H6) is significantly positive (0.8667) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. 
(b) Derivatives loss (DL) –Appendix 45 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only the interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has 
significant positive impact on DL with the coefficient of 0.0006. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and negatively related to DL with the coefficient of -0.0025 during the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still reduces DL during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
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diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly negative (-0.0002) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of 
all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is significantly positive (0.0007) before 
the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
(c) Market beta (MB) –Appendix 46 reports the statistical results.   
Total period: 
No diversifications or interactions have significant impacts on MB. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly negative (-0.3925) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
(d) Interest rate beta (IRB) –Appendix 47 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on IRB. The impact of domestic 
geographic diversification is positive while the impact of non-interest-income 
diversification is negative. Although individual domestic geographic diversification (H2) 
has no significant impact on IRB, the interaction of domestic geographic diversification 
and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to IRB with the 
coefficient of 0.4176. Therefore, domestic geographic diversification still increases IRB. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is -0.3695. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to IRB 
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with the coefficient of 3.4411 during the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still increases IRB during the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes negatively significant (-6.0019) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly negative 
(-0.3629) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. However, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and positively related to IRB with the coefficient of 41.1594 before the 
crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still increase IRB with 
positive net impact of –0.3629 + 41.1594 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0089. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from negative to positive. Moreover, the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively 
related to IRB with the coefficient of 159.2641 during the crisis. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still increases IRB during the crisis. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-3.7632) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively 
significant (-4.6397) during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (10.0336) during the crisis. 
(e) Value at Riak (VaR) –Appendix 48 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on VaR. Both the impacts of 
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security diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification are positive. The coefficient 
on security diversification (H4) is 0.0002. Although individual off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) has no significant impact on VaR, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to VaR with the coefficient of 0.000007. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still 
increases VaR. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to VaR 
with the coefficient of 0.0002 before the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still increases VaR before the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on loan diversification (H3) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is 
significantly and negatively related to VaR with the coefficient of -0.0002 before the 
crisis. Therefore, loan diversification still reduces VaR before the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and negatively related to VaR with the coefficient of -0.0004 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still reduces VaR before the crisis. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is significantly negative 
(-0.0001) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and positively related to VaR with the coefficient of 0.000007 before the 
crisis. Even if S6 were 1, the net impact of –0.0001 + 0.000007 * S6 would still be 
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negative. Therefore, the impact of off-balance-sheet diversification is negative before the 
crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively 
significant (0.0009) during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of 
all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes negatively significant (-0.0016) during the crisis. 
Summary for market risk - Table 57 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 58 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
4.5 Default risk 
Distance to default (Z-score) –Appendix 49 reports the statistical results.   
Total period: 
Only domestic geographic diversification has significant impact on Z. The impact is 
positive. Although individual domestic geographic diversification (H2) has no significant 
impact on Z, the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio 
(H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to Z with the coefficient of 821.82. 
Therefore, domestic geographic diversification still increases Z. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to Z with 
the coefficient of 1036.01 before the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still increases Z before the crisis. 
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Table 57: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Money Center BHCs  
         for Total Period      
              
              Market Risk  
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB VaR 
Activity diversification       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
    
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
    
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 -    + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
   -  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 -         
Scale interaction       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 +   +  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 +     
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
    
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
    
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 -       + 
Activity interaction       
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
    
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 +     
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   +       
 
 
 
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta  
 
VaR: value at risk  
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Table 58: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for Money Center BHCs 
  
 
         for Sub-periods      
    
 
                        
 
                      Market Risk 
   
 
                Before The Crisis               During The Crisis  
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
MG DL MB IRB VaR MG DL MB IRB VaR 
Activity diversification             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
     -     
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +           
Security Div. (SD) H4 -         -  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
   -        
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 -       -       -   
Scale interaction             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 +    + +   +  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 +    -       
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
    - - -    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
   +      +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         + -         
Activity interaction             
DGD * LD H2*H3 
           
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 - -       - + 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 +         +  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   +               - 
 
     
 
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta       
VaR: value at risk           
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The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly positive (769.86) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for default risk - Table 59 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 60 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
SUMMARY OF DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERACTION EFFECTS FOR 
MONEY CENTER BHCs 
a. Total period: Table 61 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - The interaction of domestic geographic diversification and 
deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4), and the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction 
of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable 
impacts. 
For market returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), and off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
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Table 59: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications 
         for Money Center BHCs for Total Period 
      
  Default Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation Z 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
Z: distance to default  
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Table 60: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications  
          for Money Center BHCs for Sub-periods   
        
 
 
        Default Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation Z Z 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 +   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
Z: distance to default   
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Table 61: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Money Center BHCs for Total Period   
                                                
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=5)    (n=1)   (n=13)  
    Accounting Returns   Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0  1 0 1  0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 1 3  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 0 3   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  1 0 1  2 2 4  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 2 3   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1   
                                                
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk       Market Risk    Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 15 0 15 x 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 x 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 20 20 40 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 8 15 1.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 100 100 0.00 20 0 20 X 0 0 0 . 15 8 23 1.88 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 20 0 20 X 0 0 0 . 23 0 23 X 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 40 40 0.00 100 0 100 x 15 15 31 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 15 0 15 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 20 20 40 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 15 23 0.53 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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For credit risk - Loan diversification (H3) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratio greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that 
favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of domestic 
geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - The interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that 
favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
b. Before the crisis: Table 62 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2) and the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that unfavorable 
impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2) and 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the 
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interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), 
and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable 
impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Loan diversification (H3) and the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Security diversification (H4), non-interest-income diversification 
(H5), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, loan 
diversification (H3), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification 
and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - The interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2) and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
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Table 62: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Money Center BHCs Before The Crisis   
                                                
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=5)    (n=1)   (n=13)  
   Accounting Returns   Market Returns     Credit Risk       Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 1 0 1  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  3 0 3  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 1 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  2 0 2   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 2 2  1 0 1  1 3 4  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 1 2  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 1 4  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 3 3  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  2 0 2  1 0 1  3 2 5  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1   
                                                
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                             
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 25 0 25 x 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 23 0 23 x 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 8 15 1.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 20 0 20 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 100 100 0.00 20 0 20 X 0 0 0 . 23 8 31 2.88 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 40 0 40 X 0 0 0 . 15 0 15 X 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 40 40 0.00 100 0 100 x 8 23 31 0.35 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 20 20 40 1.00 0 0 0 . 8 15 23 0.53 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 20 0 20 X 0 0 0 . 23 8 31 2.88 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 23 23 0.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 15 15 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 40 0 40 X 100 0 100 x 23 15 38 1.53 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 8 15 1.00 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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diversifications (H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
c. During the crisis: Table 63 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - The interaction of domestic geographic diversification and 
deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6), and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic geographic 
diversification (H2) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), security 
diversification (H4), non-interest-income diversification (H5), off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) benefit BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, loan diversification (H3), the interaction of domestic geographic and 
loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. 
For market risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), security diversification 
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Table 63: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for Money Center BHCs During The Crisis   
                                              
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=5)   (n=1)   (n=13)  
    Accounting Returns   Market Returns     Credit Risk       Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 1 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 1 4  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 0 3   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  2 2 4  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  4 0 4  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 1 0 1  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  3 0 3   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  0 0 0  3 1 4  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 3 3  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1   
                                              
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk       Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                            
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 25 25 0.00 50 0 50 x 100 0 100 x 20 0 20 x 0 0 0 . 23 8 31 2.88 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 20 0 20 x 0 0 0 . 15 0 15 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 20 0 20 x 0 0 0 . 23 0 23 X 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 40 40 0.00 0 0 0 . 15 15 31 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 25 0 25 x 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 40 0 40 X 0 0 0 . 31 0 31 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 25 0 25 x 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 23 0 23 X 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 20 20 40 1.00 0 0 0 . 23 8 31 2.88 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 20 20 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 23 23 0.00 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 20 0 20 x 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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(H4), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
(H4), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of 
domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), and the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) hurt BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable 
impacts. 
For default risk – No diversifications or interactions advantage BHCs. 
5 INTERNATIONAL BHCs 
5.1 Accounting returns 
(a) Return on asset (ROA) –Appendix 50 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Five types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. The impacts of 
international diversification, domestic geographic diversification and loan diversification 
are negative while the impacts of security diversification and non-interest-income 
diversification are positive. 
The coefficient on international geographic diversification (H1) is -0.0162. Although 
individual domestic geographic diversification (H2) has no significant impact on ROA, 
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the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is 
significantly and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -0.0105. Therefore, 
domestic geographic diversification still reduces ROA. The coefficient on loan 
diversification (H3) is -0.0292. 
Although individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on ROA, 
the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0326. Therefore, security 
diversification still increases ROA. Although individual non-interest-income 
diversification (H5) has no significant impact on ROA, the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is 
significantly and positively related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.9803. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still increases ROA. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant positive impact on ROA with the coefficient of 0.0365. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and negatively related to ROA 
with the coefficient of -0.0116 before the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still reduces ROA before the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on loan diversification (H3) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is 
significantly and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -0.0203 before the 
crisis. Therefore, loan diversification still reduces ROA before the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
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it becomes negatively significant (-0.0369) during the crisis. However, the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related 
to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0196 before the crisis. Therefore, security diversification 
still increases ROA before the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively 
related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.9656 before the crisis. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still increases ROA before the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0011 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still increases ROA during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications 
(H4*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (0.0741) 
during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively 
significant (-0.5482) during the crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) –Appendix 51 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on RAROA. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification, loan diversification and non-interest-income 
diversification are negative. The coefficient on international geographic diversification 
(H1) is -78.2784. The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is -55.1982. The coefficient 
  
 
183 
on non-interest-income diversification (H3) is -33.6704. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant positive impact on RAROA with the coefficient of 81.6928. The interaction of 
international geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5) has 
significant positive impact on RAROA with the coefficient of 52.4429. The interaction of 
domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) has significant 
negative impact on RAROA with the coefficient of -29.5276. The interaction of 
all-activity diversifications (H1* H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant positive impact on 
RAROA with the coefficient of 83.7005. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on international geographic diversification (H1) is significantly 
negative (-100.6305) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
However, the interaction of international geographic diversification and cross-border loan 
exposure ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and negatively related to RAROA with the 
coefficient of -1.5457 during the crisis. Therefore, international geographic 
diversification still reduces RAROA during the crisis. 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-329.6981) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is significantly negative (-74.4565) before 
the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. However, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to 
RAROA with the coefficient of -171.7180. Therefore, loan diversification still reduces 
RAROA. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes negatively significant (-65.5254) during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction 
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of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively 
related to RAROA with the coefficient of 158.9234 during the crisis. Therefore, greater 
security diversification could still improve RAROA with positive net impact of –65.5254 
+ 158.9234 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.4124. The results show that the sign of the impact 
of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio during the crisis. If the 
ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly negative 
(-44.6512) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-36.3439) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications 
(H1*H3) is significantly positive (107.7094) before the crisis while it is significantly 
negative (-171.0714) during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (834.4693) during the crisis. The coefficient on the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is insignificant 
before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (101.9944) during the crisis. 
(c) Return on equity (ROE) –Appendix 52 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Four types of diversification have significant impacts on ROE. The impacts of 
domestic geographic diversification and loan diversification are negative while the 
impacts of security diversification and non-interest-income diversification are positive. 
Although individual domestic geographic diversification (H2) has no significant 
impact on ROE, the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio 
(H2*S2) is significantly and negatively related to ROE with the coefficient of -0.1202. 
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Therefore, domestic geographic diversification still reduces ROE. The coefficient on loan 
diversification (H3) is -0.3174. Although individual security diversification (H4) has no 
significant impact on ROE, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.4503. 
Therefore, security diversification still increases ROE. Although individual 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) has no significant impact on ROE, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 18.0231. Therefore, 
security diversification still increases ROE. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant positive impact on ROE with the coefficient of 0.3814. The interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has significant negative impact 
on ROE with the coefficient of -0.1430. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and negatively related to ROE 
with the coefficient of -0.1594 before the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still reduces ROE before the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on loan diversification (H3) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is 
significantly and negatively related to ROE with the coefficient of -0.3100 before the 
crisis. Therefore, loan diversification still reduces ROE before the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes negatively significant (-0.4877) during the crisis. However, the interaction of 
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security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related 
to ROE with the coefficient of 0.2446 before the crisis. Therefore, security diversification 
still increases ROE before the crisis. On the other hand, the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to ROE 
with the coefficient of 0.8626during the crisis. Therefore, greater security diversification 
could still improve ROE with positive net impact of –0.4877 + 0.8626 * S4 if S4 is 
greater than 0.5654. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large 
enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Although both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively 
related to ROE with the coefficient of 14.7023 before the crisis. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still increases ROE before the crisis. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-0.2679) during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 0.0110 during the crisis. 
Even if S6 were 1, the net impact of –0.2679 + 0.0110 * S6 would still be negative. 
Therefore, the impact of off-balance-sheet diversification is negative during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively 
significant (2.3271) during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (0.9784) during the crisis. The coefficient on the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is insignificant 
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before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-6.8405) during the crisis. 
(d) Risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE) –Appendix 53 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on RAROE. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification, loan diversification and non-interest-income 
diversification are negative. The coefficient on international geographic diversification 
(H1) is -134.3897. The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is -71.8340. The 
coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is -65.4190. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant positive impact on RAROE with the coefficient of 115.9632. The interaction 
of international geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5) has 
significant positive impact on RAROE with the coefficient of 100.0126. The interaction 
of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) has significant 
negative impact on RAROE with the coefficient of -43.1060. The interaction of 
all-activity diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant positive impact on 
RAROE with the coefficient of 140.5912. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on international geographic diversification (H1) is significantly 
negative (-214.7809) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
However, the interaction of international geographic diversification and cross-border loan 
exposure ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and negatively related to RAROE with the 
coefficient of -2.1174 during the crisis. Therefore, international geographic 
diversification still reduces RAROE during the crisis. 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly positive 
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(79.1227) before the crisis while it is significantly negative (-451.5756) during the crisis. 
Moreover, the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio 
(H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to RAROE with the coefficient of 
427.9980 during the crisis. Even if S2 were 1, the net impact of –451.5756 + 427.9980 * 
S2 would still be negative. Therefore, the impact of domestic geographic diversification 
is negative during the crisis. 
The coefficient on loan geographic diversification (H3) is significantly negative 
(-156.4724) before the crisis while it is significantly positive (113.5199) during the crisis. 
Moreover, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly 
and negatively related to RAROE with the coefficient of -209.7732 during the crisis. 
Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce RAROE with negative net 
impact of 113.5199 – 209.7732 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.5412. The results show that 
the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio during the 
crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes negatively significant (-83.8278) during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction 
of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively 
related to RAROE with the coefficient of 200.9623 during the crisis. Therefore, greater 
security diversification could still improve RAROE with positive net impact of –83.8278 
+ 200.9623 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.4172. The results show that the sign of the impact 
of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio during the crisis. If the 
ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly negative 
(-88.1935) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-42.6804) during the crisis. 
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The coefficient on the interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications 
(H1*H3) is significantly positive (225.9622) before the crisis while it is significantly 
negative (-230.1052) during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is significantly negative (-89.4125) before 
the crisis while it is significantly positive (1081.3990) during the crisis. The coefficient 
on the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is 
insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (129.2267) during 
the crisis. 
Summary for accounting returns - Table 64 reports the summary of significant effects 
of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 65 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 5.2 Market 
returns 
(a) Stock return (SR) –Appendix 54 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on SR. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification and loan diversification are negative while the 
impact of off-balance-sheet diversification is positive. 
Although individual international geographic diversification (H1) has no significant 
impact on SR, the interaction of international geographic diversification and cross-border 
loan exposure ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and negatively related to SR with the 
coefficient of -0.0228. Therefore, international geographic diversification still reduces SR. 
Although individual loan diversification (H3) has no significant impact on SR, the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively 
related to SR with the coefficient of -2.6280. Therefore, loan diversification still reduces 
SR. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 0.8241. 
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Table 64: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for International BHCs 
          for Total Period 
     
            
           Accounting Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification      
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 - -  - 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 - - - - 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 -  - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction      
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 -  -  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -  -  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +  +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 +  +  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction      
IGD*LD H1*H3 + + + + 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 
 +  + 
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 -  - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  -  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   +   + 
 
 
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity  
 
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity   
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Table 65: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for International BHCs   
          for Sub-periods          
                    
 
                 Accounting Returns    
          Before The Crisis              During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation ROA RAROA ROE RAROE ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification           
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1  -  -      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   +   -  - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3  -  -     + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    - - - - 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 -  -      
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6           - - - 
Scale interaction           
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
      -  - 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 -  -      + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -  -    -  - 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +  +    + + + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 +  +       
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         +   +   
Activity interaction           
IGD*LD H1*H3 
 +  +   -  - 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 
 +  +   +  + 
DGD * LD H2*H3    -   +  + 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 -  -   - + - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
    + + + + 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6       + -   - + 
 
     
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity       
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity      
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The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant negative impact on SR with the coefficient of -1.3718. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on international geographic diversification (H1) is insignificant before 
the crisis while it becomes positively significant (6.2288) during the crisis. However, the 
interaction of international geographic diversification and cross-border loan exposure 
ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -0.0359 
before the crisis. Therefore, international geographic diversification still reduces SR 
before the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly positive (1.1470) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -1.7564 before the crisis. Therefore, 
greater security diversification could still reduce SR with negative net impact of 1.1470 – 
1.7564 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.6531. The results show that the sign of the impact of 
security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio before the crisis. If the ratio 
is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is significantly positive 
(1.0575) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H1*H5) is significantly positive (0.8498) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly negative 
(-1.8330) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The coefficient 
on the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is 
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significantly negative (-1.3643) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the 
crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) –Appendix 55 reports the statistical results.    
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on RASR. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification and loan diversification are negative while the 
impact of off-balance-sheet diversification is positive. 
Although individual international geographic diversification (H1) has no significant 
impact on RASR, the interaction of international geographic diversification and 
cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and negatively related to RASR 
with the coefficient of -0.1460. Therefore, international geographic diversification still 
reduces RASR. Although individual loan diversification (H3) has no significant impact 
on RASR, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly 
and negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of -15.3783. Therefore, loan 
diversification still reduces RASR. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification 
(H6) is 3.0290. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant negative impact on RASR with the coefficient of -10.2076. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on international geographic diversification (H1) is insignificant before 
the crisis while it becomes positively significant (64.4689) during the crisis. However, 
the interaction of international geographic diversification and cross-border loan exposure 
ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of 
-0.2107 before the crisis. Therefore, international geographic diversification still reduces 
RASR before the crisis. 
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The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (74.9838) during the crisis. However, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to 
RASR with the coefficient of -12.1785 before the crisis. Therefore, loan diversification 
still reduces RASR before the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly positive (5.3929) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of -8.1406 before the crisis. Therefore, 
greater security diversification could still reduce RASR with negative net impact of 
5.3929 – 8.1406 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.6625. The results show that the sign of the 
impact of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio before the crisis. 
If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(5.5825) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of -704.1505 before 
the crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce RASR 
with negative net impact of 5.5825 – 704.1505 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0080. The 
results show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on 
the scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is significantly positive 
(4.7303) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
The coefficient on the interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications 
(H1*H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant 
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(-115.6986) during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly negative 
(-12.7469) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for market returns - Table 66 reports the summary of significant effects 
of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 67 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
5.3 Credit risk 
Net charge-offs (NCO) –Appendix 56 reports the statistical results. Total period: 
Four types of diversification have significant impacts on NCO. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification, loan diversification, non-interest-income 
diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification are positive. The coefficient on 
international geographic diversification (H1) is 0.0055. Although individual loan 
diversification (H3) has no significant impact on NCO, the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to NCO with 
the coefficient of 0.0093. Therefore, loan diversification still increases NCO. The 
coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 0.0070. Although individual 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact on NCO, the interaction 
of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly 
and positively related to NCO with the coefficient of 0.0001. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still increases NCO. The interaction of international geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5) has significant negative impact on NCO 
with the coefficient of -0.0056. 
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Table 66: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications  
          for International BHCs for Total Period  
        
       Market Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR 
Activity diversification    
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + + 
Scale interaction    
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 - - 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 - - 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction    
IGD*LD H1*H3 
  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 
  
DGD * LD H2*H3 
  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 - - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return     
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
197 
Table 67: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for International BHCs  
          for Sub-periods      
            
 
 
          Market Returns 
 
    Before The Crisis   During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR SR RASR 
Activity diversification       
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1   + + 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
     
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +  + + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 + +    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
 +    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + +     
Scale interaction       
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 - -    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
     
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 - -    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 - -    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction       
IGD*LD H1*H3 -  - - 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 +     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
     
DGD * NIID H2*H5 - -    
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -     
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
  
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return      
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Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on loan diversification (H3) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is 
significantly and positively related to NCO with the coefficient of 0.0130 before the crisis. 
Therefore, loan diversification still increases NCO before the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly positive (0.0055) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(0.0098) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to NCO with the coefficient of 0.0001 before the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still increases NCO before the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H1*H5) is significantly negative (-0.0081) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is significantly negative (-0.0094) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for credit risk - Table 68 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 69 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
5.4 Market risk 
(a) Maturity gap (MG) –Appendix 57 reports the statistical results.    
Total period: 
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Three types of diversification have significant impacts on MG. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification and loan diversification are positive while the 
impact of domestic geographic diversification is negative. 
The coefficient on international geographic diversification (H1) is 0.8216. The 
coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is -1.7115. The coefficient on 
loan diversification (H3) is 1.6223. Moreover, the interaction of loan diversification and 
loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to MG with the coefficient of 
-0.9589. Even if S3 were 1, the net impact of 1.6223 - 0.9589 * S3 would still be positive. 
Therefore, the impact of loan diversification is positive. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant negative impact on MG with the coefficient of -1.8756. The interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has significant positive impact on 
MG with the coefficient of 1.7536. The interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) has significant positive impact on MG with 
the coefficient of 0.7095. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly negative 
(-1.5258) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Although both 
the coefficients on loan diversification (H3) are insignificant before and during the crisis, 
the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and 
positively related to MG with the coefficient of 5.6413 during the crisis. Therefore, loan 
diversification still increases MG during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) is significantly positive (1.6140) 
before the crisis while it is significantly negative (-7.2756) during the crisis. 
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Table 68: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications 
          for International BHCs for Total Period  
      
  Credit Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO 
Activity diversification   
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 + 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 + 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 + 
Activity interaction   
IGD*LD H1*H3 
 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 - 
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
NCO: net charge-offs  
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Table 69: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for International BHCs 
          for Sub-periods    
        
 
 
           Credit Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO NCO 
Activity diversification     
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4 +   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 +   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 +   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 +   
Activity interaction     
IGD*LD H1*H3 
   
IGD*NIID H1*H5 -   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -   
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
 
NCO: net charge-offs     
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In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly positive (0.7174) before the 
crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
(b) Derivatives loss (DL) – Appendix 58 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Loan diversification (H3) has significant impact on DL. The impact is positive with 
the coefficient of 0.0004. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant negative impact on DL with the coefficient of -0.0005. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to DL 
with the coefficient of 0.0147 during the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still increases DL during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on loan diversification (H3) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is 
significantly and positively related to DL with the coefficient of 0.0051 during the crisis. 
Therefore, loan diversification still increases DL during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively 
related to DL with the coefficient of 0.0975 during the crisis. Therefore, 
non-interest-income diversification still increases DL during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
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diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively 
significant (-0.0079) during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (0.0315) during the crisis. 
(c) Market beta (MB) – Appendix 59 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on MB. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification and security diversification are positive. 
Although individual international geographic diversification (H1) has no significant 
impact on MB, the interaction of international geographic diversification and 
cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and positively related to MB 
with the coefficient of 0.0126. Therefore, international geographic diversification still 
increases MB. The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is 0.6125. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant negative impact on MB with the coefficient of -1.5262. In addition, the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has significant 
negative impact on MB with the coefficient of -1.0092. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and positively related to MB 
with the coefficient of 27.8847 during the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still increases MB during the crisis. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while 
it becomes positively significant (9.2622) during the crisis. 
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Although both the coefficients on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and positively related 
to MB with the coefficient of 0.1305 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet 
diversification still increases MB during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications 
(H4*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant 
(-13.3629) during the crisis. 
(d) Interest rate beta (IRB) –Appendix 60 reports the statistical results.   
Total period: 
Only loan diversification (H3) has significant impact on IRB. The impact is negative 
with the coefficient of -1.1887. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on international geographic diversification (H1) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of international geographic 
diversification and cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1) is significantly and 
positively related to IRB with the coefficient of 0.0158 before the crisis. Therefore, 
international geographic diversification still increases IRB before the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to IRB with the coefficient of 1.5817 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still increases IRB before the crisis. 
Summary for market risk - Table 70 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 71 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
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5.5 Default risk 
Distance to default (Z-score) –Appendix 61 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Three types of diversification have significant impacts on Z. The impacts of 
international geographic diversification, loan diversification and non-interest-income 
diversification are negative. The coefficient on international geographic diversification 
(H1) is -1395.75. The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is -821.88. The coefficient 
on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is -467.28. 
The interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) has 
significant positive impact on Z with the coefficient of 1409.05. The interaction of 
international geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5) has 
significant positive impact on Z with the coefficient of 909.63. The interaction of 
domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) has significant 
negative impact on Z with the coefficient of -675.30. The interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant positive impact on Z with the 
coefficient of 1987.77. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on international geographic diversification (H1) is significantly 
negative (-1760.68) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The 
coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the crisis 
while it becomes negatively significant (-6594.94) during the crisis. Although both the 
coefficients on loan diversification (H3) are insignificant before and during the crisis, the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively 
related to Z with the coefficient of -3584.68 during the crisis. Therefore, loan 
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Table 70: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for International BHCs 
           for Total Period 
 
    
            
            Market Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification      
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 +    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 -    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 + +  - 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
  +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction      
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
  +  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction      
IGD*LD H1*H3 - - -  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 
    
DGD * LD H2*H3 +    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +    
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  -  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
  
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
207 
Table 71: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for International BHCs 
  
           for Sub-periods      
    
                    
 
      Market Risk 
   
            Before The Crisis         During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification           
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 -         
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
         
Security Div. (SD) H4 
       +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5          
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6       -         
Scale interaction           
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
   +      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
      + +  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
    + +   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   +      
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
      +   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6             +   
Activity interaction           
IGD*LD H1*H3          
IGD*NIID H1*H5 
         
DGD * LD H2*H3 +    -    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +      -   
SD * OBSD H4*H6        -  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6           +     
 
     
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta      
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diversification still reduces Z during the crisis. The coefficient on security diversification 
(H4) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-1341.74) 
during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to Z with the coefficient of 3209.13 during 
the crisis. Therefore, greater security diversification could still increase Z with positive 
net impact of –1341.74 + 3209.13 * S4 if S4 is greater than 0.4182. The results show that 
the sign of the impact of security diversification depends on the scale of security ratio 
during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly negative 
(-701.84) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The coefficient 
on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes negatively significant (-780.29) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant 
(15317.57) during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (1855.05) during the crisis. 
Summary for default risk - Table 72 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 73 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
SUMMARY OF DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERACTION EFFECTS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BHCs 
a. Total period: Table 74 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - The interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
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(H4*S4), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income 
ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications 
(H1*H3), the interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H1*H5), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, international 
geographic diversification (H1), loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5), 
and the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) hurt BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, the interaction of international geographic diversification and 
cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts.  
For credit risk - The interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H1*H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratio greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, international geographic 
diversification (H1), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
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Table 72: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications 
          for International BHCs for Total Period 
      
  Default Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation Z 
Activity diversification   
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 - 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 - 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
IGD*LD H1*H3 + 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 + 
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + 
 
Z: distance to default  
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Table 73: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications  
          for International BHCs for Sub-periods   
        
 
 
         Default Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation Z Z 
Activity diversification     
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 -   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 - 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 - 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 -   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   - 
Scale interaction     
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 
   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 - 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
IGD*LD H1*H3 
   
IGD*NIID H1*H5 + + 
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 + 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 - - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 + 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + + 
 
Z: distance to default   
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diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less 
than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of international geographic and 
loan diversifications (H1*H3), and the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, international geographic 
diversification (H1), loan diversification (H3), security diversification (H4), the 
interaction of international geographic diversification and cross-border loan exposure 
ratio (H1*S1), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), 
and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable 
impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - The interaction of international geographic and loan 
diversifications (H1*H3), the interaction of international geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
international geographic diversification (H1), loan diversification (H3), 
non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts.
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Table 74: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for International BHCs for Total Period   
                                                  
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)   (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns   Market Returns    Credit Risk      Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                             
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 0 3 3  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 6 6  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 4 4  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 2 3  0 1 1  1 7 8  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 4 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2   
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 3 3  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 2 2  0 2 2  0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 5 6  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  2 1 3  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1   
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3 4 0 4  0 0 0  0 0 0  3 0 3  1 0 1  8 0 8  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  4 0 4  
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 2 2  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 6 6  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  3 0 3   
                                                  
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk       Market Risk     Default Risk    All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                             
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 0 75 75 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 50 75 0.50 0 100 100 0.00 8 58 67 0.14 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 33 33 0.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 42 50 0.19 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 17 8 25 2.13 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 75 0 75 X 100 0 100 X 67 0 67 X 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 33 0 33 X 
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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b. Before the crisis: Table 75 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), the interaction 
of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the 
interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3), the interaction 
of international geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5), and the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, international geographic diversification (H1), loan diversification 
(H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), 
and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable 
impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Loan diversification (H3), security diversification (H4), 
non-interest-income diversification (H5), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), and the 
interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of international geographic 
diversification and cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of international geographic and loan 
diversifications (H1*H3), the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
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diversifications (H2*H5), and the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - The interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H1*H5) and the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security diversification 
(H4), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of loan diversification and 
loan ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating 
that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2) and off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that 
favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of 
international geographic diversification and cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1), 
the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - The interaction of international geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5) and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
international geographic diversification (H1), non-interest-income diversification (H5), 
the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio
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Table 75: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for International BHCs Before The Crisis   
                                                 
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)   (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk        Market Risk        Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                             
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 3 3  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 2 2  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 1 3  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 2 2  1 0 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 4 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  3 0 3   
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 3 3  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 2 2  0 2 2  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 5 5  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 2 0 2  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  2 3 5  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 2 0 2  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  2 2 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1   
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3 2 0 2  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 1 3  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 2 0 2  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  5 0 5  
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 2 2  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 2 2  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 6 6  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 1 2  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  2 0 2   
                                                 
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk       Market Risk      Default Risk    All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                             
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 50 50 0.00 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 50 50 0.00 50 0 50 x 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 8 33 42 0.24 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 42 42 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 50 0 50 X 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 17 25 42 0.68 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 50 0 50 X 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 17 17 33 1.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3 50 0 50 X 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 50 0 50 X 50 0 50 X 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 42 0 42 X 
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 17 0 17 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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(H5*S5), and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
c. During the crisis: Table 76 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Loan diversification (H3), the interaction of domestic 
geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of international 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5), the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
domestic geographic diversification (H2), security diversification (H4), off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6), the interaction of international geographic diversification and 
cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications 
(H1*H3), the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - International geographic diversification (H1) and loan 
diversification (H3) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that 
favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of 
international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratio less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
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For credit risk – No diversifications or interactions advantage BHCs. 
For market risk - The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3), the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5), and the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security diversification (H4), the interaction of 
domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction 
of all-activity diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - The interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
the interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H1*H5), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction 
of all-activity diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), security diversification (H4), 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
6 All BHCs 
6.1 Accounting returns 
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Table 76: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for International BHCs During The Crisis   
                                                
   (n=4)    (n=2)   (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)   (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk        Market Risk        Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                            
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 3 3  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 1 0 1  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  3 0 3  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 4 4  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 6 6  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 3 3  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 4 4   
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  1 2 3  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 1 1  0 5 5  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 3 0 3  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  4 0 4  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  2 1 3   
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3 0 2 2  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 4 4  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  3 0 3  
DGD * LD H2*H3 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  4 0 4  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 1 2 3  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 1 1  2 3 5  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 4 0 4  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  6 0 6  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 1 2 3  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  2 3 5   
                                                
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk      Market Risk    Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                            
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 x 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 25 0 25 X 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 75 75 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 33 33 0.00 
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 42 42 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 75 0 75 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 33 0 33 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 33 33 0.00 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 25 0 25 X 
DGD * LD H2*H3 50 0 50 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 100 0 100 X 33 0 33 X 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 25 50 75 0.50 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 100 100 0.00 17 25 42 0.68 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 100 0 100 x 50 0 50 X 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 25 50 75 0.50 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 100 0 100 x 17 25 42 0.68 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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(a) Return on asset (ROA) –Appendix 62 reports the statistical results.   
Total period: 
Four types of diversification have significant impacts on ROA. They are domestic 
geographic diversification, loan diversification, security diversification and 
non-interest-income diversification. The coefficient on domestic geographic 
diversification (H2) is -0.0116. The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is 0.0064. 
However, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly 
and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -0.0102. Therefore, greater 
non-interest-income diversification could still reduce ROA with negative net impact of 
0.0064 – 0.0102 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.6275. The results show that the sign of the 
impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio. If the ratio is large 
enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -0.0015. However, the interaction 
of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively 
related to ROA with the coefficient of 0.0048. Therefore, greater security diversification 
could still improve ROA with positive net impact of –0.0015 + 0.0048 * S4 if S4 is 
greater than 0.3125. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the 
impact turns from negative to positive. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 0.0024. However, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -0.3824. Therefore, 
greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce ROA with negative net 
impact of 0.0024 – 0.3824 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0063. The results show that the 
sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the scale of 
non-interest-income ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to 
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negative. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has 
significant positive impact on ROA with the coefficient of 0.0087. In addition, the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) has 
significant positive impact on ROA with the coefficient of 0.0052. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly negative 
(-0.0118) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The coefficient 
on security diversification (H4) is significantly negative (-0.0014) before the crisis while 
it becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to ROA 
with the coefficient of 0.0030 before the crisis. Therefore, greater security diversification 
could still improve ROA with positive net impact of –0.0014 + 0.0030 * S4 if S4 is 
greater than 0.4667. The results show that the sign of the impact of security 
diversification depends on the scale of security ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large 
enough, the impact turns from negative to positive. 
Both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) before and during 
the crisis are significantly positive (0.0025 and 0.0026, respectively). Moreover, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to ROA with the coefficient of -0.3742 before the 
crisis. Therefore, greater non-interest-income diversification could still reduce ROA with 
negative net impact of 0.0025 – 0.3742 * S5 if S5 is greater than 0.0067. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of non-interest-income diversification depends on the 
scale of non-interest-income ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from positive to negative. 
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The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly positive (0.0108) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic 
and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly positive (0.0033) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
(b) Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) –Appendix 63 reports the statistical 
results.   
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on RAROA. The impacts of 
security diversification and non-interest-income diversification are positive. Although 
individual security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on RAROA, the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and 
positively related to RAROA with the coefficient of 4.9704. Therefore, security 
diversification still increases RAROA. The coefficient on non-interest-income 
diversification (H5) is 1.0896. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes positively significant (16.1598) during the crisis. Both the 
coefficients on loan diversification (H3) before and during the crisis are significantly 
positive (9.4096 and 12.7155, respectively). Moreover, the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to RAROA 
with the coefficient of -16.1682 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still reduce RAROA with negative net impact of 9.4096 – 16.1682 * S3 if S3 is 
greater than 0.5820. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification 
depends on the scale of loan ratio before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
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turns from positive to negative. The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is 
insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (4.3269) during the 
crisis. In addition, the coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 
significantly positive (1.7480) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the 
crisis. However, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively related to RAROA with 
the coefficient of 308.7365 during the crisis. Therefore, non-interest-income 
diversification still increases RAROA during the crisis. 
(c) Return on equity (ROE) –Appendix 64 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on ROE. Although individual 
loan diversification (H3) has no significant impact on ROE, the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to ROE with 
the coefficient of -0.0405. Therefore, loan diversification still reduces ROE. The 
coefficient on security diversification (H4) is -0.0062. However, the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related 
to ROE with the coefficient of 0.0279. Therefore, greater security diversification could 
still improve ROA with positive net impact of –0.0062 + 0.0279 * S4 if S4 is greater than 
0.2223. The results show that the sign of the impact of security diversification depends on 
the scale of security ratio. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from negative to 
positive. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) has 
significant positive impact on ROE with the coefficient of 0.0557. In addition, the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) has 
significant positive impact on ROE with the coefficient of 0.0279. 
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Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on domestic geographic diversification (H2) are 
insignificant before and during the crisis, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2) is significantly and negatively related to ROE 
with the coefficient of -0.0318 before the crisis. Therefore, domestic geographic 
diversification still reduces ROE before the crisis. Although both the coefficients on 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) are insignificant before and during the crisis, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and positively related to ROE with the coefficient of 4.2226 during the 
crisis. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still increases ROE during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly positive (0.0404) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. 
(d) Risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE) –Appendix 65 reports the statistical 
results. 
Total period: 
Only non-interest-income diversification (H5) has significant impact on RAROE. The 
impact is positive with the coefficient of 1.2280. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is significantly positive 
(1.7325) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. However, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and positively related to RAROE with the coefficient of 309.3526 during 
the crisis. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still increases RAROE during 
the crisis. 
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Summary for accounting returns - Table 77 reports the summary of significant 
effects of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 78 reports the summary 
of significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
6.2 Market returns 
(a) Stock return (SR) –Appendix 66 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only security diversification (H4) has significant impact on SR. The impact is 
positive with the coefficient of 0.0488. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes positively significant (0.7304) during the crisis. The coefficient on 
loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively 
significant (0.3682) during the crisis. The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is 
significantly positive (0.0596) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the 
crisis. The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is insignificant before 
the crisis while it becomes positively significant (0.1883) during the crisis. However, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to SR with the coefficient of -10.4155 before the 
crisis. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still reduces SR before the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively 
significant (-0.5275) during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of 
security and of-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is significantly negative (-0.0690) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis.  
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Table 77: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for All 
 
          BHCs for Total Period 
    
            
            Accounting Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 -    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +    
Security Div. (SD) H4 -  -  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + +  + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6         
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -  -  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 + + +  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 +  +  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +  +  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
    
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6         
 
 
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity  
 
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity   
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Table 78: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for All BHCs   
          for Sub-periods         
                    
 
              Accounting Returns    
             Before The Crisis              During The Crisis 
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
ROA RAROA ROE RAROE ROA RAROA ROE RAROE 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 -      +   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 + + + + + + + + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 -      +   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + +  + +    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6                 
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
  -       
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 - - - - -  - - 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +         
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -      + + + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6                 
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 +  +       
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +         
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
         
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6                 
 
     
ROA: return on asset      RAROA: risk-adjusted return on asset     ROE: return on equity       
RAROE: risk-adjusted return on equity      
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(b) Risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) –Appendix 67 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on RASR. The impacts of loan 
diversification and security diversification are positive. The coefficient on loan 
diversification (H3) is 0.8153. The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is 0.2790. 
The interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant 
negative impact on RASR with the coefficient of -3.1407. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes positively significant (4.9388) during the crisis. The coefficient on 
loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively 
significant (3.9194) during the crisis. The coefficient security diversification (H4) is 
significantly positive (0.3971) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the 
crisis. The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is insignificant before 
the crisis while it becomes positively significant (0.9895) during the crisis. However, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to RASR with the coefficient of -57.5344 before 
the crisis. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still reduces RASR before the 
crisis. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-0.8343) during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively 
significant (-4.6560) during the crisis. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of 
all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is significantly negative (-2.5655) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
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Summary for market returns - Table 79 reports the summary of significant effects 
of diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 80 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
6.3 Credit risk 
Net charge-offs (NCO) –Appendix 68 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on NCO. They are 
non-interest-income diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification. The impact of 
non-interest-income diversification is negative while the impact of off-balance-sheet 
diversification is positive. The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 
-0.0006. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 0.0006. 
The interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has 
significant negative impact on NCO with the coefficient of -0.0014. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on loan diversification (H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes negatively significant (-0.0048) during the crisis. However, the interaction of 
loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and positively related to NCO 
with the coefficient of 0.0058during the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification 
could still increase NCO with positive net impact of –0.0048 + 0.0058 * S3 if S3 is 
greater than 0.8276. The results show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification 
depends on the scale of loan ratio during the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact 
turns from negative to positive. The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification 
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Table 79: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications  
          for All BHCs for Total Period  
        
      Market Returns 
  Variable Abbreviation SR RASR 
Activity diversification    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 + + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction    
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction    
DGD * LD H2*H3 
  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   - 
 
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return     
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Table 80: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for All BHCs 
          for Sub-periods      
            
 
 
          Market Returns 
 
    Before The Crisis   During The Crisis 
  
Variable 
Abbreviation 
SR RASR SR RASR 
Activity diversification       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
  + + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
  + + 
Security Div. (SD) H4 + +    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  + + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 +     - 
Scale interaction       
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
     
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
    - 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
     
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 - -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6         
Activity interaction       
DGD * LD H2*H3 
     
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
  - - 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -     
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   -     
 
 
SR: stock return     RASR: risk-adjusted stock return      
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(H5) is significantly negative (-0.0006) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. However, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and negatively related to NCO with the 
coefficient of -0.4803 during the crisis. Therefore, security diversification still reduces 
NCO during the crisis. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 
significantly positive (0.0005) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the 
crisis.  
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is significantly positive (0.0026) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (0.0095) during the crisis. The coefficient on the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is significantly 
negative (-0.0010) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
Summary for credit risk - Table 81 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 82 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods.  
6.4 Market risk 
(a) Maturity gap (MG) –Appendix 69 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on MG. They are 
non-interest-income diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification. Although 
individual non-interest-income diversification (H5) has no significant impact on MG, the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) 
is significantly and negatively related to MG with the coefficient of -1.5069.  
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Table 81: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications 
          for All BHCs for Total Period 
      
  Credit Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + 
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 + 
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 - 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
NCO: net charge-offs  
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Table 82: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications  
          for All BHCs for Sub-periods   
        
 
 
           Credit Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation NCO NCO 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 - 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 -   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 +   
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 + 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 - 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 +   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 + 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
NCO: net charge-offs   
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Therefore, non-interest-income diversification still reduces MG. The coefficient on 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 0.0579. 
The interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has 
significant negative impact on MG with the coefficient of -0.0730. The interaction of 
all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant negative impact on MG 
with the coefficient of -0.4227. 
Sub-period analysis: 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and negatively related to MG with the coefficient of -0.1650 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still reduces MG before the crisis. Although 
both the coefficients on non-interest-income diversification (H5) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and negatively related to MG with the 
coefficient of -1.3185 before the crisis. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification 
still reduces MG before the crisis. The coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification 
(H6) is significantly positive (0.0500) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. However, the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is significantly and negatively related to MG with the 
coefficient of -0.0473 during the crisis. Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still 
reduces MG during the crisis. 
. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (0.5756) 
during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is significantly positive (0.1491) before the 
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crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) is insignificant before the crisis 
while it becomes negatively significant (-0.1816) during the crisis. The coefficient on the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is significantly negative 
(-0.6580) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. 
(b) Derivatives loss (DL) –Appendix 70 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Only off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has significant impact on DL. The impact 
is positive with the coefficient of 0.00004. 
The interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant 
negative impact on DL with the coefficient of -0.0003. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is significantly negative 
(-0.0001) before the crisis while it is significantly positive (0.0001) during the crisis. 
Although both the coefficients on security diversification (H4) are insignificant before 
and during the crisis, the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) 
is significantly and positively related to DL with the coefficient of 0.0001 before the 
crisis. Therefore, security diversification still increases DL before the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively significant (0.0001) 
during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (0.0003) during the crisis. The coefficient on the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-0.0010) during the crisis. 
  
 
237 
(c) Market beta (MB) –Appendix 71 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on MB. The impacts of 
non-interest-income diversification and off-balance-sheet diversification are negative. 
The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is -0.1249. Although 
individual off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) has no significant impact on MB, the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and negatively related to MB with the coefficient of -0.0217. Therefore, 
off-balance-sheet diversification still reduces MB. 
The interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) has significant 
negative impact on MB with the coefficient of -1.6055. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is significantly positive (0.2180) 
before the crisis while it becomes insignificant during the crisis. The coefficient on 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes negatively significant (-0.5022) during the crisis. Although both the coefficients 
on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) are insignificant before and during the crisis, the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) is 
significantly and negatively related to MB with the coefficient of -0.0234 before the crisis. 
Therefore, off-balance-sheet diversification still reduces MB before the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes positively 
significant (1.5594) during the crisis. 
(d) Interest rate beta (IRB) –Appendix 72 reports the statistical results. 
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Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on IRB. The impacts of security 
diversification and off-balance diversification are positive. Although individual security 
diversification (H4) has no significant impact on IRB, the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to IRB 
with the coefficient of 0.3686. Therefore, security diversification still increases IRB. The 
coefficient on off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) is 0.0718. 
The interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) has significant positive impact on IRB with the coefficient of 0.1841. The 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) has significant 
negative impact on IRB with the coefficient of -0.1279. 
Sub-period analysis: 
There are no significant differences in the effects of diversifications and interactions 
on IRB between before and during crisis. 
Summary for market risk - Table 83 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 84 reports the summary of 
significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods.  
6.5 Default risk 
Distance to default (Z-score) –Appendix 73 reports the statistical results. 
Total period: 
Two types of diversification have significant impacts on Z. The impacts of security 
diversification and non-interest-income diversification are positive. Although individual 
security diversification (H4) has no significant impact on Z, the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related to Z with 
the coefficient of 183.37. Therefore, security diversification still increases Z. The  
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Table 83: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for All BHCs 
          for Total Period     
            
                   Market Risk  
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
    
Security Div. (SD) H4 
    
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
  -  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + +   + 
Scale interaction      
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
    
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
    
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 
   + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -    
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 - + -   
Activity interaction      
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   + 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 -   - 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 - - -   
 
  
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta   
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Table 84: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications for All BHCs 
 
                    for Sub-periods     
    
                    
 
       Market Risk 
   
             Before The Crisis           During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation MG DL MB IRB MG DL MB IRB 
Activity diversification           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2  -     +   
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
         
Security Div. (SD) H4 
  +       
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 
       -  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 + +   +   +   + 
Scale interaction           
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 +     -   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
         
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 - +  +     + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 -         
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 - + -   -       
Activity interaction           
DGD * LD H2*H3 
    + +   
DGD * NIID H2*H5 +      + +  
SD * OBSD H4*H6    - -   - 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 -   -     - -   
 
    
MG: maturity gap     DL: derivatives loss     MB: market beta    IRB: interest rate beta      
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coefficient on non-interest-income diversification (H5) is 26.27. 
Sub-period analysis: 
The coefficient on domestic geographic diversification (H2) is insignificant before the 
crisis while it becomes positively significant (528.53) during the crisis. The coefficient on 
loan diversification (H3) is significantly positive (260.66) before the crisis while it 
becomes insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, the interaction of loan diversification 
and loan ratio (H3*S3) is significantly and negatively related to Z with the coefficient of 
-506.07 before the crisis. Therefore, greater loan diversification could still reduce Z with 
negative net impact of 260.66 – 506.07 * S3 if S3 is greater than 0.5151. The results 
show that the sign of the impact of loan diversification depends on the scale of loan ratio 
before the crisis. If the ratio is large enough, the impact turns from positive to negative. 
The coefficient on security diversification (H4) is insignificant before the crisis while it 
becomes positively significant (168.02) during the crisis. However, the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) is significantly and positively related 
to Z with the coefficient of 193.60 before the crisis. Therefore, security diversification 
still increases Z before the crisis. The coefficient on non-interest-income diversification 
(H5) is significantly positive (42.92) before the crisis while it becomes insignificant 
during the crisis. However, the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) is significantly and positively related to Z with the 
coefficient of 7672.01 during the crisis. Therefore, non-interest-income diversification 
still increases Z during the crisis. 
The coefficient on the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications 
(H2*H3) is insignificant before the crisis while it becomes negatively significant (-761.11) 
during the crisis. 
Summary for default risk - Table 85 reports the summary of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions for total period. Table 86 reports the summary of 
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significant effects of diversifications and interactions for the sub-periods. 
SUMMARY OF DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERACTION EFFECTS FOR ALL 
BHCs 
a. Total period: Table 87 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), 
security diversification (H4), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio 
(H3*S3), and the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Loan diversification (H3) and security diversification (H4) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts.  
For credit risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) and the interaction of off-balance-sheet 
diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less 
than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
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Table 85: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications 
          for All BHCs for Total Period 
      
  Default Risk 
  Variable Abbreviation Z 
Activity diversification   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6   
Scale interaction   
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 
 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6   
Activity interaction   
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6   
 
Z: distance to default  
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Table 86: Summary of Significant Effects of Diversifications   
          for All BHCs for Sub-periods   
        
 
 
         Default Risk 
  Before The Crisis During The Crisis 
  Variable Abbreviation Z Z 
Activity diversification     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 
 + 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 +   
Security Div. (SD) H4 
 + 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 +   
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6     
Scale interaction     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 
   
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 -   
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 +   
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 
 + 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6     
Activity interaction     
DGD * LD H2*H3 
 - 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 
   
SD * OBSD H4*H6 
   
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6     
 
Z: distance to default   
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Table 87: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for All BHCs for Total Period      
                                                  
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)    (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns     Credit Risk        Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   + - Total   
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 2 2  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 2 4  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 3 0 3  0 0 0  1 0 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  6 0 6  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 3 3  0 0 0  0 4 4   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 2 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 3 0 3  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  4 1 5  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  2 1 3  0 0 0  2 2 4   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  2 1 3  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  2 0 2  0 0 0  3 0 3  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  3 0 3  0 0 0  3 1 4   
                                                  
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk        Market Risk     Default Risk    All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 25 0 25 X 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 17 33 1.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 75 0 75 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 100 0 100 x 50 0 50 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 75 75 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 33 33 0.00 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 75 0 75 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 100 0 100 x 33 8 42 4.13 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 50 25 75 2.00 0 0 0 . 17 17 33 1.00 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 75 0 75 x 0 0 0 . 25 8 33 3.13 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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For market risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction 
of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) and the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts.  
b. Before the crisis: Table 88 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), 
security diversification (H4), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and 
deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), and 
the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio 
(H5*S5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable 
impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Security diversification (H4) and off-balance-sheet 
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diversification (H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that 
favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction 
of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less 
than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5) and the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2, the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the 
interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction 
of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, security diversification (H4), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the 
interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of 
domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable 
impacts. 
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Table 88: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for All BHCs Before The Crisis     
                                                   
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)    (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk        Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 4 0 4  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  5 0 5  
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 1 1  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  2 2 4  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 3 0 3  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  5 0 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  1 0 1  0 1 1  0 3 3  0 0 0  1 4 5   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 2 2  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 4 4  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 5 5  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 2 3  1 0 1  3 2 5  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 1 1  0 2 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 3 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 1 3  0 0 0  2 1 3   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 1 3  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  1 1 2  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  1 0 1  0 0 0  2 1 3  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  2 1 3   
                                                   
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk      Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 42 0 42 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 25 25 0.00 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 17 17 33 1.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 75 0 75 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 42 0 42 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 100 100 0.00 0 75 75 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 33 42 0.24 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 17 17 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 42 42 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 50 75 0.50 100 0 100 x 25 17 42 1.47 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 25 25 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 25 33 0.32 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 50 25 75 2.00 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 8 8 17 1.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 100 0 100 x 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 17 8 25 2.13 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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For default risk - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), 
and the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4) benefit BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio 
(H3*S3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than one, indicating that unfavorable 
impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
c. During the crisis: Table 89 reports the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions. 
For accounting returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan 
diversification (H3), security diversification (H4), and non-interest-income 
diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that 
favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) and the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For market returns - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan diversification 
(H3), and non-interest-income diversification (H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of loan diversification 
and loan ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For credit risk - Loan diversification (H3) and the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) and the 
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interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For market risk - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of 
domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic 
geographic diversification (H2), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of 
security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of domestic geographic 
and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For default risk - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), security diversification 
(H4), and the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income 
ratio (H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that 
favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratio less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
SUMMARY OF IMPACT SWITCH OF DIVERSIFICATION 
Table 90 reports a summary of how the impact of diversification may change or 
switch signs for the total sample period. It indicates the signs of the diversification 
impacts (favorable or unfavorable) and the switch points regarding the scale of their 
associated activities. The results show that the impact of some forms of diversification  
  
 
251 
Table 89: Number and Percentage of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions for All BHCs During The Crisis     
                                                   
   (n=4)    (n=2)    (n=1)   (n=4)    (n=1)    (n=12)  
     Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk        Market Risk      Default Risk   All Performances 
(Number) Variable Abbreviation + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total   + - Total  + - Total   
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 1 0 1  2 0 2  0 0 0  0 1 1  1 0 1  4 1 5  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 4 0 4  2 0 2  1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  7 0 7  
Security Div. (SD) H4 1 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  2 0 2  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 1 0 1  2 0 2  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  4 0 4  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 3 3   
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 3 3  0 1 1  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 5 5  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 1 1  0 0 0  0 1 1  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 3 3  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1  2 3 5  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  1 0 1  0 0 0  1 0 1   
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 2 2  0 1 1  0 3 3  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0  0 2 2  0 1 1  0 2 2  0 0 0  0 5 5  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  2 0 2  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0  2 0 2  0 0 0  2 0 2   
                                                   
    Accounting Returns    Market Returns      Credit Risk       Market Risk     Default Risk   All Performances 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 25 0 25 x 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 100 0 100 x 33 8 42 4.13 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 100 0 100 x 100 0 100 x 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 58 0 58 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 25 0 25 x 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 17 0 17 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 25 0 25 x 100 0 100 x 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 33 0 33 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 
Scale interaction                          
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 75 75 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 42 42 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 75 75 0.00 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 X 0 0 0 . 100 0 100 x 17 25 42 0.68 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 X 
Activity interaction                          
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 50 50 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 0 0 . 0 100 100 0.00 0 100 100 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 0 0 0 . 0 42 42 0.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 x 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 50 0 50 x 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 x 
"n" indicates the number of performance measures; "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item. 
"Percentage" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.          
"Total" indicates the total number or percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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depends on the relative magnitude or the scale of their associated activities. That is, when 
the scale of the diversified activity is large enough, the diversification impact changes its 
direction. 
For example, for small BHCs, when the scale of loan ratio (S3) is not large, loan 
diversification (H3) has an unfavorable impact on maturity gap (MG). But when the scale 
ratio reaches 0.6888, the net impact turns favorable. It is instructive to observe that the 
average scale value is 0.6597, which is slightly below the switch point. The implication is 
that roughly half of the small BHCs experience an unfavorable impact from loan 
diversification while the other half experiences a favorable impact. When the security 
scale ratio (S4) is small, security diversification (H4) has unfavorable impacts on both 
ROA and ROE. When the non-interest-income scale ratio (S5) is below the switch point, 
non-interest-income diversification (H5) has favorable impacts on both ROA and ROE, 
and an unfavorable impact on both stock returns (SR) and risk-adjusted stock returns 
(RASR). When the off-balance-sheet scale ratio (S6) is not large, off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) has a favorable impact on derivatives losses (DL), and an 
unfavorable impact on net charge-offs (NCO) and market beta (MB). 
For larger community BHCs, when the loan scale ratio (S3) is below the switch point, 
loan diversification (H3) has favorable impact on ROA. When the security scale ratio (S4) 
is small, security diversification (H4) has an unfavorable impact on ROA. When the 
off-balance-sheet scale ratio (S6) is below the switch point, off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) has a favorable impact on derivatives losses (DL).  
For regional BHCs, when the loan scale ratio (S3) is not large, loan diversification 
(H3) has favorable impacts on risk-adjusted ROA (RAROA), market beta (MB) and 
distance to default (Z), and an unfavorable impact on maturity gap (MG). When the 
security scale ratio (S4) is below the switch point, security diversification (H4) has a 
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Table 90: Summary of Impact Switch of Diversification for Total Period 
      
           
Small BHCs ROA ROA ROE ROE SR RASR NCO MG DL MB 
Significant impact H4 (-) H5 (+) H4 (-) H5 (+) H5 (-) H5 (-) H6 (-) H3 (-) H6 (+) H6 (-) 
Switch point 0.1887  0.0022  0.1995  0.0022  0.0016  0.0033  0.6522  0.6888  0.2000  0.3798  
Mean of scale 0.1863  0.0023  0.1863  0.0023  0.0023  0.0023  0.1513  0.6597  0.1513  0.1513  
Larger Community BHCs ROA ROA DL        
Significant impact H3 (+) H4 (-) H6 (+)        
Switch point 0.4126  0.4667  0.2500         
Mean of scale 0.6707  0.1902  0.2230                
Regional BHCs RAROA RAROA RAROE RASR NCO MG MB Z Z  
Significant impact H3 (+) H4 (-) H4 (-) H5 (+) H4 (+) H3 (-) H3 (+) H3 (+) H4 (-)  
Switch point 0.7972  0.1668  0.1487  0.0133  0.3056  0.8607  0.7620  0.7486  0.1445   
Mean of scale 0.6763  0.1572  0.1572  0.0045  0.1572  0.6763  0.6763  0.6763  0.1572    
All BHCs ROA ROA ROA ROE       
Significant impact H3 (+) H4 (-) H5 (+) H4 (-)       
Switch point 0.6275  0.3125  0.0063  0.2223        
Mean of scale 0.6634  0.1871  0.0031  0.1871              
           
"+" indicates favorable impact; "-" indicates unfavorable impact.         
H3: loan diversification; H4: security diversification; H5: non-interest-income diversification; H6: off-balance-sheet diversification.    
Significant impact indicates the diversification which has significant positive/negative impact at 10% significance level on performance measures   
Switch point indicates the scale of activity/total asset ratio at which diversification changes its direction of impact     
Mean of scale indicates the mean of activity/total asset ratio         
ROA: return on asset; RAROA: risk-adjusted ROA; ROE: return on equity; RAROE: risk-adjusted ROE; SR: stock return; RASR: risk-adjusted SR;   
NCO: net charge-offs; MG: maturity gap; DL: derivatives losses; MB: market beta; IRB: interest rate beta; Z: distance to default    
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favorable impact on net charge-offs (NCO) and unfavorable impacts on risk-adjusted 
ROA (RAROA), risk-adjusted ROE (RAROE) and distance to default (Z). When the 
non-interest-income scale ratio (S5) is small, non-interest-income diversification (H5) 
has a favorable impact on risk-adjusted stock return (RASR). 
For all BHCs, when the loan scale ratio (S3) is below the switch point, loan 
diversification (H3) has a favorable impact on ROA. When the security scale ratio (S4) is 
small, the security diversification (H4) has unfavorable impacts on ROA and ROE. When 
the non-interest-income scale ratio (S5) is not large, non-interest-income diversification 
(H5) has a favorable impact on ROA. 
In general, among the various forms of diversification where the net impacts switch 
with scale, loan diversification switches from favorable to unfavorable five times out of 
seven. The results suggest that BHCs might tend to make increasingly risky loans when 
the size of their loan portfolios expands beyond a critical level. Moreover, agency 
problems might also become uncontrollable. On the other hand, security diversification 
tends to switch from unfavorable to favorable eight out of nine times. Thus, the results 
indicate that with larger portfolios of securities, BHCs are more likely to reduce portfolio 
risk and increase their returns with a wide selection of diversified securities. 
SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERACTION 
EFFECTS ON BHCs’ INTEGRAL PERFORMANCE 
a. Total period: Table 91 reports the summary of percentage of significant impacts of 
diversifications and interactions on BHCs’ integral performance. 
For small BHCs - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of loan 
diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5), the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
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diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, loan diversification (H3), 
security diversification (H4), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), and the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios 
less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For larger community BHCs - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit 
ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic 
geographic diversification (H2), security diversification (H4), off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), , 
and the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For regional BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan diversification 
(H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of security diversification 
and security ratio (H4*S4), and the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security 
diversification (H4), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), 
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the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), the interaction 
of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5), and the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For money center BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan 
diversification (H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
and the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio 
(H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable 
impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of loan diversification 
and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3), the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5), the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For international BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of international geographic and loan 
diversifications (H1*H3), the interaction of international geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
international geographic diversification (H1), loan diversification (H3), security 
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Table 91: Summary of Percentage of Significant Impacts of Diversifications and Interactions on BHCs' Integral Performance for Total Period 
                                        
     Small     Community    Regional    Money Center    International    All BHCs 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1                 0 50 50 0.00     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 0 0 . 8 17 25 0.47 42 17 58 2.47 15 0 15 x 8 0 8 X 0 8 8 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 8 8 0.00 17 0 17 X 25 8 33 3.13 8 0 8 x 8 58 67 0.14 17 0 17 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 8 33 42 0.24 0 17 17 0.00 8 25 33 0.32 8 8 15 1.00 0 8 8 0.00 17 17 33 1.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 25 17 42 1.47 50 0 50 X 17 0 17 X 15 8 23 1.88 0 33 33 0.00 50 0 50 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 8 17 25 0.47 8 17 25 0.47 0 0 0 . 23 0 23 X 17 0 17 X 0 33 33 0.00 
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1                 0 25 25 0.00     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 8 8 17 1.00 15 15 31 1.00 0 17 17 0.00 0 0 0 . 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 8 0 8 X 8 8 17 1.00 8 25 33 0.32 0 8 8 0.00 8 42 50 0.19 0 17 17 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 33 0 33 X 8 17 25 0.47 42 8 50 5.25 15 0 15 X 17 0 17 X 33 8 42 4.13 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 17 17 33 1.00 17 0 17 X 0 25 25 0.00 8 0 8 X 17 8 25 2.13 8 8 17 1.00 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 17 17 33 1.00 8 17 25 0.47 25 0 25 X 8 15 23 0.53 0 8 8 0.00 17 17 33 1.00 
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3                 67 0 67 X     
IGD*NIID H1*H5                 33 0 33 X     
DGD * LD H2*H3 0 8 8 0.00 0 8 8 0.00 8 17 25 0.47 0 8 8 0.00 0 8 8 0.00 17 0 17 X 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 8 0 8 X 17 17 33 1.00 17 25 42 0.68 0 8 8 0.00 0 50 50 0.00 17 8 25 2.13 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 17 8 25 2.13 17 0 17 x 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 8 8 17 1.00 25 0 25 X 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 8 0 8 X 8 0 8 x 0 8 8 0.00 0 8 8 0.00 25 0 25 x 25 8 33 3.13 
 "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item.       
"%" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs' integral performance           
"Total" indicates the percentage of performance measures on which individual diversification or interaction have significant impacts; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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diversification (H4), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of 
international geographic diversification and cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1), 
the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For all BHCs - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), 
the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5), the interaction of security 
and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, domestic 
geographic diversification (H2), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), and the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
b. Before the crisis: Table 92 reports the summary of percentage of significant impacts of 
diversifications and interactions on BHCs’ integral performance. 
For small BHCs - Non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction 
of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. 
However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), off-balance-sheet diversification 
(H6), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of 
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non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For larger community BHCs - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income 
diversification (H5), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of domestic 
geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5), the interaction of security 
and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security 
diversification (H4), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), and the interaction 
of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) 
ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For regional BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan diversification 
(H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of security diversification 
and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and 
off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security diversification 
(H4), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), 
the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
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hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For money center BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), security 
diversification (H4), non-interest-income diversification (H5), off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
and the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H2*H5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable 
impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification 
and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that 
unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For international BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), security 
diversification (H4), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of security 
diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of international geographic and 
loan diversifications (H1*H3), the interaction of international geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H1*H5), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater 
than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
international geographic diversification (H1), loan diversification (H3), 
non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of international geographic 
diversification and cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1), the interaction of domestic 
geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan 
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Table 92: Summary of Percentage of Significant Impacts of Diversifications and Interactions on BHCs' Integral Performance Before The Crisis 
                                        
     Small     Community    Regional     Money Center    International    All BHCs 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1                 0 25 25 0.00     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 0 8 8 0.00 8 8 17 1.00 50 8 58 6.25 23 0 23 x 17 0 17 X 8 8 17 1.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 0 0 0 . 17 0 17 X 33 17 50 1.94 8 8 15 1.00 8 17 25 0.47 42 0 42 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 8 8 17 1.00 0 17 17 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 8 0 8 X 17 8 25 2.13 17 17 33 1.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 42 8 50 5.25 33 0 33 X 33 8 42 4.13 23 8 31 2.88 8 33 42 0.24 42 0 42 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 0 17 17 0.00 8 0 8 X 0 0 0 . 15 0 15 X 25 0 25 X 8 33 42 0.24 
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1                 0 25 25 0.00     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 25 25 0.00 8 23 31 0.35 0 17 17 0.00 0 17 17 0.00 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 25 25 0.00 0 17 17 0.00 17 33 50 0.52 8 15 23 0.53 0 42 42 0.00 0 42 42 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 8 8 17 1.00 8 17 25 0.47 33 8 42 4.13 23 8 31 2.88 17 25 42 1.68 25 17 42 1.47 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 17 17 0.00 8 8 17 1.00 8 33 42 0.24 0 23 23 0.00 17 17 33 1.00 8 25 33 0.32 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 25 8 33 3.13 8 17 25 0.47 33 8 42 4.13 0 8 8 0.00 0 8 8 0.00 17 8 25 2.13 
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3                 17 8 25 2.13     
IGD*NIID H1*H5                 42 0 42 X     
DGD * LD H2*H3 8 8 17 1.00 0 8 8 0.00 33 17 50 1.94 0 15 15 0.00 0 17 17 0.00 17 8 25 2.13 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 0 8 8 0.00 25 17 42 1.47 8 17 25 0.47 23 15 38 1.53 0 50 50 0.00 8 8 17 1.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 17 0 17 x 8 0 8 x 0 0 0 . 8 8 15 1.00 8 8 17 1.00 17 8 25 2.13 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 0 0 0 . 8 0 8 x 17 0 17 x 0 8 8 0.00 17 0 17 x 17 8 25 2.13 
 "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item.       
"%" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs' integral performance           
"Total" indicates the percentage of performance measures on which individual diversification or interaction have significant impacts; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification 
and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan 
diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than 
one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For all BHCs - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income diversification (H5), 
the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of 
domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), and the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and 
non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
c. During the crisis: Table 93 reports the summary of percentage of significant impacts of 
diversifications and interactions on BHCs’ integral performance. 
For small BHCs - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income diversification 
(H5), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of security diversification and 
security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income 
diversifications (H2*H5), the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet 
diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity diversifications 
(H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating 
that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, security diversification 
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(H4), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), 
the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), and the 
interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6) hurt 
BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate 
favorable impacts. 
For larger community BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan 
diversification (H3), security diversification (H4), non-interest-income diversification 
(H5), the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), 
and the interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio 
(H5*S5) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable 
impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of loan diversification 
and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio 
(H4*S4), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and 
the interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
For regional BHCs - Loan diversification (H3), non-interest-income diversification 
(H5), the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio 
(H6*S6), and the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3) 
benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts 
dominate unfavorable impacts. However, the interaction of domestic geographic 
diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5), 
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and the interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with 
their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable 
impacts. 
For money center BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), security 
diversification (H4), non-interest-income diversification (H5), off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6), the interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the 
interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of 
domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5), and the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable 
impacts. However, loan diversification (H3), the interaction of non-interest-income 
diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the interaction of domestic 
geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the interaction of security and 
off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, 
indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts.  
For international BHCs - International geographic diversification (H1), loan 
diversification (H3), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), 
the interaction of off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), 
the interaction of international geographic and non-interest-income diversifications 
(H1*H5), the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and 
the interaction of security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6) benefit BHCs 
with their (+/-) ratios greater than one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate 
unfavorable impacts. However, domestic geographic diversification (H2), security 
diversification (H4), off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of 
international geographic diversification and cross-border loan exposure ratio (H1*S1), 
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Table 93: Summary of Percentage of Significant Impacts of Diversifications and Interactions on BHCs' Integral Performance During The Crisis 
                                        
     Small     Community    Regional     Money Center   International    All BHCs 
( % ) Variable Abbreviation + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Activity diversification                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1                 17 0 17 x     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 8 8 17 1.00 33 25 58 1.32 8 8 17 1.00 23 8 31 2.88 0 25 25 0.00 33 8 42 4.13 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 17 0 17 X 33 8 42 4.13 17 0 17 X 0 8 8 0.00 25 0 25 X 58 0 58 X 
Security Div. (SD) H4 0 25 25 0.00 25 0 25 X 0 0 0 . 15 0 15 X 0 50 50 0.00 17 0 17 X 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 33 0 33 X 42 0 42 X 8 0 8 X 8 0 8 X 0 0 0 . 33 0 33 X 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 8 0 8 X 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 23 0 23 X 0 33 33 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 
Scale interaction                          
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1                 0 17 17 0.00     
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 8 17 25 0.47 25 0 25 X 0 8 8 0.00 15 15 31 1.00 8 17 25 0.47 8 0 8 X 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 0 17 17 0.00 8 17 25 0.47 0 17 17 0.00 8 0 8 X 0 42 42 0.00 0 42 42 0.00 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 17 0 17 X 0 17 17 0.00 0 8 8 0.00 31 0 31 X 33 0 33 X 0 8 8 0.00 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 0 42 42 0.00 50 8 58 6.25 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 0.00 0 8 8 0.00 17 25 42 0.68 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 0 17 17 0.00 0 25 25 0.00 33 25 58 1.32 23 0 23 X 17 8 25 2.13 8 0 8 X 
Activity interaction                          
IGD*LD H1*H3                 0 33 33 0.00     
IGD*NIID H1*H5                 25 0 25 X     
DGD * LD H2*H3 8 8 17 1.00 8 25 33 0.32 25 0 25 X 0 8 8 0.00 33 0 33 X 0 25 25 0.00 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 8 0 8 X 0 33 33 0.00 8 17 25 0.47 23 8 31 2.88 17 25 42 0.68 0 42 42 0.00 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 17 8 25 2.13 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 23 23 0.00 50 0 50 X 17 0 17 x 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 25 17 42 1.47 8 8 17 1.00 0 8 8 0.00 8 0 8 x 17 25 42 0.68 17 0 17 x 
 "+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable; "-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable, "x" indicates infinity. "." indicates an unavailable item.       
"%" indicates the percentage of individual diversification or interaction which have significant impacts on BHCs' integral performance           
"Total" indicates the percentage of performance measures on which individual diversification or interaction have significant impacts; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".  
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the interaction of domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the 
interaction of loan diversification and loan ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of 
non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), the 
interaction of international geographic and loan diversifications (H1*H3), the interaction 
of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5), and the 
interaction of all-activity diversifications (H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) hurt BHCs with their 
(+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts dominate favorable impacts. 
For all BHCs - Domestic geographic diversification (H2), loan diversification (H3), 
security diversification (H4), non-interest-income diversification (H5), the interaction of 
domestic geographic diversification and deposit ratio (H2*S2), the interaction of 
off-balance-sheet diversification and off-balance-sheet ratio (H6*S6), the interaction of 
security and off-balance-sheet diversifications (H4*H6), and the interaction of all-activity 
diversifications (H2*H3*H4*H5*H6) benefit BHCs with their (+/-) ratios greater than 
one, indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. However, 
off-balance-sheet diversification (H6), the interaction of loan diversification and loan 
ratio (H3*S3), the interaction of security diversification and security ratio (H4*S4), the 
interaction of non-interest-income diversification and non-interest-income ratio (H5*S5), 
the interaction of domestic geographic and loan diversifications (H2*H3), and the 
interaction of domestic geographic and non-interest-income diversifications (H2*H5) 
hurt BHCs with their (+/-) ratios less than one, indicating that unfavorable impacts 
dominate favorable impacts. 
6.2 Integrated Diversification Effect Analysis 
Table 94 - 96 report the number and percentage of significant effects of 
diversifications and interactions on BHCs performance measures.  
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a. Total Period: 
For all BHCs, 20% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
11% have unfavorable impacts on accounting returns. International BHCs have the 
highest percentage of favorable impacts (17%) while small and money center BHCs have 
the lowest percentage (7%). On the other hand, international BHCs have the highest 
percentage of unfavorable impacts (22%) while money center BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (2%). 
For all BHCs, 11% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
4% have unfavorable impacts on market returns. Money center BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (18%) while larger community BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (4%). On the other hand, international BHCs have the highest percentage of 
unfavorable impacts (17%) while larger community BHCs have the lowest percentage 
(0%). 
For all BHCs, 14% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
14% have unfavorable impacts on credit risk. Small BHCs have the highest percentage of 
favorable impacts (21%) while international BHCs have the lowest percentage (6%). On 
the other hand, International BHCs have the highest percentage of unfavorable impacts 
(22%) while small and money center BHCs have the lowest percentage (7%). 
For all BHCs, 16% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
11% have unfavorable impacts on market risk. Larger community BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (18%) while money center BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (7%). On the other hand, regional BHCs have the highest percentage of 
unfavorable impacts (13%) while small BHCs have the lowest percentage (7%). 
For all BHCs, 14% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
0% have unfavorable impacts on default risk. Regional BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (21%) while larger community and money center BHCs 
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have the lowest percentage (7%). On the other hand, regional BHCs have the highest 
percentage of unfavorable impacts (29%) while small, larger community and money 
center BHCs have the lowest percentage (0%). 
B. Before the crisis: 
For all BHCs, 20% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
14% have unfavorable impacts on accounting returns. Regional BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (21%) while small and money center BHCs have the 
lowest percentage (5%). On the other hand, international BHCs have the highest 
percentage of unfavorable impacts (18%) while money center BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (4%). 
For all BHCs, 11% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
14% have unfavorable impacts on market returns. Regional BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (21%) while small BHCs have the lowest percentage 
(4%). On the other hand, international BHCs have the highest percentage of unfavorable 
impacts (31%) while larger community BHCs have the lowest percentage (4%). For all 
BHCs, 14% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 14% have 
unfavorable impacts on credit risk. Regional BHCs have the highest percentage of 
favorable impacts (29%) while international BHCs have the lowest percentage (11%). On 
the other hand, International BHCs have the highest percentage of unfavorable impacts 
(22%) while small and larger community BHCs have the lowest percentage (14%). 
For all BHCs, 14% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
16% have unfavorable impacts on market risk. Larger community and regional BHCs 
have the highest percentage of favorable impacts (13%) while international BHCs have 
the lowest percentage (3%). On the other hand, regional BHCs have the highest 
percentage of unfavorable impacts (14%) while small BHCs have the lowest percentage 
(4%). 
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Table 94: Number of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions 
    
          For BHC Sub-groups for Total Period 
       
             
*    For each performance measure, 14 diversification and interaction measures       
     (5 diversifications and 9 interactions) for small, larger community, regional, money center and all BHCs 
**  For each performance measure, 18 diversification and interaction measures       
     (6 diversifications and 12 interactions) for international BHCs      
                          
        Small  Community    Regional Money Center International    All BHCs 
  + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Accounting returns                  
ROA 2 2 5 4 1 0 1 0 3 4 5 4 
Risk-adjusted ROA 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 0 3 4 2 0 
ROE 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 1 3 4 3 2 
Risk-adjusted ROE 0 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 3 4 1 0 
Sub-total 4 6 9 6 7 4 4 1 12 16 11 6 
Percentage 7% 11% 16% 11% 13% 7% 7% 2% 17% 22% 20% 11% 
                  
Market returns                  
Stock return 1 2 0 0 2 1 3 1 1 3 1 0 
Risk-adjusted stock return 2 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 
Sub-total 3 4 1 0 3 3 5 2 2 6 3 1 
Percentage 11% 14% 4% 0% 11% 11% 18% 7% 6% 17% 11% 4% 
                  
Credit risk                  
Net charge-off ratio 3 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 4 2 2 
Percentage 21% 7% 14% 21% 14% 14% 7% 7% 6% 22% 14% 14% 
                  
Market risk                  
Maturity gap ratio 2 1 4 2 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 1 
Derivatives loss ratio 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 
Market beta 2 1 2 0 3 2 0 0 2 2 3 0 
Interest rate beta 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 
Sub-total 6 4 10 5 9 7 4 5 7 7 9 6 
Percentage 11% 7% 18% 9% 16% 13% 7% 9% 10% 10% 16% 11% 
                  
Default risk                  
Z - score 2 0 1 0 3 4 1 0 3 5 2 0 
Percentage 14% 0% 7% 0% 21% 29% 7% 0% 17% 28% 14% 0% 
Total 18 15 23 14 24 20 15 9 25 38 27 15 
Percentage 11% 9% 14% 8% 14% 12% 9% 5% 12% 18% 16% 9% 
"+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable         
"-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable         
Percentage: The percentage of total diversification and interaction measures      
          which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.       
For example: the 11% for favorable impact on small BHCs performance = 18 / (14*12)      
(14 diversification and interactions measures for each of 12 BHCs performance measures)     
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Table 95: Number of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions 
    
          For BHC Sub-groups Before The Crisis 
        
             
*    For each performance measure, 14 diversification and interaction measures       
      (5 diversifications and 9 interactions) for small, larger community, regional, money center and all BHCs   
**  For each performance measure, 18 diversification and interaction measures       
      (6 diversifications and 12 interactions) for international BHCs      
                          
        Small  Community    Regional Money Center International    All BHCs 
  + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Accounting returns                  
ROA 2 3 3 4 3 0 0 0 2 2 5 4 
Risk-adjusted ROA 0 0 1 0 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 1 
ROE 1 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Risk-adjusted ROE 0 1 0 0 3 3 2 1 4 5 2 1 
Sub-total 3 6 5 5 12 5 3 2 10 13 11 8 
Percentage 5% 11% 9% 9% 21% 9% 5% 4% 14% 18% 20% 14% 
                  
Market returns                  
Stock return 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 4 6 2 2 
Risk-adjusted stock return 1 3 2 1 3 3 2 2 3 5 1 2 
Sub-total 1 3 2 1 6 5 4 5 7 11 3 4 
Percentage 4% 11% 7% 4% 21% 18% 14% 18% 19% 31% 11% 14% 
                  
Credit risk                  
Net charge-off ratio 3 2 1 2 4 3 2 3 2 4 2 2 
Percentage 21% 14% 7% 14% 29% 21% 14% 21% 11% 22% 14% 14% 
                  
Market risk                  
Maturity gap ratio 1 0 4 2 3 3 2 4 1 2 4 2 
Derivatives loss ratio 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 
Market beta 3 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 
Interest rate beta 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 
Sub-total 5 2 7 5 7 8 5 6 2 4 8 9 
Percentage 9% 4% 13% 9% 13% 14% 9% 11% 3% 6% 14% 16% 
                  
Default risk                  
Z - score 1 1 1 0 3 3 2 0 2 4 3 1 
Percentage 7% 7% 7% 0% 21% 21% 14% 0% 11% 22% 21% 7% 
Total 13 14 16 13 32 24 16 16 23 36 27 24 
Percentage 8% 8% 10% 8% 19% 14% 10% 10% 11% 17% 16% 14% 
"+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable         
"-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable         
Percentage: The percentage of total diversification and interaction measures      
          which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.       
For example: the 8% for favorable impact on small BHCs performance = 13 / (14*12)      
(14 diversification and interactions measures for each of 12 BHCs performance measures)     
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Table 96: Number of Significant Effects of Diversifications and Interactions 
    
          For BHC Sub-groups During The Crisis 
        
 
            
*    For each performance measure, 14 diversification and interaction measures       
     (5 diversifications and 9 interactions) for small, larger community, regional, money center and all BHCs  
**  For each performance measure, 18 diversification and interaction measures       
      (6 diversifications and 12 interactions) for international BHCs       
                          
        Small  Community    Regional Money Center International    All BHCs 
  + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Accounting returns                  
ROA 2 2 3 2 0 0 3 0 2 2 2 1 
Risk-adjusted ROA 1 1 4 2 0 1 0 0 4 7 4 0 
ROE 3 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 4 3 2 1 
Risk-adjusted ROE 1 1 5 1 0 1 1 0 7 7 2 1 
Sub-total 7 5 14 7 0 2 6 1 17 19 10 3 
Percentage 13% 9% 25% 13% 0% 4% 11% 2% 24% 26% 18% 5% 
                  
Market returns                  
Stock return 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 2 2 1 3 1 
Risk-adjusted stock return 0 2 0 1 2 1 4 2 2 1 3 3 
Sub-total 0 2 0 1 4 3 9 4 4 2 6 4 
Percentage 0% 7% 0% 4% 14% 11% 32% 14% 11% 6% 21% 14% 
                  
Credit risk                  
Net charge-off ratio 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 
Percentage 29% 14% 14% 14% 7% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 14% 14% 
                  
Market risk                  
Maturity gap ratio 2 3 4 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 
Derivatives loss ratio 1 2 2 4 0 0 1 0 1 4 2 4 
Market beta 3 3 2 3 3 2 0 0 1 3 2 1 
Interest rate beta 1 2 0 1 2 1 3 3 0 0 1 2 
Sub-total 7 10 8 10 6 4 7 4 3 8 7 8 
Percentage 13% 18% 14% 18% 11% 7% 13% 7% 4% 11% 13% 14% 
                  
Default risk                  
Z - score 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 5 5 3 1 
Percentage 0% 0% 29% 7% 0% 7% 0% 0% 28% 28% 21% 7% 
Total 18 19 28 21 11 11 23 9 29 34 28 18 
Percentage 11% 11% 17% 13% 7% 7% 14% 5% 13% 16% 17% 11% 
"+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable          
"-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable         
Percentage: The percentage of total diversification and interaction measures       
          which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.       
For example: the 11% for favorable impact on small BHCs performance = 18 / (14*12)      
(14 diversification and interactions measures for each of 12 BHCs performance measures)     
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For all BHCs, 21% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
7% have unfavorable impacts on default risk. Regional BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (21%) while small and larger community BHCs have the 
lowest percentage (7%). On the other hand, international BHCs have the highest 
percentage of unfavorable impacts (22%) while larger community and money center 
BHCs have the lowest percentage (0%). 
C. During the crisis: 
For all BHCs, 18% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
5% have unfavorable impacts on accounting returns. Larger community BHCs have the 
highest percentage of favorable impacts (25%) while regional BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (0%). On the other hand, international BHCs have the highest percentage of 
unfavorable impacts (26%) while money center BHCs have the lowest percentage (2%). 
For all BHCs, 21% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
14% have unfavorable impacts on market returns. Money center BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (14%) while larger community BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (0%). On the other hand, money center BHCs have the highest percentage of 
unfavorable impacts (14%) while larger community BHCs have the lowest percentage 
(4%). 
For all BHCs, 14% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
14% have unfavorable impacts on credit risk. Small BHCs have the highest percentage of 
favorable impacts (29%) while international BHCs have the lowest percentage (0%). On 
the other hand, small and larger community BHCs have the highest percentage of 
unfavorable impacts (14%) while money center and international BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (0%). 
For all BHCs, 13% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
14% have unfavorable impacts on market risk. Larger community BHCs have the highest 
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percentage of favorable impacts (14%) while international BHCs have the lowest 
percentage (4%). On the other hand, small and larger community BHCs have the highest 
percentage of unfavorable impacts (18%) while regional and money center BHCs have 
the lowest percentage 7%). 
For all BHCs, 21% of the diversifications and interactions have favorable impacts and 
7% have unfavorable impacts on default risk. Larger community BHCs have the highest 
percentage of favorable impacts (29%) while small, regional and money center BHCs 
have the lowest percentage (0%). On the other hand, international BHCs have the highest 
percentage of unfavorable impacts (28%) while small and money center BHCs have the 
lowest percentage (0%). 
Table 97 reports the summary of significant impacts of diversifications and 
interactions on performance for all BHCs groups and periods.  
A. Total period: 
For all BHCs, 25% of the diversifications and interactions have impacts on 
performances. International BHCs have the highest percentage impacts (30%) while 
money center BHCs have the lowest percentage impacts (14%). On the other hand, small, 
larger community, regional and money center BHCs have their (+/-) ratio greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. Therefore, 
diversifications advantage BHCs relatively. The results show a consistency with the 
hypothesis of the portfolio theory for these BHCs. However, for international BHCs their 
(+/-) ratio is less than one (0.67), indicating that diversifications disadvantage BHCs 
relatively. Therefore, the results show a consistency with the hypothesis of the agency 
theory for international BHCs. 
B. Before the crisis: 
For all BHCs, 30% of the diversifications and interactions have impacts on 
performances. Regional BHCs have the highest percentage impacts (33%) while small 
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BHCs have the lowest percentage impacts (16%). On the other hand, small, larger 
community, regional and money center BHCs have their (+/-) ratio greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. Therefore, 
diversifications advantage BHCs relatively. The results show a consistency with the 
hypothesis of the portfolio theory for these BHCs. However, for international BHCs their 
(+/-) ratio is less than one (0.65), indicating that diversifications disadvantage BHCs 
relatively. Therefore, the results show an inconsistency with the hypothesis of the agency 
theory for international BHCs. 
C. During the crisis: 
For all BHCs, 28% of the diversifications and interactions have impacts on performances. 
Larger community BHCs have the highest percentage impacts (30%) while regional 
BHCs have the lowest percentage impacts (14%). On the other hand, small, larger 
community, regional and money center BHCs have their (+/-) ratio greater than one, 
indicating that favorable impacts dominate unfavorable impacts. Therefore, 
diversifications advantage BHCs relatively. The results show a consistency with the 
hypothesis of the portfolio theory for these BHCs. However, for international BHCs their 
(+/-) ratio is less than one (0.81), indicating that diversifications disadvantage BHCs 
relatively. Therefore, the results show an inconsistency with the hypothesis of the agency 
theory for international BHCs. 
This study finds that diversifications basically benefit all BHCs except for 
international BHCs. For domestic BHCs, the benefits of diversified portfolio dominate 
the incurred agency costs. While for international BHCs, agency costs dominate the 
benefits of diversified portfolio. 
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Table 97: Summary of Significant Impacts of Diversifications and Interactions on BHCs Performance 
             
             
                        
    Total period   Before the crisis    During the crisis 
  + - Total +/- + - Total +/- + - Total +/- 
Small BHCs 11% 9% 20% 1.22  8% 8% 16% 1.00  11% 11% 22% 1.00  
Larger community BHCs 14% 8% 22% 1.75  10% 8% 18% 1.25  17% 13% 30% 1.31  
Regional BHCs 14% 12% 26% 1.17  19% 14% 33% 1.36  7% 7% 14% 1.00  
Money center BHCs 9% 5% 14% 1.80  10% 10% 20% 1.00  14% 5% 19% 2.80  
International BHCs 12% 18% 30% 0.67  11% 17% 28% 0.65  13% 16% 29% 0.81  
All BHCs 16% 9% 25% 1.78  16% 14% 30% 1.14  17% 11% 28% 1.55  
             
"+" indicates favorable impact on dependent variable 
       
"-" indicates unfavorable impact on dependent variable 
      
Percentage: The percentage of total diversification and interaction measures 
    
          which have significant impacts on BHCs performance measures.      
"Total" indicates the percentage of performance measures on which individual 
diversification or interaction have significant impacts; +/- indicates the ratio of "+" to "-".     
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6.3 Interaction Effect of M&A and Diversification Analysis 
M&A is a common way for BHCs to expand. It is usually associated with several 
forms of diversification. For example, BHCs could acquire other BHCs which provide 
similar services in different areas to expand and diversify geographically. On the other 
hand, BHCs could also merge other BHCs which provide different types of loans in the 
same area to expand and diversify their loan portfolios. Diversifications have been 
empirically shown in prior sections to yield favorable and unfavorable impacts on 
performance. Therefore, whether BHCs benefit by engaging in M&A activity to diversify 
their portfolios is an important issue. Specifically, what types of 
diversification-associated M&A activity BHCs should employ is an important issue.  
Table 98 reports panel regression results which include the interactions of merger 
dummy and diversification variables as explanatory variables to test the impacts of 
diversification-associated mergers on performance for all BHCs for the total period. 
BHCs are expected to merge to take advantages of financial benefits. Therefore, the 
regression coefficients on the merger-diversification interaction terms are expected to 
have a positive or favorable impact on BHCs’ performance. For example, the interaction 
of the merger and domestic geographic diversification variable (C4*H2) has a significant 
and positive impact on ROA and distance to default (Z), with regression coefficients of 
0.0007 and 24.8, respectively. The interaction of the merger and non-interest-income 
diversification variable (C4*H5) has a significant and favorable (negative) impact on net 
charge-offs (NCO) with a coefficient of -0.0005. The interaction of the merger and 
off-balance-sheet diversification variable (C4*H6) has a significant and positive impact 
on stock return (SR) with the coefficient of 0.0847.  
Thus, the results indicate that mergers associated with domestic geographic 
diversification have favorable impacts on BHCs’ accounting returns and default risk.  
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Table 98 : Regressions for All BHCs for Total Period             
                                 
Variables Variable Abbreviation 
Expected 
Sign ROA 
Std. 
Error   SR 
Std. 
Error   NCO 
Std. 
Error   MB 
Std. 
Error   Z 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification                       
 C  -0.0062 0.0012 *** -0.0794 0.0501   -0.0036 0.0010 *** -3.0567 0.4161 *** -18.2 107.0  
Domestic Geographic 
Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0117 0.0041 *** 0.1166 0.0927   -0.0016 0.0017  0.3584 0.4248  -24.4 100.5  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0064 0.0025 ** 0.0615 0.0598   -0.0004 0.0013  -0.0483 0.2625  64.3 109.1  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0015 0.0004 *** 0.0489 0.0189 *** 0.0003 0.0003  -0.0120 0.0720  -7.0 16.0  
Non-interest-income Div. 
(NIID) H5 ? 0.0024 0.0010 ** 0.0197 0.0195   -0.0006 0.0004 * -0.1212 0.0667 * 26.1 11.6 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. 
(OBSD) H6 ? -0.0007 0.0004   0.0118 0.0199   0.0006 0.0003 ** 0.0261 0.0762   -11.2 21.3   
Scale variables                      
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0004 0.0009  0.0525 0.0247 ** 0.0003 0.0006  0.1261 0.1082  112.8 32.3 *** 
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0105 0.0022 *** 0.0358 0.0512   0.0016 0.0010  0.1728 0.2316  154.0 95.6  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0036 0.0007 *** 0.0994 0.0392 ** 0.0000 0.0004  -0.0907 0.1522  30.3 38.3  
Non-interest-income 
Ratio S5 + 0.4718 0.1155 *** 1.8212 2.7153   0.0849 0.0445 * -4.0814 3.6004  -808.8 473.7 * 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0029 0.0053   -0.0001 0.0000 *** -0.0016 0.0036   -0.1 1.3   
Scale interaction                      
Domestic Geographic 
Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0052 0.0034  -0.1063 0.0781   -0.0008 0.0018  -0.2815 0.4259  -107.7 84.8  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0102 0.0038 *** -0.0650 0.0927   0.0005 0.0018  0.0155 0.4628  -153.0 192.4  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0048 0.0012 *** -0.0913 0.0669   -0.0012 0.0010  -0.2294 0.2626  183.5 79.7 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. 
(NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.3825 0.2132 * -1.2024 4.9791   -0.0282 0.1209  6.4937 5.9285  185.2 664.9  
Off-balance-sheet Div. 
(OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0002 0.0002   0.0058 0.0091   0.0002 0.0001 ** -0.0215 0.0110 * 0.0 3.6   
Activity interaction                      
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0087 0.0032 *** -0.0648 0.1037   0.0023 0.0015  -0.0274 0.5142  219.4 161.1  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0052 0.0020 *** -0.0023 0.0715   0.0013 0.0009  -0.2189 0.1902  19.2 68.7  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0001 0.0008  -0.0451 0.0383   -0.0014 0.0005 *** 0.1327 0.1210  19.0 36.9  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0004 0.0062   -0.3584 0.2371   0.0007 0.0038   -1.6650 0.7858 ** -586.5 349.7 * 
Merger interaction                   
Merger*DGD C4*H2 + 0.0007 0.0004 * 0.0152 0.0314   0.0000 0.0002  0.0155 0.0209  24.8 13.7 * 
Merger*LD C4*H3 + 0.0001 0.0006  -0.0837 0.0620   -0.0002 0.0003  0.0596 0.0400  33.1 23.3  
Merger*SD C4*H4 + 0.0001 0.0005  0.0392 0.0413   0.0001 0.0002  0.0467 0.0285  2.1 14.0  
Merger*NIID C4*H5 + -0.0002 0.0007  -0.0652 0.0498   -0.0005 0.0002 ** -0.0459 0.0359  10.0 18.4  
Merger*OBSD C4*H6 + -0.0004 0.0005   0.0847 0.0404 ** 0.0003 0.0003   0.0229 0.0273   2.5 17.7   
Control variables                      
International Loan 
Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0014 0.0003 *** 0.0154 0.0103   -0.0003 0.0003  -0.0184 0.1329  19.0 40.3  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0017 0.0049   0.0004 0.0001 *** 0.5122 0.0529 *** 0.7 14.0  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0241 0.0061 *** 0.1347 0.1167   0.0045 0.0031  0.3122 0.6017  1170.7 187.0 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0005 0.0010  0.1894 0.0467 *** 0.0002 0.0003  -0.0653 0.0262 ** -6.0 11.1  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0001 0.0004  0.0331 0.0400   0.0002 0.0002  -0.0407 0.0248  -29.5 16.3 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0017 0.0010  -0.2023 0.0592 *** 0.0001 0.0004  0.0046 0.0512  -26.2 24.7  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0005 0.0002 *** -0.0553 0.0164 *** 0.0002 0.0001 *** 0.0191 0.0075 ** -11.1 2.8 *** 
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0006 0.0002 *** -0.0042 0.0160   0.0003 0.0001 *** 0.0570 0.0128 *** -21.9 4.5 *** 
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0024 0.0004 *** 0.0228 0.0170   0.0006 0.0002 ** 0.1371 0.0252 *** -56.9 9.5 *** 
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0020 0.0004 *** -0.0160 0.0168   0.0005 0.0002 ** 0.1737 0.0277 *** -74.2 10.5 *** 
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0022 0.0004 *** 0.0359 0.0167 ** 0.0005 0.0002 ** 0.2045 0.0316 *** -84.4 11.5 *** 
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0022 0.0004 *** -0.0092 0.0165   0.0004 0.0002 * 0.2434 0.0348 *** -77.6 12.5 *** 
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0022 0.0004 *** -0.0386 0.0163 ** 0.0003 0.0002  0.2891 0.0379 *** -82.5 13.3 *** 
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0023 0.0004 *** -0.0085 0.0163   0.0003 0.0002  0.4535 0.0405 *** -94.5 13.9 *** 
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0030 0.0005 *** -0.1042 0.0166 *** 0.0006 0.0002 ** 0.4968 0.0443 *** -107.9 14.7 *** 
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0043 0.0005 *** -0.0807 0.0227 *** 0.0011 0.0002 *** 0.5466 0.0468 *** -126.6 15.5 *** 
First-order Coefficient of 
Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.4255 0.0611 *** -0.2198 0.0254 *** 0.5676 0.1171 *** 0.9558 0.0064 *** 0.9 0.0 *** 
Observations   18121   4878    18121   4878   18121   
Adjusted R-squared     0.5477    0.1274    0.4931    0.9529    0.8388    
ROA: return on asset; SR: stock return; NCO: net charge-offs; MB: market beta; Z: distance to default         
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%               
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Mergers associated with non-interest-income diversification have a favorable impact on 
BHC’s credit risk perhaps due to the fact that greater reliance on non-interest income 
implies a reduced reliance on risky loans which reduce a bank’s credit risk. Furthermore, 
mergers associated with off-balance-sheet diversification have a favorable impact on 
BHCs’ market returns. Although only a few merger-diversification regression coefficients 
are significant, they all support the hypothesis of favorable portfolio benefits and cost 
synergies. 
6.4 Response Elasticity Analysis 
Table 99 reports the significant performance response elasticities for all BHCs for the 
total period. Response elasticities, which equal the percentage change in the bank 
performance measures divided by the percentage change in the diversification measures, 
help to compare the relative importance of the statistical results.  
For accounting returns, a ten percent increase in loan (H3) and non-interest-income 
diversification (H5) would increase BHCs’ ROA by 10% and 4.2%, respectively. A ten 
percent increase in domestic geographic (H2) and security diversifications (H4) would 
both decrease BHCs’ ROA by 2.3%. A ten percent increase in non-interest-income 
diversification (H5) would increase BHCs’ risk-adjusted ROA (RAROA) by 0.8%. A ten 
percent increase in security diversification (H4) would decrease BHCs’ ROE by 0.9%. 
Moreover, a ten percent increase in non-interest-income diversification (H5) would 
increase BHCs’ risk-adjusted ROE (RAROE) by 0.9%. 
For market returns, a ten percent increase in security diversification (H4) would 
increase BHCs’ stock return (SR) by 13.4%. A ten percent increase in loan (H3) and 
security diversifications (H4) would increase BHCs’ risk-adjusted stock return (RASR) 
by 28.9% and 10%, respectively. The impact of loan diversification on RASR is almost 
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three times the impact of security diversification. 
For credit risk, a ten percent increase in non-interest-income diversification (H5) 
would decrease BHCs’ net charge-offs (NCO) by 5.1%. However, a ten percent increase 
in off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) would increase BHCs’ net charge-offs (NCO) by 
1.9%. 
For market risk, a ten percent increase in off-balance-sheet diversification (H6) would 
increase BHCs’ maturity gap (MG) by 0.7%. A ten percent increase in off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) would increase BHCs’ derivatives losses (DL) by 44.8%. A ten 
percent increase in non-interest-income diversification (H5) would decrease BHCs’ 
market beta (MB) by 0.9%. Finally, a ten percent increase in off-balance-sheet 
diversification (H6) would decrease BHCs’ interest rate beta (IRB) by 20.7%.  
For default risk, a ten percent increase in non-interest-income diversification (H5) 
would increase BHCs’ distance to default (Z) by 0.6%. 
In general, the results indicate that non-interest-income diversification has the most 
consistent and favorable impact on BHCs’ performance. It both increases the returns and 
reduces portfolio risk. Security diversification has an unfavorable impact on accounting 
returns but favorable impacts on market returns. Off-balance-sheet diversification has 
unfavorable impacts on various types of risk while making no positive contribution to 
BHCs’ returns. The largest unfavorable impact is on derivatives losses (DL) where the 
elasticity is equal to 4.48. The result indicates that the wider the range of 
off-balance-sheet activities, the greater the risk of derivatives losses that BHCs may 
encounter. Furthermore, the elasticity between loan diversification and risk-adjusted 
stock return is quite large and favorable (2.89), suggesting that a ten percent increase in 
loan diversification will lead to a 28.9% improvement in risk-adjusted stock return. On 
the other hand, a ten percent increase in off-balance-sheet diversification reduces the 
BHCs’ interest rate beta by 20.7% since many derivatives are commonly used to hedge  
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Table 99: Significant Response Elasticities for Change in the Performance Measures for All BHCs for Total Period 
    
                            
Variables 
Variable 
Abbreviation 
ROA RAROA ROE RAROE SR RASR NCO MG DL MB IRB Z 
Domestic Geographic Div. H2 -0.2309 ***            
Loan Div. H3 0.9973 **     2.8927 *       
Security Div. H4 -0.2281 ***  -0.0890 **  1.3445 *** 0.9886 **       
Non-interest-income Div. H5 0.4155 ** 0.0754 ***  0.0853 ***   -0.5080 *   -0.0855 *  0.0570 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. H6             0.1900 ** 0.0681 ** 4.4801 *   -2.0682 **   
              
ROA: return on asset; RAROA: risk-adjusted ROA; ROE: return on equity; RAROE: risk-adjusted ROE; SR: stock return; RASR: risk-adjusted SR;     
NCO: net charge-offs; MG: maturity gap; DL: derivatives losses; MB: market beta; IRB: interest rate beta; Z: distance to default      
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%              
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interest rate risk. This interpretation is also consistent with the positive coefficient on 
maturity gap (MG) of 0.0681. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Bank holding companies (BHCs) are hypothesized to achieve potential portfolio and 
synergistic benefits through various forms of diversification, such as, domestic and 
international geographic diversification, loan and security diversification, and 
non-interest-income and off-balance-sheet diversification. Over the sample period 
deregulation has enabled BHCs to greatly expand their diversification efforts. On the 
other hand, diversification can generate new managerial problems or agency costs. This 
dissertation examines five issues. 1) Do all the various forms of diversification have the 
same favorable/unfavorable effects on BHCs’ performance?, 2) Are there any interaction 
effects among the various types of diversification?, 3) Since the business strategies of 
large BHCs are different from those of small BHCs, do the diversification effects vary by 
size?, 4) How did diversification impact BHC performance during the 2007-2008 
financial crisis?, and 5) What types of diversification-associated M&A should BHCs 
employ to take advantages of diversification benefits? 
Overall Results - The study finds that not all forms of diversifications have the same 
impacts on BHCs’ performance. Some types of diversification support the hypothesis of 
favorable portfolio benefits and cost synergies, while other findings support the 
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hypothesis of unfavorable agency costs. For example, for all BHCs for the total period, 
loan and non-interest-income diversifications have favorable impacts on ROA, while 
domestic geographic and security diversifications have unfavorable impacts on ROA. A 
ten percent increase in loan and non-interest-income diversifications would increase 
BHCs’ ROA by 10% and 4.2%, respectively. A ten percent increase in domestic 
geographic and security diversifications would both decrease BHCs’ ROA by 2.3%. The 
findings indicate that non-interest-income diversification has the strongest favorable 
impacts on BHCs’ performance as it both increases returns and reduces portfolio risk. 
Security diversification has unfavorable impacts on accounting returns but favorable 
impacts on market returns. Off-balance-sheet diversification has unfavorable impacts on 
risk and it does not contribute to BHCs’ returns. The largest unfavorable impact is on 
derivatives losses. The result indicates that the wider the range of off-balance-sheet 
activities, the higher the risk of derivatives losses that BHCs encounter. 
Moreover, for some diversification measures, the impacts depend on the scale of their 
associated activities. When the scale of the diversified activity is large enough, the net 
diversification impact may change its sign. For example, when the scale of the security 
portfolio relative to total asset is less than 0.0022, the net impact of security 
diversification on ROA for small BHCs is favorable, while it becomes unfavorable when 
the scale is greater than 0.0022. The results show that diversification might become 
difficult to manage if the scale of the activity is too large. The study finds that, in general, 
among the various diversified activities where the sign of the impacts switch with scales, 
loan diversification switches direction from favorable to unfavorable. The results indicate 
that BHCs might tend to make increasingly risky loans when their scale of loans expands. 
Moreover, agency problems might also become difficult to control. On the other hand, 
security diversification tends to switch the direction of impact from unfavorable to 
favorable. The results indicate that with larger security portfolios, BHCs are more 
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capable of reducing risk and increasing returns with a wide selection of securities. 
Results for Various Size Banks - For small banks, larger community banks, and 
regional BHCs, non-interest-income and loan diversifications generally enhance 
performance while security portfolio and off-balance sheet diversifications reduce 
performance. For very large money center banks, diversification into off-balance-sheet 
activities generates the strongest performance benefit, while domestic geographic, loan 
and non-interest income diversifications also have favorable impacts. On the other hand, 
security portfolio diversification has a mix of both favorable and unfavorable effects. 
Focusing on BHCs with international loan portfolios, off-balance-sheet diversification 
creates the strongest performance benefits, followed by domestic geographic 
diversification. On the other hand, international geographic and loan diversifications, 
along with security portfolio and non-interest income diversifications reduce bank 
performance. 
Over all, it appears that larger banks (with the exception of international banks) 
achieve more favorable diversification benefits. On the other hand, the interaction effects 
of various forms of diversifications appear to benefit small BHCs the most. For small and 
larger community BHCs, the interactions of domestic geographic and 
non-interest-income diversifications, security and off-balance-sheet diversification, and 
“all-activity” diversification generally enhance performance, while they reduce 
performance for regional, money center and international BHCs. Thus, the results show 
that smaller BHCs may not benefit through single channel diversification because doing 
so likely increases operating costs while the bank remains unable to fulfill their target 
customers’ full range of service needs. However, by multi-channel diversification, the 
interaction benefits of diversifications can be achieved. On the other hand, larger BHCs 
can benefit through single channel diversification because they have more market power 
and are able to enjoy the benefits of diversified portfolios and cost synergies generated 
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through economies of scale. However, multi-channel diversification may make larger 
BHCs more difficult to manage. For example, they might engage in unfamiliar and risky 
business where operating and agency costs offset potential portfolio benefits.  
Overall, diversification generally supports the hypothesis of favorable portfolio 
benefits and cost synergies. Furthermore, diversification has a consistently more 
favorable impact during the recent financial crisis. That is, the results show that 
diversification plays a more important role in hedging risk and increasing returns during 
the financial crisis. In general, BHCs with widely diversified activities will suffer less 
than other BHCs with concentrated activities when financial crisis occurs.  
Impact of Merger Activity - The study also finds that M&A activity associated with 
several forms of diversification improve BHC performance. Mergers associated with 
domestic geographic diversification have favorable impacts on accounting returns and 
default risk. Mergers associated with non-interest-income diversification have a favorable 
impact on credit risk. Furthermore, mergers associated with off-balance-sheet 
diversification have favorable impact on market returns. Thus, the results support the 
hypothesis of favorable portfolio benefits and cost synergies. The overall implications for 
BHCs are that not all diversification-driven mergers generate benefits for BHCs. Hence, 
BHCs should choose the right mergers which meet their business goals. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The prime objective of research on bank M&A activity in the literature is to identify 
motives for consolidation. Motives such as economies of scale and scope, managerial 
efficiency, risk diversification, and income improvement have been studied extensively. 
However, few studies specifically examine M&As in terms of their associated 
diversification benefits. Wagner (2008) presents a model to show that even though 
consolidation brings about diversification gains, a financial institution’s stability may 
decline since the institution’s incentives for taking on risk may increase and the need to 
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insure adequate liquidity may deteriorate. Empirical results in prior papers focus on the 
impact of M&A activity on risk and returns. However, these studies have few 
implications to guide banks in their M&A decisions. In this study, activity diversification 
has been shown to have both favorable/unfavorable effects on banks’ performance. 
Different forms of M&A activity generate different types of activity diversification and, 
thus, are expected to have different impacts on banks’ performance. Therefore, M&A 
activity should be categorized and analyzed according to their relative diversification 
impacts when M&A issues are studied. This will allow future research to explore more 
fully the implication for bank M&A activity. This dissertation examines the issue 
assuming that the impacts of merger-diversification interaction are contemporaneous. 
However, the effects of M&A activity might emerge over a considerable period of time. 
Thus, the long term implication of merger-diversification strategies need to be examined 
in future research. 
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Appendix 1: Return on Asset (ROA) Regressions for Small BHCs         
                   
    Total period      Before the Crisis    During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation 
Expected 
Sign ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.0018 0.0021  0.0019 0.0019   -0.0077 0.0059  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0020 0.0110  -0.0003 0.0119   -0.0208 0.0235  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0010 0.0016  0.0014 0.0017   0.0113 0.0040 *** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0010 0.0005 * -0.0007 0.0004 * -0.0014 0.0022  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0025 0.0007 *** 0.0028 0.0006 *** 0.0021 0.0013  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0005 0.0007   -0.0003 0.0006   0.0003 0.0026   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0026 0.0007 *** 0.0030 0.0006 *** -0.0005 0.0018  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0036 0.0012 *** 0.0036 0.0012 *** 0.0115 0.0039 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0001 0.0011  0.0001 0.0010   0.0043 0.0046  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 0.6794 0.1624 *** 0.7496 0.1545 *** 0.2837 0.1349 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0018 0.0005 *** 0.0016 0.0005 *** 0.0034 0.0016 ** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0023 0.0136  -0.0063 0.0149   0.0172 0.0287  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0026 0.0024  -0.0049 0.0027 * -0.0132 0.0057 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0053 0.0017 *** 0.0024 0.0015 * 0.0078 0.0063  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -1.1756 0.2798 *** -1.3594 0.2613 *** -0.5200 0.2529 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0014 0.0019   0.0006 0.0018   -0.0009 0.0052   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0056 0.0070  0.0095 0.0078   -0.0052 0.0094  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.0002 0.0020  -0.0004 0.0018   0.0049 0.0075  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0001 0.0008  -0.0004 0.0008   0.0001 0.0035  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0233 0.0228   0.0040 0.0236   0.2547 0.1061 ** 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD            
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0012 0.0003 *** -0.0012 0.0003 *** -0.0008 0.0009  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0268 0.0021 *** 0.0214 0.0020 *** 0.0395 0.0053 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0020 0.0008 ** 0.0012 0.0008   0.0065 0.0027 ** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0005 0.0004  0.0000 0.0003   -0.0023 0.0014 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0019 0.0021  -0.0035 0.0020 * 0.0032 0.0058  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0001 0.0002  0.0003 0.0001 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0002 0.0002  0.0003 0.0002      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0008 0.0004 ** -0.0001 0.0003      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0009 0.0004 ** -0.0002 0.0003      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0008 0.0004 * -0.0001 0.0003      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0008 0.0004 * -0.0001 0.0003      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0007 0.0004 * -0.0001 0.0003      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0008 0.0004 * 0.0000 0.0003      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0012 0.0004 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0020 0.0004 ***     -0.0011 0.0001 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.4614 0.0429 *** 0.4951 0.0556 *** 0.3412 0.0613 *** 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.3396    0.3717    0.2602    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%              
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Appendix 2: Risk Adjusted Return on Asset (RAROA) Regressions for Small BHCs      
                     
       Total period       Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation 
Expected 
Sign RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  12.7190 8.9922  -14.7828 9.0301   8.5951 14.3500  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -6.3237 6.4769  -10.8857 8.5223   29.9899 40.7685  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -5.4416 5.6348  0.2462 7.6022   7.2721 11.2648  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -1.5584 0.8291 * -0.4448 1.0520   2.0284 3.6872  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.3206 0.6167  1.0796 0.7479   3.3148 1.7623 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.6703 1.1552   0.5290 1.0908   1.8444 3.8965   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.2063 1.3751  1.6406 1.5664   7.2213 3.9906 * 
Loan Ratio S3 + -2.2860 3.8660  4.6676 5.5690   3.0952 7.0291  
Security Ratio S4 + -0.8281 2.4279  0.6197 2.5945   1.6154 7.5210  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 85.8837 43.0996 ** 75.3785 35.0958 ** 195.4875 146.2303  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -1.6180 1.3074   -1.5020 1.5213   0.5533 4.0118   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 2.9999 6.2347  0.0429 7.2941   -56.2971 56.4407  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 7.2467 7.9505  -4.5072 11.4305   -9.4308 15.2824  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 6.2233 3.9936  2.2765 4.9811   6.6018 12.8512  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 138.1351 122.7268  -24.4912 137.6013   -648.5177 344.9150 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.1104 2.7068   -1.3164 3.0575   -0.3054 10.0793   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -4.0849 11.3863  10.5295 17.2312   15.4813 20.8652  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.7125 4.8446  -5.1064 4.1727   -6.9074 7.9486  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.8174 1.7371  1.0489 1.8802   -3.5760 6.0242  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 48.6148 32.3456   38.5543 42.0060   191.3378 229.3557   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? -1.1859 1.5274  2.7545 1.4652 * -2.9442 2.4020  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 39.9014 7.5144 *** 34.6166 8.9621 *** 34.0422 11.1748 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0939 0.5982  -0.3109 0.6516   -1.3017 2.4738  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.1125 0.2849  -0.0556 0.3280   -0.8876 0.6758  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -2.3894 2.1028  -3.7341 2.5457   4.8227 3.7026  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.3696 0.1704 ** -0.1637 0.1714      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.5850 0.2746 ** -0.2464 0.2753      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -1.0073 0.6035 * -1.1387 0.6226 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -1.4522 0.6616 ** -1.4916 0.6674 **    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -1.6883 0.7106 ** -1.6355 0.7083 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -1.5350 0.7531 ** -1.4133 0.7401 *    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -1.5629 0.7943 ** -1.3428 0.7740 *    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -1.8222 0.8302 ** -1.4487 0.8047 *    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -2.4663 0.8742 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -3.0169 0.9129 ***     -1.6297 0.2389 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8907 0.0111 *** 0.8900 0.0125 *** 0.7750 0.0280 *** 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.8012    0.8048    0.6246    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 3: Return on Equity (ROE) Regressions for Small BHCs         
      Total period     Before the Crisis    During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation 
Expected 
Sign ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.0156 0.0336  0.0453 0.0245 * -0.1837 0.0968 * 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0936 0.2170  0.0420 0.1840   -0.5649 0.6674  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0244 0.0268  0.0274 0.0221   0.1641 0.0726 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0157 0.0073 ** -0.0068 0.0053   -0.0234 0.0292  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0232 0.0060 *** 0.0260 0.0052 *** 0.0288 0.0168 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0031 0.0102   -0.0085 0.0095   0.0260 0.0403   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0333 0.0078 *** 0.0349 0.0063 *** 0.0103 0.0287  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0432 0.0209 ** 0.0451 0.0165 *** 0.1622 0.0679 ** 
Security Ratio S4 + -0.0132 0.0165  0.0005 0.0132   0.0522 0.0723  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 6.1131 1.2332 *** 6.7112 1.1082 *** 3.3756 3.3868  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0236 0.0073 *** 0.0178 0.0064 *** 0.0760 0.0349 ** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0124 0.2403  -0.1374 0.2351   0.4311 0.8128  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0475 0.0413  -0.0732 0.0380 * -0.1882 0.1046 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0787 0.0275 *** 0.0200 0.0176   0.1360 0.0992  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -10.7006 2.0723 *** -12.2575 1.8820 *** -7.3579 6.0233  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0001 0.0248   0.0061 0.0243   -0.0959 0.0870   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.1874 0.1380  0.1263 0.1177   0.0201 0.2388  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.0197 0.0347  0.0027 0.0259   0.0138 0.1913  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0004 0.0123  -0.0052 0.0115   0.0090 0.0484  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.3460 0.4651   -0.2956 0.4076   7.5138 2.8672 *** 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0099 0.0053 * -0.0130 0.0048 *** -0.0024 0.0119  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.1085 0.0686  -0.0507 0.0417   0.5148 0.2075 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0416 0.0145 *** 0.0185 0.0127   0.1708 0.0634 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0108 0.0083  -0.0010 0.0030   -0.0466 0.0275 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0129 0.0409  -0.0340 0.0241   0.0423 0.1455  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0012 0.0025  0.0036 0.0017 **    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0030 0.0029  0.0031 0.0020      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0065 0.0050  0.0004 0.0039      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0083 0.0055  -0.0013 0.0046      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0065 0.0054  0.0008 0.0044      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0060 0.0052  0.0013 0.0039      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0051 0.0051  0.0019 0.0040      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0058 0.0050  0.0022 0.0039      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0114 0.0051 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0245 0.0054 ***     -0.0168 0.0027 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.4271 0.1142 *** 0.4650 0.1247 *** 0.3298 0.1616 ** 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2390    0.2689    0.2259    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 4: Risk Adjusted Return on Equity (RAROE) Regressions for Small BHCs      
                     
       Total period    Before the Crisis    During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation 
Expected 
Sign RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   RAROE 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  18.6618 9.0282 ** -8.8367 9.5121   10.3650 13.2804  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -9.9078 6.1603  -14.2084 7.3151 * -8.6789 29.2632  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -6.5806 5.4184  -1.7305 7.2830   7.3975 8.4462  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -1.4671 0.8524 * -0.3525 1.0941   1.0344 3.2349  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.3621 0.6395  1.2328 0.7611   3.2811 1.6386 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -1.2937 1.2708   -0.4526 1.2281   0.3494 3.5467   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -1.2078 1.3477  -0.5540 1.5694   3.8706 3.4227  
Loan Ratio S3 + -5.0978 3.6208  1.7824 5.3022   3.0650 5.9661  
Security Ratio S4 + -1.5769 2.5901  0.2319 2.7574   -0.4311 6.9291  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 77.7551 40.7394 * 68.7041 31.8454 ** 207.8954 139.6414  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -1.4089 1.4016   -1.5350 1.7242   -0.0038 3.7992   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 6.2758 6.4896  3.5594 7.5896   -4.5398 38.6454  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 9.1994 7.5983  -0.9553 10.8528   -10.5203 11.6002  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 5.9958 4.0035  2.0057 4.9849   9.2981 11.4484  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 199.0415 125.0654  30.6209 141.2071   -689.7074 331.6121 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.4633 2.9531   -1.7827 3.4711   2.0866 9.4222   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 2.3160 9.3173  12.7371 12.3883   10.2898 16.2680  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -3.3554 3.0247  -6.0971 3.9697   -5.6019 6.5150  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 1.7185 1.8554  2.6113 2.0445   -2.4176 5.4049  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 40.7556 31.7713   16.2227 40.5033   270.1002 178.8307   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? -1.4796 1.5607  2.5845 1.5422 * -2.6243 2.1792  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 25.0175 7.2513 *** 20.7264 8.5562 ** 31.3346 9.8189 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 1.1188 0.6023 * 0.5521 0.6541   1.0440 2.4207  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0409 0.3631  -0.0247 0.4301   -0.6756 0.7010  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -2.7564 2.0504  -4.0382 2.4624   4.3211 3.5770  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.4250 0.1762 ** -0.2512 0.1729      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.6102 0.2740 ** -0.3347 0.2646      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -1.0934 0.6639 * -1.4488 0.6643 **    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -1.3465 0.7228 * -1.6437 0.7089 **    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -1.5534 0.7728 ** -1.7922 0.7451 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -1.4320 0.8149 * -1.6346 0.7745 **    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -1.3865 0.8528  -1.5187 0.8039 *    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -1.6870 0.8884 * -1.6988 0.8317 **    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -2.4649 0.9332 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -2.9116 0.9697 ***     -1.4228 0.2314 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8778 0.0107 *** 0.8794 0.0116 *** 0.7527 0.0302 *** 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7796    0.7866    0.5934    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 5: Stock Return (SR) Regressions for Small BHCs         
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis    During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation 
Expected 
Sign SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.2605 0.2011  -0.2438 0.1573   -2.4839 0.9315 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.2112 1.0227  -0.6424 1.0325   9.8575 18.9870  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0302 0.1354  0.0453 0.1157   0.7011 0.7257  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0556 0.0374  0.0426 0.0312   0.0545 0.1629  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0642 0.0343 * -0.0153 0.0292   0.1823 0.1976  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0744 0.0585   0.0428 0.0613   -0.0806 0.4297   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.1466 0.0608 ** 0.1050 0.0525 ** 0.5134 0.2837 * 
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0625 0.1034  0.1245 0.0892   0.2974 0.5978  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.1878 0.0820 ** 0.0763 0.0755   1.1969 0.8150  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -15.9845 5.5871 *** 3.8470 5.2485   -6.5712 17.5734  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0991 0.0773   -0.0074 0.0655   0.5969 0.3179 * 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.7792 1.4167  1.0750 1.4218   -12.3913 21.4106  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0441 0.1979  -0.1315 0.1664   -0.9029 0.9813  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.1871 0.1235  -0.1185 0.1063   -0.8437 1.0274  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 40.2470 11.5143 *** -5.9629 10.7402   50.7167 39.2370  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.4783 0.2321 ** -0.2190 0.2515   -0.8873 0.8467   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.5875 0.5818  -0.3806 0.5956   2.1968 7.3645  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.3956 0.2654  -0.2635 0.2689   0.4498 8.4608  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0587 0.0859  0.0266 0.0810   0.3906 0.7263  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 2.4353 2.6719   3.4718 2.5200   -28.3685 34.7414   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0140 0.0255  0.0167 0.0198   0.2007 0.0865 ** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0360 0.2427  -0.0399 0.2016   1.0104 1.0069  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.2940 0.1094 *** 0.2632 0.1057 ** 0.2129 0.3616  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0204 0.0219  0.0289 0.0208   0.1744 0.1623  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.4252 0.1344 *** -0.4459 0.1251 *** -0.4586 0.4489  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0257 0.0211  -0.0382 0.0206 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0122 0.0222  -0.0212 0.0219      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0528 0.0304 * 0.0682 0.0288 **    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0197 0.0297  0.0347 0.0282      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0400 0.0298  0.0602 0.0280 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0097 0.0296  0.0037 0.0283      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0404 0.0295  -0.0255 0.0276      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0068 0.0287  0.0042 0.0276      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.1068 0.0295 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.1191 0.0416 ***     0.0107 0.0288  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.1064 0.0486 ** -0.1634 0.0405 *** -0.1554 0.0705 ** 
Observations   1229   989    239   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1468    0.1401    0.0581    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 6: Risk Adjusted Stock Return (RASR) Regressions for Small BHCs       
                     
      Total period    Before the Crisis        During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation 
Expected 
Sign RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -1.3541 1.2485  -1.3600 1.2259   -14.0544 5.9001 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -1.6791 7.4153  -3.4548 7.7901   48.9902 44.8609  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0776 0.9353  0.2062 0.9033   2.7686 4.4057  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.5725 0.2433 ** 0.7162 0.2491 *** 0.3841 0.9423  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.5936 0.2273 *** -0.3902 0.2281 * -0.1688 1.1445  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.3135 0.4091   0.2175 0.4544   -1.9884 2.1427   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 1.0793 0.4228 ** 0.9284 0.4422 ** 2.6868 1.6616  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.6267 0.6431  0.6711 0.6275   5.2855 3.5529  
Security Ratio S4 + 1.6181 0.6003 *** 1.0145 0.5969 * 11.8164 5.2997 ** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -55.8895 29.0314 * 12.3812 41.8230   -24.0508 72.4500  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.5230 0.4616   0.1892 0.4649   1.7464 1.8774   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 8.4741 10.4010  10.7513 10.8456   -71.5107 42.4029 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.1228 1.3262  -0.5890 1.2890   -3.2512 5.7352  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -1.4242 0.8772  -1.5439 0.8820 * -7.0710 6.1846  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 182.2321 67.7149 *** 20.5862 85.8351   266.1284 197.7531  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -2.7247 1.6881   -1.5108 1.8745   -2.8477 4.8455   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -8.8037 4.2537 ** -9.4214 4.4685 ** 17.4652 14.6917  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -1.5998 2.0870  -1.6603 2.2524   14.4173 23.2496  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.3575 0.6106  0.1703 0.6084   3.8834 3.8311  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -1.2711 22.2675   2.0194 23.1482   -163.8264 79.4715 ** 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0060 0.1607  0.0423 0.1567   0.7774 0.5419  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.4516 1.4116  -0.1593 1.3386   3.0364 7.2513  
Asset Growth C3 + 1.2769 0.6817 * 1.1678 0.6932 * 1.7074 1.9566  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.1776 0.1917  0.1680 0.2195   1.3050 1.0110  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -2.4228 0.8817 *** -2.3520 1.1915 ** -3.8153 2.2844 * 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.1788 0.1537  -0.2462 0.1535      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.1068 0.1628  -0.1609 0.1632      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.3623 0.2079 * 0.3724 0.2096 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.1369 0.2081  0.1574 0.2105      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.3482 0.2084 * 0.3848 0.2103 *    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0397 0.2093  -0.0254 0.2111      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.2887 0.2092  -0.2862 0.2084      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0565 0.2082  0.0471 0.2110      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.9784 0.2132 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.9261 0.2493 ***     0.1315 0.1880  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.1219 0.0345 *** -0.1300 0.0350 *** -0.1829 0.0771 ** 
Observations   1229   989    239   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2021    0.1361    0.0101    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 7: Net Charge Off (NCO) Regressions for Small BHCs         
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis   During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign NCO Std. Error   NCO 
Std. 
Error   NCO Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -0.0036 0.0009 *** -0.0033 0.0009 *** 0.0025 0.0028  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0012 0.0045  -0.0018 0.0050   0.0058 0.0063  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0007 0.0007  -0.0001 0.0004   -0.0009 0.0024  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0002 0.0003  -0.0002 0.0002   0.0018 0.0011 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0005 0.0001 *** -0.0005 0.0001 *** -0.0019 0.0007 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0015 0.0005 *** 0.0012 0.0004 *** 0.0024 0.0019   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0004 0.0002  0.0001 0.0002   0.0009 0.0009  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0001 0.0005  -0.0003 0.0003   -0.0026 0.0021  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0008 0.0004 * -0.0009 0.0004 ** -0.0020 0.0023  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0140 0.0302  0.0233 0.0349   -0.1407 0.0655 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0005 0.0002 ** -0.0003 0.0002   -0.0025 0.0011 ** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0034 0.0060  0.0039 0.0066   -0.0055 0.0090  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0005 0.0011  0.0012 0.0007 * 0.0007 0.0036  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0009 0.0007  0.0006 0.0006   -0.0058 0.0029 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.0014 0.0603  0.0218 0.0696   0.2326 0.1292 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0023 0.0013 * -0.0021 0.0012 * 0.0007 0.0043   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0031 0.0030  -0.0026 0.0033   -0.0034 0.0076  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0008 0.0009  0.0008 0.0009   0.0045 0.0048  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0014 0.0005 *** -0.0009 0.0005 ** -0.0042 0.0021 ** 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0123 0.0157   -0.0028 0.0158   -0.1171 0.0592 ** 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0007 0.0002 *** 0.0007 0.0002 *** 0.0002 0.0005  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.0025 0.0009 *** -0.0010 0.0009   -0.0066 0.0027 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0020 0.0004 *** -0.0015 0.0004 *** -0.0045 0.0016 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0002 0.0004  -0.0002 0.0001 * 0.0016 0.0014  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0015 0.0015  0.0028 0.0008 *** -0.0041 0.0057  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0001 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0001 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0003 0.0002 ** 0.0002 0.0001      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0004 0.0002 ** 0.0002 0.0001      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0004 0.0002 ** 0.0002 0.0001      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0004 0.0002 ** 0.0002 0.0001      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0001 0.0002  0.0000 0.0001      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0001 0.0002  -0.0001 0.0001      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0003 0.0002 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0009 0.0002 ***     0.0006 0.0001 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.2503 0.0355 *** 0.2363 0.0400 *** 0.2057 0.0581 *** 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1288    0.1164    0.1292    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 8: Maturity Gap (MG) Regressions for Small BHCs         
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis   During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MG Std. Error   MG 
Std. 
Error   MG 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.1660 0.1665  -0.0894 0.1884   0.2201 0.3310  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.1484 0.1539  -0.1689 0.1731   1.1787 0.6274 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.2695 0.1419 * 0.2275 0.1524   -0.0704 0.2236  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0283 0.0287  -0.0131 0.0304   0.1767 0.0717 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0048 0.0172  -0.0153 0.0196   0.0584 0.0524  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0450 0.0352   -0.0208 0.0383   0.0973 0.0853   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.0889 0.0445 ** -0.0933 0.0536 * -0.1154 0.0710  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.1010 0.0881  0.0383 0.0984   -0.2048 0.1791  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0232 0.0640  -0.0542 0.0708   0.0122 0.1804  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.3214 0.9474  0.0612 0.9502   -0.3266 5.7087  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0740 0.0394 * 0.1242 0.0462 *** 0.1321 0.1088   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.2335 0.1671  0.1293 0.1710   -1.8348 0.7997 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.3913 0.2030 * -0.2936 0.2235   0.0015 0.3247  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.2125 0.1136 * -0.1106 0.1253   -0.6044 0.2537 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 1.0023 3.7207  6.4371 4.3914   4.9635 12.2079  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0909 0.0847   -0.1794 0.1063 * -0.0715 0.2369   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0614 0.2118  0.0793 0.2399   0.9353 0.3387 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0344 0.0957  0.0886 0.1132   0.0261 0.2162  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0867 0.0544  0.0891 0.0617   -0.1679 0.1338  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -1.6299 1.2251   -1.7284 1.3279   -1.7229 3.2826   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0530 0.0268 ** 0.0431 0.0298   0.0080 0.0514  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0526 0.1609  0.1394 0.1737   0.3631 0.2616  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0258 0.0191  0.0341 0.0210   -0.0227 0.0517  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0045 0.0077  -0.0139 0.0100   0.0091 0.0091  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0397 0.0369  -0.0267 0.0440   0.0063 0.0764  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0081 0.0053  -0.0075 0.0054      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0130 0.0072 * -0.0122 0.0074 *    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0097 0.0159  0.0274 0.0180      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0051 0.0163  0.0238 0.0186      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0140 0.0167  0.0331 0.0190 *    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0165 0.0169  0.0363 0.0193 *    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0121 0.0170  0.0329 0.0195 *    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0032 0.0170  0.0245 0.0194      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0126 0.0175         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0167 0.0172      -0.0033 0.0056  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8278 0.0106 *** 0.8121 0.0128 *** 0.7766 0.0220 *** 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.6972    0.6788    0.6201    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 9: Derivatives Loss (DL) Regressions for Small BHCs         
      Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0002  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0000 *** 
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0000 0.0003  0.0000 0.0000   0.0026 0.0019  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0003  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0001  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.0007 0.0007  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0037 0.0040  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0003 0.0001 *** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0002  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0001 *** 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0002 0.0002   0.0000 0.0000   -0.0004 0.0014   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 *    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0000 0.0000         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0000 0.0000      0.0000 0.0000  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.0523 0.0115 *** 0.0909 0.0129 *** 0.0488 0.0264 * 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.0050    0.0135    0.0078    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 10: Market Beta (MB) Regressions for Small BHCs         
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -6.2748 2.1400 *** -5.8578 1.8868 *** -19.1655 3.5129 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0459 1.5297  3.3936 2.5367   22.9011 16.8362  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.2168 0.7976  -0.2245 1.0479   0.9617 1.9819  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0335 0.0738  0.1121 0.0924   0.7266 0.3861 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0723 0.1410  -0.1942 0.1696   -0.0889 0.4346  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.6332 0.2022 *** 0.5493 0.2179 ** 1.1677 0.7164   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.0652 0.1756  -0.1402 0.2497   0.1647 0.6472  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.3554 0.4913  -0.1621 0.5657   1.0392 1.4259  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0210 0.1655  -0.3476 0.2030 * 0.8793 1.3822  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -24.7340 16.8684  -33.5986 26.9343   -30.5414 22.6229  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.7643 0.3653 ** 0.6039 0.3138 * 1.0326 0.9247   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 1.0939 1.7199  0.7196 1.9358   -1.4162 18.5211  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.1043 1.2971  0.7242 1.4970   -1.8367 2.8042  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.2261 0.3127  0.8267 0.5280   -0.1801 1.6467  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 40.7016 30.5889  64.9820 45.3920   130.0089 77.1557 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -1.6673 0.6373 *** -1.1921 0.6784 * -0.2230 2.3826   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -2.2909 1.5410  -8.2242 3.7607 ** -31.0488 4.8976 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0493 0.9741  -0.1318 1.3772   -12.0160 5.9761 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.6017 0.2835 ** -0.7211 0.2693 *** -2.6123 1.1560 ** 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 1.6263 5.2766   8.7153 8.1456   47.3209 24.4690 * 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? 0.9978 0.3179 *** 0.9716 0.2772 *** 2.9321 0.4096 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 3.2650 1.1125 *** 4.0714 1.2126 *** 6.3856 2.1813 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0920 0.1084  -0.0498 0.0901   -1.0019 0.4315 ** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0066 0.0165  0.0350 0.0324   0.1166 0.1115  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0709 0.1059  -0.1938 0.1692   0.3868 0.5254  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0031 0.0158  0.0104 0.0215      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0006 0.0271  0.0247 0.0367      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0028 0.0570  -0.0015 0.0663      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0137 0.0629  0.0265 0.0732      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0172 0.0696  0.0515 0.0817      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0318 0.0812  0.0738 0.0899      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0621 0.0917  0.1217 0.0979      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.1987 0.1029 * 0.2861 0.1045 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.1954 0.1130 *        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.1695 0.1212      -0.1063 0.0508 ** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9427 0.0173 *** 0.8934 0.0357 *** 0.9095 0.0293 *** 
Observations   1229   989    239   
Adjusted R-squared     0.9388    0.8922    0.8932    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 11: Interest Rate Beta (IRB) Regressions for Small BHCs         
     Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  1.6976 0.7022 ** 1.0828 0.3252 *** 1.9279 1.3341  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.7605 1.0592  -0.2158 0.7947   -17.0736 9.0531 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.3145 0.3988  -0.1900 0.3400   0.7538 1.0336  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0323 0.0497  0.0218 0.0392   0.0932 0.2513  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0403 0.0825  -0.0089 0.0498   -0.0786 0.2490  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.1934 0.1385   0.0402 0.0883   -0.5013 0.4118   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.0397 0.1290  -0.1444 0.0901   0.1011 0.3659  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.1663 0.2269  -0.2089 0.2693   0.1195 0.6436  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.1488 0.1583  0.0674 0.0716   -0.3404 0.9326  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 4.5863 8.3928  -9.9686 9.4365   -13.5460 13.6731  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.4133 0.2002 ** -0.3559 0.1510 ** -0.6874 0.4298   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.8315 1.2392  0.2223 0.8277   21.2335 10.5082 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.9022 0.5932  0.2945 0.5454   -1.5624 1.4234  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.1327 0.2701  -0.1400 0.1571   -0.2193 1.0849  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -9.6198 14.9949  20.8691 15.5812   5.7061 35.9686  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.4878 0.4668   0.3579 0.3429   2.2531 1.0059 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.8746 1.2296  0.2570 0.9330   -2.3806 3.2171  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.8298 0.4864 * 0.0581 0.3575   -0.2152 3.6075  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.2851 0.2070  -0.0903 0.1070   0.3650 0.6836  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -1.4321 4.4112   -0.8464 3.7049   12.9869 11.9908   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD +           
Log Asset C1 ? -0.2221 0.1056 ** -0.1187 0.0452 *** -0.2219 0.1552  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -1.9835 0.5483 *** 0.3827 0.3158   -4.5638 1.6512 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.1107 0.0582 * -0.0303 0.0407   -0.1793 0.2539  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0093 0.0140  0.0188 0.0164   -0.0712 0.0387 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.1351 0.0677 ** -0.0450 0.0840   0.2655 0.2522  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0105 0.0167  -0.0151 0.0092 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0663 0.0269 ** -0.0733 0.0148 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.1134 0.0525 ** -0.1468 0.0272 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.1395 0.0574 ** -0.1781 0.0302 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0705 0.0638  -0.1200 0.0320 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0908 0.0669  -0.1460 0.0331 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.1206 0.0713 * -0.1670 0.0350 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0641 0.0747  -0.1115 0.0352 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0627 0.0784         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0942 0.0795      -0.0173 0.0332  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8054 0.0263 *** 0.8435 0.0239 *** 0.6659 0.0618 *** 
Observations   1229   989    239   
Adjusted R-squared     0.6312    0.7445    0.4547    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 12: Distance to Default (Z-Score) Regressions for Small BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  119.26 276.90  -689.75 270.83 ** 195.21 492.75  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -123.90 126.02  -218.05 196.50   710.72 1268.47  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -195.23 167.75  -140.77 253.96   -24.71 326.95  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -29.10 22.72  3.01 29.93   191.56 123.07  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 17.19 17.74  41.52 21.98 * 79.78 52.21  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -22.77 29.12   22.99 26.79   77.13 116.98   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 38.68 42.19  72.37 51.90   232.38 129.94 * 
Loan Ratio S3 ? -127.52 116.11  -15.65 177.82   -167.23 219.53  
Security Ratio S4 ? -87.08 73.56  -46.41 82.19   101.47 225.99  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -476.84 1154.28  -731.10 1144.26   -1112.80 5183.14  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -76.92 35.64 ** -92.22 41.53 ** -64.62 122.46   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 7.63 133.22  -51.19 177.52   -1318.93 1766.34  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 286.72 238.39  133.37 370.54   116.80 458.38  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 231.80 115.38 ** 194.65 157.68   -87.96 400.34  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -2968.13 3291.78  -6023.98 4045.41   -16806.64 12444.86  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 84.29 72.56   52.26 82.18   120.32 279.38   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -100.55 242.17  179.94 426.44   108.74 637.89  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 8.44 121.18  -185.56 105.09 * -343.50 256.61  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 2.75 44.75  -33.18 48.39   -195.01 186.93  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 1105.41 607.14 * 1236.40 937.19   8079.45 6966.01   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD -           
Log Asset C1 ? 3.93 47.27  129.49 46.17 *** -59.51 82.84  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 1917.94 231.02 *** 1948.70 263.55 *** 1885.22 370.85 *** 
Asset Growth C3 - 4.02 15.51  -7.71 16.87   -61.84 74.73  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.88 5.51  4.52 5.99   -20.75 16.20  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -71.63 43.04 * -104.54 52.44 ** 119.77 107.40  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -6.60 3.93 * -3.62 4.09      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -10.37 6.76  -5.46 7.00      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -13.34 17.15  -33.58 17.69 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -27.88 18.83  -46.92 19.00 **    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -35.95 20.37 * -53.80 20.35 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -34.02 21.80  -50.82 21.51 **    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -35.84 23.16  -50.66 22.73 **    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -38.24 24.44  -50.35 23.78 **    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -43.60 25.92 *        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -56.15 27.34 **     -35.72 7.25 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.92 0.01 *** 0.92 0.01 *** 0.83 0.02 *** 
Observations   7543   6071    1471   
Adjusted R-squared     0.8688    0.8586    0.7324    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 13: Return on Asset (ROA) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs       
                     
      Total period    Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0084 0.0020 *** -0.0093 0.0025 *** -0.0159 0.0055 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0218 0.0063 *** -0.0173 0.0063 *** -0.0281 0.0109 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0095 0.0042 ** 0.0115 0.0049 ** 0.0087 0.0052 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0028 0.0007 *** -0.0027 0.0009 *** -0.0004 0.0015  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0036 0.0014 *** 0.0038 0.0013 *** 0.0033 0.0015 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0018 0.0008 ** -0.0005 0.0009   -0.0009 0.0024   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -0.0009 0.0013  -0.0021 0.0021   0.0013 0.0010  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0150 0.0035 *** 0.0150 0.0037 *** 0.0182 0.0059 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0057 0.0012 *** 0.0037 0.0015 ** 0.0195 0.0046 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 0.4693 0.1194 *** 0.5504 0.1096 *** 0.2815 0.0835 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0002   0.0070 0.0015 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0190 0.0066 *** 0.0131 0.0080   0.0302 0.0111 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0143 0.0062 ** -0.0178 0.0071 ** -0.0093 0.0073  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0060 0.0018 *** 0.0057 0.0026 ** 0.0021 0.0051  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.3614 0.2228  -0.3337 0.1720 * -0.1537 0.2232  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0001 0.0008   -0.0010 0.0013   -0.0071 0.0032 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 + 0.0052 0.0039  0.0076 0.0050   -0.0054 0.0079  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + 0.0077 0.0026 *** 0.0043 0.0027   0.0132 0.0085  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 + 0.0017 0.0014  -0.0002 0.0016   0.0010 0.0038  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + -0.0113 0.0082   -0.0014 0.0100   -0.0278 0.0194   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0003 0.0004  -0.0013 0.0006 ** 0.0028 0.0006 *** 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0001 0.0002  0.0002 0.0002   -0.0011 0.0004 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0246 0.0086 *** 0.0223 0.0157   0.0377 0.0069 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0001 0.0018  -0.0010 0.0015   0.0117 0.0029 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0003 0.0001 ** 0.0000 0.0001   0.0005 0.0003  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0016 0.0019  -0.0007 0.0016   -0.0121 0.0030 *** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0007 0.0002 *** -0.0002 0.0001      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0009 0.0003 *** -0.0003 0.0002      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0031 0.0006 *** -0.0024 0.0005 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0024 0.0005 *** -0.0017 0.0005 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0028 0.0005 *** -0.0021 0.0004 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0029 0.0006 *** -0.0022 0.0004 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0028 0.0006 *** -0.0021 0.0004 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0029 0.0006 *** -0.0022 0.0004 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0037 0.0006 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0054 0.0007 ***     -0.0018 0.0002 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.4041 0.0779 *** 0.6141 0.0845 *** 0.1552 0.0384 *** 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.5961    0.6854    0.4131    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 14: Risk Adjusted Return on Asset (RAROA) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs     
       Total period       Before the Crisis    During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  9.4681 5.7859  -12.6642 6.5625 * -11.0618 8.4472  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -3.6771 4.5285  -5.0633 5.5688   14.4625 7.7905 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -4.2715 6.4171  0.7726 6.5876   8.4068 8.6052  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.9679 0.8341  -0.9856 0.9506   6.1264 3.0385 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 1.6173 0.5958 *** 1.9456 0.7661 ** 2.5884 1.3963 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -1.3716 1.1498   -0.7977 1.2858   -3.1212 4.0448   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 2.4754 1.6012  1.6149 1.9823   3.4567 2.2641  
Loan Ratio S3 + -0.1613 4.9152  8.5610 5.6226   13.9327 6.3848 ** 
Security Ratio S4 + 3.4057 2.0121 * 2.6950 2.2782   21.2158 5.8909 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.5481 7.6259  3.2836 6.3189   -106.6094 41.7256 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0464 0.1281   0.0481 0.1244   6.9003 3.7731 * 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.2461 4.4674  3.2867 5.2972   -2.6452 7.7749  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 9.3277 10.7188  -1.5968 10.5894   -6.7390 12.3465  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 4.4619 4.0205  2.3172 4.7916   -7.9477 9.5978  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 23.1319 23.0785  5.2184 18.1782   245.4352 104.3305 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0972 1.6419   -1.5741 1.5034   -1.7293 7.3549   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 8.8135 6.5235  4.6018 7.2359   -20.3855 11.6341 * 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -2.2599 3.4212  -0.0343 3.6732   1.8365 6.9365  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 3.0627 2.1029  1.8236 2.4247   0.8776 5.8348  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 4.7663 17.2506   -12.6874 17.3530   -59.9694 34.4299 * 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 2.9184 3.4627  2.0109 4.0160   5.9942 2.8614 ** 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.6456 0.7246  2.1406 0.8047 *** -1.2042 0.8919  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 12.9558 6.8724 * 9.7725 5.8679 * 26.8647 8.4732 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -1.5258 0.5709 *** -2.1338 0.5894 *** -1.0499 1.5728  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.2804 0.1781  -0.2516 0.2331   -1.0196 0.5137 ** 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -1.6624 1.1100  -2.8047 1.3878 ** 1.4193 2.1322  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.6617 0.1752 *** -0.3505 0.1815 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -1.1254 0.2597 *** -0.5466 0.2725 **    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -2.6382 0.4533 *** -1.5801 0.4621 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -2.7919 0.4946 *** -1.5008 0.5069 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -3.3281 0.5426 *** -1.8494 0.5601 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -3.0170 0.5924 *** -1.3635 0.6031 **    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -3.2657 0.6289 *** -1.4433 0.6411 **    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -4.2627 0.6520 *** -2.1352 0.6684 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -5.4576 0.6865 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -6.4190 0.7148 ***     -2.4588 0.2450 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8908 0.0100 *** 0.8887 0.0110 *** 0.7287 0.0331 *** 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7957    0.7970    0.5905    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 15: Return on Equity (ROE) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs       
       Total period    Before the Crisis   During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROE Std. Error   ROE 
Std. 
Error   ROE 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0012 0.0163  -0.0032 0.0106   -0.1854 0.1243  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0887 0.0406 ** -0.0240 0.0163   -0.2591 0.1436 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0273 0.0258  0.0122 0.0131   0.1091 0.1093  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0113 0.0038 *** -0.0073 0.0032 ** 0.0037 0.0312  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0071 0.0051  0.0005 0.0032   0.0225 0.0265  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0011 0.0072   0.0011 0.0048   0.0637 0.0599   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0131 0.0051 *** 0.0070 0.0053   0.0293 0.0191  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0554 0.0224 ** 0.0379 0.0115 *** 0.2795 0.1421 ** 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0509 0.0083 *** 0.0232 0.0074 *** 0.3205 0.1059 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 0.8611 0.1602 *** 1.0205 0.1539 *** -0.1799 0.5467  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0014 0.0013   -0.0001 0.0007   0.1016 0.0293 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0861 0.0384 ** 0.0048 0.0174   0.2704 0.1124 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0345 0.0373  -0.0239 0.0187   -0.1253 0.1513  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0122 0.0151  0.0021 0.0126   0.0458 0.0865  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.4750 0.5713  0.2443 0.4843   6.2355 2.4305 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0030 0.0056   -0.0041 0.0060   -0.1320 0.0576 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 + -0.0059 0.0275  0.0067 0.0131   -0.0561 0.1213  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + 0.0372 0.0183 ** 0.0191 0.0097 ** 0.1416 0.1213  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 + -0.0076 0.0130  -0.0044 0.0080   -0.0813 0.0816  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + -0.0132 0.0729   0.0060 0.0509   -0.2829 0.2745   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0144 0.0039 *** 0.0014 0.0036   0.0402 0.0068 *** 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0032 0.0018 * 0.0023 0.0010 ** -0.0254 0.0067 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0301 0.0357  -0.0586 0.0253 ** 0.3379 0.1458 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0543 0.0147 *** 0.0052 0.0051   0.2690 0.0861 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0046 0.0014 *** 0.0004 0.0009   0.0141 0.0057 ** 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0751 0.0156 *** -0.0246 0.0071 *** -0.2767 0.0884 *** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0026 0.0021  -0.0005 0.0013      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0035 0.0023  -0.0014 0.0016      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0145 0.0027 *** -0.0074 0.0019 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0102 0.0027 *** -0.0029 0.0019      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0117 0.0028 *** -0.0046 0.0019 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0125 0.0028 *** -0.0058 0.0020 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0119 0.0030 *** -0.0059 0.0023 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0113 0.0029 *** -0.0055 0.0020 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0179 0.0030 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0458 0.0053 ***     -0.0260 0.0033 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.1868 0.0588 *** 0.4453 0.0996 *** 0.0801 0.0431 * 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1392    0.3097    0.1186    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 16: Risk Adjusted Return on Equity (RAROE) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs     
                     
     Total period     Before the Crisis     During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  7.1137 6.4711  -11.0082 7.2442   -3.0771 7.9607  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -4.5540 5.0215  -2.3533 5.2028   11.0993 6.0245 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 1.6103 7.1208  9.4223 7.7895   14.6937 8.4597 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.2418 1.0164  0.3206 1.1399   4.8504 2.5526 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 1.5922 0.7838 ** 1.5667 0.9700   2.4995 1.3439 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.7425 1.6342   0.2551 1.7520   -4.6711 3.4109   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 2.3823 2.2093  2.4854 2.3583   3.5483 1.9597 * 
Loan Ratio S3 + 1.9251 4.6046  11.4876 5.7141 ** 15.8032 6.2056 ** 
Security Ratio S4 + 2.4559 2.0404  2.4116 2.5714   20.2767 5.6503 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 12.6739 5.6403 ** 15.7211 6.3748 ** -89.1295 59.9938  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.1158 0.1795   0.2204 0.1970   6.6731 3.1973 ** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 4.0310 5.9759  1.9337 5.8727   -2.1626 6.2540  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.5178 10.7049  -13.7526 11.4067   -13.8685 12.0358  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 2.9835 4.1377  -0.3796 5.1924   -7.3130 9.2114  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 18.2771 22.1723  4.1583 19.0851   217.8506 122.0292 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -1.6451 2.2574   -3.5027 2.4492   -1.8205 6.3915   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 1.9734 6.9636  -2.5466 7.2420   -13.2046 9.5085  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.7094 3.7969  4.4189 4.1461   0.8211 6.9422  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 2.7448 2.3563  1.8514 2.7195   3.3476 5.1671  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -8.0728 18.8211   -19.7587 20.0648   -51.0833 26.5091 * 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 2.2006 3.6817  1.3721 3.4083   7.2753 1.3690 *** 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.1982 0.7313  1.6649 0.8319 ** -2.4544 0.7472 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? -3.4128 5.6974  -6.5803 5.2006   12.5429 7.4124 * 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.5629 0.6364  -0.9426 0.7040   0.0008 1.4007  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.2910 0.1868  -0.4121 0.2573   -0.6525 0.4566  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -3.3410 1.5221 ** -3.9298 1.9643 ** -0.8119 1.9681  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.5910 0.2416 ** -0.2260 0.2393      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -1.1664 0.3166 *** -0.5091 0.3247      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -3.1374 0.5358 *** -1.9904 0.5650 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -3.2368 0.5867 *** -1.8520 0.6236 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -3.7051 0.6353 *** -2.1234 0.6823 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -3.8729 0.6965 *** -2.1283 0.7476 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -4.2181 0.7535 *** -2.3047 0.8076 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -5.2223 0.7924 *** -3.0282 0.8602 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -6.5835 0.8374 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -7.6523 0.8839 ***     -2.3367 0.2273 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8799 0.0124 *** 0.8768 0.0144 *** 0.7137 0.0238 *** 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7839    0.7773    0.5922    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 17: Stock Return (SR) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs        
      Total period     Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  0.0687 0.1168  0.0759 0.1143   -1.1057 0.4745 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0280 0.1649  -0.0745 0.1446   0.2514 0.5281  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0598 0.1380  0.1209 0.1258   0.1833 0.4108  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0260 0.0327  0.0299 0.0339   0.1403 0.1397  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0179 0.0273  0.0123 0.0282   0.1713 0.1755  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0233 0.0352   0.0175 0.0382   -0.1302 0.1761   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0404 0.0314  0.0488 0.0322   0.1786 0.1258  
Loan Ratio S3 + -0.0369 0.1486  -0.0008 0.1447   0.5943 0.3823  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0106 0.0930  -0.0621 0.0934   0.9671 0.3165 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 1.7227 3.7975  2.5384 4.1173   1.2005 19.5999  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0006 0.0060   0.0032 0.0048   -0.2293 0.1347 * 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0369 0.1785  -0.0172 0.1656   0.2705 0.6552  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0248 0.2087  -0.2143 0.1928   -0.0422 0.6121  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0250 0.1264  -0.0346 0.1342   -0.2382 0.5290  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -4.0414 7.0339  -11.3855 7.3835   9.0286 31.7600  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0174 0.0230   0.0103 0.0238   0.3869 0.2458   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.1296 0.1487  0.0280 0.1247   -0.1034 0.5009  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.1136 0.1118  0.1365 0.1034   -0.5942 0.4524  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0808 0.0633  -0.0538 0.0678   -0.0985 0.2476  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0215 0.6075   -0.1834 0.6925   0.4858 1.6706   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0406 0.0149 *** 0.0445 0.0195 ** 0.0056 0.0374  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0213 0.0092 ** -0.0068 0.0092   0.0018 0.0392  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0938 0.1696  -0.1119 0.1607   1.1796 0.5152 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.1683 0.0664 ** 0.1415 0.0640 ** 0.1829 0.2153  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0031 0.0111  0.0024 0.0117   -0.0369 0.0402  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.1906 0.0824 ** -0.1778 0.0809 ** 0.0355 0.2596  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0158 0.0210  -0.0790 0.0177 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0423 0.0200 ** -0.0207 0.0180      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0784 0.0215 *** 0.0287 0.0193      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0352 0.0212 * -0.0092 0.0189      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0850 0.0209 *** 0.0376 0.0187 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0493 0.0208 ** 0.0025 0.0185      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0167 0.0206  -0.0384 0.0183 **    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0461 0.0207 ** -0.0052 0.0186      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0464 0.0211 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0107 0.0289      0.0777 0.0152 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.2866 0.0336 *** -0.1564 0.0307 *** -0.4606 0.0611 *** 
Observations   2869   2309    559   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1409    0.0856    0.2254    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 18: Risk Adjusted Stock Return (RASR) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs     
                     
       Total period     Before the Crisis     During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.0773 0.6999  -0.4442 0.7170   -3.5384 2.7310  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.1911 1.0090  -0.4003 1.0702   2.9029 2.6875  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 1.4598 0.8190 * 1.7786 0.8217 ** 4.1580 2.6142  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0313 0.2027  0.0118 0.2121   0.6511 0.8159  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.1135 0.1801  0.1037 0.1853   1.2455 1.0003  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.1873 0.2401   0.1496 0.2542   -0.9065 1.1141   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.3983 0.2042 * 0.3676 0.2115 * 1.4584 0.7756 * 
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.7606 0.7488  1.1950 0.7479   3.1130 2.0534  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.4249 0.5141  0.0807 0.5314   5.0622 1.6960 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -0.8340 23.1112  11.0279 23.3233   -7.6134 119.2474  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0118 0.0356   0.0356 0.0278   -0.6489 0.9001   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.4891 1.0769  -0.7170 1.1470   1.9562 3.6053  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -1.6938 1.2598  -2.8768 1.2770 ** -4.2464 3.8495  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.3105 0.8120  -0.1042 0.8606   -2.7154 3.0937  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 4.8792 44.2908  -60.6301 43.0804   87.0334 198.6100  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0101 0.1478   -0.0488 0.1413   1.5287 1.6002   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.3308 0.8518  0.8127 0.8926   -0.8958 2.7877  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.8435 0.6384  1.2065 0.7110 * -5.9382 2.7881 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.3892 0.4348  -0.2567 0.4544   -0.1654 1.6277  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -2.4558 3.1989   -3.0237 3.4999   5.7655 11.3690   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.2211 0.1149 * 0.1867 0.1278   0.1130 0.3072  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.1827 0.0653 *** -0.0311 0.0686   -0.4964 0.2306 ** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.9889 0.9730  -0.0850 1.0183   6.9270 2.7759 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.7717 0.3675 ** 0.6016 0.3685   0.0340 1.3452  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0259 0.0891  -0.0113 0.0937   -0.0408 0.2951  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.8890 0.5544  -0.8394 0.5424   1.4355 1.9674  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.3080 0.1198 ** -0.6089 0.1152 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.1024 0.1196  -0.2055 0.1187 *    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.3301 0.1260 *** 0.1053 0.1233      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0453 0.1241  -0.1591 0.1213      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.4769 0.1249 *** 0.2634 0.1222 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.3085 0.1262 ** 0.0886 0.1237      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0567 0.1251  -0.3344 0.1227 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.2809 0.1273 ** 0.0314 0.1287      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.7449 0.1295 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.1786 0.1636      0.7047 0.0949 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.2549 0.0209 *** -0.1753 0.0214 *** -0.4218 0.0425 *** 
Observations   2869   2309    559   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1782    0.1042    0.2394    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 19: Net Charge Off (NCO) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs       
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis    During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign NCO Std. Error   NCO Std. Error   NCO 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0046 0.0017 *** -0.0045 0.0019 ** -0.0009 0.0041  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0018 0.0027  -0.0020 0.0028   -0.0076 0.0080  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0036 0.0030  -0.0011 0.0025   -0.0081 0.0046 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0003 0.0006  0.0002 0.0006   -0.0006 0.0012  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0013 0.0005 ** -0.0011 0.0006 * -0.0005 0.0007  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0009 0.0004 ** 0.0003 0.0003   0.0019 0.0016   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0000 0.0010  0.0010 0.0012   -0.0021 0.0007 *** 
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0007 0.0024  0.0017 0.0020   -0.0026 0.0053  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0000 0.0007  0.0002 0.0007   -0.0066 0.0037 * 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0719 0.0413 * 0.0576 0.0378   0.2340 0.0370 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0001 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0000 *** -0.0042 0.0011 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0026 0.0036  -0.0016 0.0039   -0.0015 0.0094  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0054 0.0044  0.0025 0.0038   0.0110 0.0063 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0016 0.0024  -0.0001 0.0019   0.0031 0.0036  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.0519 0.1265  -0.0584 0.1384   -0.4583 0.0987 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0005 0.0004   0.0001 0.0004   0.0040 0.0026   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0038 0.0022 * 0.0035 0.0020 * 0.0006 0.0048  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0026 0.0013 ** 0.0022 0.0013 * 0.0122 0.0047 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0017 0.0008 ** -0.0012 0.0007   -0.0032 0.0025  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0006 0.0055   0.0030 0.0053   -0.0010 0.0104   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0000 0.0005  0.0006 0.0006   -0.0002 0.0003  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0006 0.0002 *** 0.0004 0.0001 *** 0.0012 0.0002 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0071 0.0053  0.0103 0.0063   0.0000 0.0034  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0007 0.0005  0.0011 0.0005 ** -0.0027 0.0011 ** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0002 0.0001  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0004 0.0005  -0.0007 0.0005   0.0027 0.0013 ** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0002 0.0001 ** -0.0001 0.0001      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0003 0.0002 ** -0.0001 0.0001      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0008 0.0003 ** 0.0002 0.0003      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0008 0.0004 ** 0.0002 0.0003      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0008 0.0003 ** 0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0006 0.0003 * 0.0000 0.0002      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0005 0.0003  -0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0006 0.0003 * -0.0002 0.0002      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0008 0.0004 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0014 0.0004 ***     0.0008 0.0001 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.6541 0.1650 *** 0.6996 0.2184 *** 0.3540 0.0688 *** 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.5786    0.6055    0.5333    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 20: Maturity Gap (MG) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs        
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  0.1276 0.1460  0.0879 0.1466   -0.2480 0.1929  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.2527 0.1080 ** -0.2939 0.1247 ** -0.3268 0.1800 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0667 0.1803  0.0524 0.1941   0.5034 0.2549 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0101 0.0207  0.0112 0.0229   -0.1243 0.0805  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0119 0.0148  -0.0083 0.0169   -0.0625 0.0321 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0565 0.0355   0.0597 0.0394   0.0236 0.0955   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.0674 0.0452  -0.0665 0.0468   -0.0007 0.0649  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0964 0.1311  0.1103 0.1407   0.4907 0.1722 *** 
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0531 0.0491  -0.0225 0.0530   -0.2582 0.1753  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.5669 0.1576 *** 0.4191 0.1681 ** 4.0037 1.1016 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0015 0.0042   -0.0028 0.0044   0.3142 0.0728 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0866 0.1216  0.1758 0.1650   0.0825 0.1799  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.2048 0.2541  -0.2598 0.2739   -0.7812 0.3512 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0098 0.0912  -0.1214 0.1024   0.4964 0.2735 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -1.7185 0.4379 *** -1.5773 0.3898 *** -6.9101 2.7958 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0719 0.0410 * 0.0952 0.0425 ** -0.1383 0.1483   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.2147 0.1351  0.1359 0.1633   0.2155 0.2217  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.1655 0.0677 ** 0.2570 0.0860 *** 0.1979 0.1632  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.1072 0.0534 ** -0.1210 0.0632 * -0.0943 0.1417  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -1.0025 0.4028 ** -1.2204 0.4719 *** -0.1155 1.0662   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0409 0.0944  0.0854 0.0752   -0.0133 0.0297  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0071 0.0177  0.0146 0.0170   0.0181 0.0194  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.1079 0.1386  0.2124 0.1547   -0.0253 0.1755  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0434 0.0157 *** 0.0378 0.0165 ** 0.1164 0.0404 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0018 0.0038  0.0040 0.0048   0.0151 0.0079 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0682 0.0247 *** -0.0703 0.0307 ** -0.1492 0.0468 *** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0062 0.0046  -0.0071 0.0047      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0084 0.0068  -0.0099 0.0068      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0038 0.0109  0.0050 0.0115      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0086 0.0115  0.0088 0.0120      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0173 0.0122  0.0159 0.0125      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0172 0.0126  0.0148 0.0128      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0222 0.0130 * 0.0186 0.0130      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0084 0.0134  0.0051 0.0133      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0001 0.0138         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0097 0.0141      -0.0057 0.0052  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8605 0.0077 *** 0.8538 0.0086 *** 0.7705 0.0233 *** 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7579    0.7477    0.6756    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 21: Derivatives Loss (DL) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs        
                     
     Total period     Before the Crisis   During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign DL Std. Error   DL 
Std. 
Error   DL Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0001  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0003 0.0001 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0000 0.0002  0.0000 0.0003   0.0000 0.0001  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0001 0.0000 ** -0.0001 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 ** 
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0001  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000   0.0001 0.0001  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0003 0.0001 * 0.0003 0.0002   0.0002 0.0003  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0001 0.0000 ** -0.0001 0.0000 * -0.0001 0.0000 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001   -0.0006 0.0001 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0000 0.0003  0.0000 0.0004   0.0000 0.0001  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0001 0.0001 * 0.0001 0.0001 * -0.0001 0.0001  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.0020 0.0011 * -0.0022 0.0013   -0.0012 0.0014  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0004 0.0002 ** 0.0004 0.0002 ** 0.0003 0.0000 *** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0003 0.0001 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000 ** 0.0001 0.0001 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0001  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0000 0.0002   0.0000 0.0002   -0.0007 0.0003 ** 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0001  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 *    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 **    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0000 0.0000         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0000 0.0000 **     0.0000 0.0000  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.3519 0.1800 * -0.3602 0.1821 ** 0.0524 0.0231 ** 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1360    0.1404    0.1125    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 22: Market Beta (MB) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs        
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -1.9138 0.5621 *** -0.3602 0.5536   6.8083 1.1202 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0227 0.4288  -0.5609 0.5971   -0.7201 0.7711  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.7521 0.5574  -0.1076 0.6276   -2.9451 1.2480 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0647 0.0831  0.0328 0.1012   -0.1162 0.3714  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.1240 0.0642 * -0.1278 0.0826   -0.3042 0.2348  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0288 0.0826   -0.0117 0.1040   0.0506 0.4163   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.1306 0.0908  0.0494 0.1484   -0.5238 0.3191  
Loan Ratio S3 ? -0.1189 0.3547  0.3877 0.4049   -2.6775 0.8534 *** 
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0519 0.2093  0.1471 0.2260   -0.8501 0.6903  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -2.1482 4.9309  3.8372 6.8315   -58.5512 31.7622 * 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0088 0.0049 * 0.0178 0.0081 ** -0.1051 0.3763   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0043 0.4313  0.1337 0.6927   0.9926 0.9862  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.8381 0.8942  -0.6725 1.0047   4.8295 1.8560 *** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0904 0.3204  -0.1035 0.4220   1.4923 1.5709  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 2.9165 7.8379  -3.0282 10.7030   89.4688 50.1179 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.1091 0.0555 ** -0.2247 0.1014 ** -0.0478 0.6535   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.2761 0.5388  0.7224 0.7954   -2.0104 1.1410 * 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0027 0.1698  0.0003 0.2880   1.3731 0.7205 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.2224 0.1465  0.2464 0.2103   0.0559 0.6602  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.1394 0.9470   0.0811 1.2852   -1.2056 2.8912   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.2260 0.0959 ** -0.1285 0.3036   -0.3235 0.2520  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.3928 0.0719 *** 0.0860 0.0760   -0.4138 0.1163 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.8184 0.5798  0.0309 0.7327   -2.4080 1.1040 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0372 0.0399  0.0422 0.0383   -0.5005 0.1895 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0143 0.0069 ** -0.0171 0.0091 * -0.0550 0.0356  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0009 0.0507  -0.0589 0.0564   0.6895 0.2491 *** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0320 0.0081 *** 0.0735 0.0119 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0875 0.0136 *** 0.1663 0.0199 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.1678 0.0262 *** 0.2605 0.0332 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.2252 0.0294 *** 0.3486 0.0378 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.2740 0.0335 *** 0.4319 0.0431 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.3324 0.0368 *** 0.5219 0.0473 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.3945 0.0403 *** 0.6210 0.0517 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.6086 0.0426 *** 0.8754 0.0553 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.6730 0.0459 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.7358 0.0483 ***     0.0012 0.0192  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9523 0.0079 *** 0.9246 0.0118 *** 0.7582 0.0381 *** 
Observations   2869   2309    559   
Adjusted R-squared     0.9639    0.9318    0.7000    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 23: Interest Rate Beta (IRB) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs      
                     
       Total period     Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0537 0.2245  0.3095 0.2454   0.3126 0.6697  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.1665 0.2691  -0.1268 0.2463   0.2770 0.6350  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.4028 0.2925  0.5345 0.5574   0.3282 0.5865  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0244 0.0466  -0.0635 0.0455   -0.2691 0.1670  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0215 0.0364  -0.0334 0.0372   -0.0379 0.1495  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0681 0.0498   0.0712 0.0643   0.1835 0.2041   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0385 0.0608  0.0102 0.0651   -0.2507 0.1527  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.2948 0.2380  0.3571 0.3940   0.2757 0.5650  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.2863 0.1360 ** -0.3253 0.1383 ** -1.5951 0.4951 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 1.6307 2.9095  -4.1433 2.8132   14.5598 16.7169  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0030 0.0029   0.0010 0.0034   0.0750 0.1491   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0228 0.2791  -0.1450 0.2543   -0.6385 0.7744  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.7688 0.4204 * -0.7866 0.8001   -0.2771 0.8669  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.3981 0.1999 ** 0.4707 0.2257 ** 2.4473 0.6674 *** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -3.2817 4.5018  5.1625 4.4303   -31.4239 26.8759  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0270 0.0274   -0.0232 0.0289   0.1497 0.2824   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.2959 0.2784  0.3518 0.2576   -1.1269 0.6912  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0407 0.1096  0.1645 0.1561   0.7765 0.5201  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0964 0.0945  -0.0496 0.0982   -0.4717 0.2926  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.8023 0.4700 * -0.5207 0.5175   1.5944 1.7681   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0431 0.0320  -0.0063 0.0317   0.0377 0.0458  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0073 0.0217  -0.0561 0.0291 * -0.0043 0.0456  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.7845 0.3064 ** -0.5671 0.3551   -1.5911 0.6022 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0194 0.0268  -0.0012 0.0243   0.1583 0.1948  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0039 0.0075  -0.0041 0.0075   0.0423 0.0353  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0202 0.0410  0.0140 0.0342   -0.2693 0.2398  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0102 0.0086  0.0078 0.0065      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0423 0.0136 *** -0.0415 0.0109 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0885 0.0179 ** -0.0730 0.0150 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.1413 0.0192 *** -0.1297 0.0166 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0436 0.0207 ** -0.0414 0.0180 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0591 0.0218 *** -0.0585 0.0187 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.1032 0.0236 *** -0.0895 0.0197 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0892 0.0234 *** -0.0641 0.0195 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.1020 0.0234 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.2968 0.0212 ***     -0.1861 0.0138 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.7325 0.0223 *** 0.8175 0.0210 *** 0.3761 0.0479 *** 
Observations   2869   2309    559   
Adjusted R-squared     0.6846    0.7091    0.4577    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 24: Distance to Default (Z-Score) Regressions for Larger Community BHCs      
      Total period     Before the Crisis   During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign Z Std. Error   Z 
Std. 
Error   Z Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  103.34 169.88  -418.39 199.60 ** -93.85 244.66  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -48.19 131.08  -96.71 178.36   573.78 217.86 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -48.04 185.90  112.80 192.25   -13.15 289.97  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -34.05 23.56  -42.64 27.11   197.38 85.80 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 45.73 15.90 *** 39.16 22.01 * 81.29 39.10 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -41.29 26.90   -35.21 37.51   -95.10 120.88   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 94.40 47.27 ** 67.48 68.56   30.35 68.04  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 79.33 167.82  297.67 187.55   214.49 180.83  
Security Ratio S4 ? 51.34 53.47  13.41 61.78   439.87 174.02 ** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -662.52 427.56  -661.40 395.73 * -6155.35 1072.13 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -2.92 2.68   -0.41 2.04   14.02 112.69   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -90.05 119.59  14.76 171.52   -173.70 213.84  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 66.63 336.55  -253.29 333.24   148.21 398.03  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 186.04 116.21  162.43 138.87   -125.36 292.81  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 46.66 615.68  -19.54 576.20   5350.48 2808.75 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 38.50 34.64   -10.23 22.82   238.31 220.88   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 283.22 191.56  175.41 218.77   -910.83 355.63 ** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.00 88.24  62.42 103.09   132.68 182.59  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 65.24 49.60  48.61 70.54   -82.30 168.91  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -365.78 453.47   -745.31 486.32   -1249.42 958.44   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD - 84.06 68.88  1.99 74.60   116.58 24.83 *** 
Log Asset C1 ? -6.45 20.07  60.44 24.23 ** -32.58 27.37  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 943.28 261.83 *** 815.83 246.80 *** 1387.32 277.63 *** 
Asset Growth C3 - -9.03 17.97  -35.55 18.73 * 4.53 47.23  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -4.26 4.73  -1.91 6.52   -26.83 14.06 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -36.19 30.26  -69.18 36.98 * 61.94 68.32  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -12.41 4.20 *** -6.06 4.66      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -25.32 6.59 *** -12.71 7.52 *    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -54.87 11.85 *** -24.46 12.82 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -72.07 13.35 *** -35.98 14.44 **    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -83.45 14.91 *** -42.08 16.16 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -71.84 16.68 *** -26.04 17.71      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -77.04 18.01 *** -27.21 19.17      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -95.40 18.76 *** -38.45 20.07 *    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -112.17 20.10 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -136.32 21.28 ***     -58.43 6.75 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.90 0.01 *** 0.90 0.01 *** 0.79 0.03 *** 
Observations   9798   7886    1911   
Adjusted R-squared     0.8204    0.8123    0.6703    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 25: Return on Asset (ROA) Regressions for Regional BHCs         
      Total period     Before the Crisis   During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROA Std. Error   ROA 
Std. 
Error   ROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0014 0.0099  0.0157 0.0063 ** -0.0586 0.1618  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0033 0.0059  -0.0002 0.0033   -0.0193 0.0571  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0074 0.0099  -0.0047 0.0040   0.0876 0.1124  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0018 0.0051  -0.0030 0.0029   -0.0445 0.0487  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0008 0.0017  0.0017 0.0010   -0.0299 0.0181  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0009 0.0028   -0.0019 0.0015   -0.0366 0.0273   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -0.0006 0.0038  0.0024 0.0014 * -0.0269 0.0185  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0113 0.0096  -0.0021 0.0031   0.0865 0.0921  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0138 0.0069 ** 0.0035 0.0027   -0.0045 0.0693  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -0.0222 0.0616  0.0221 0.0396   -1.7594 2.8638  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0015 0.0010   -0.0011 0.0005 ** -0.0091 0.0139   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0091 0.0084  -0.0066 0.0044   0.0139 0.0502  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0100 0.0125  0.0086 0.0056   -0.1343 0.1536  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0068 0.0146  0.0064 0.0066   -0.0091 0.1502  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.2652 0.1941  0.1294 0.0779 * 2.9734 4.4561  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0035 0.0017 ** 0.0020 0.0008 ** 0.0176 0.0218   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0006 0.0080  0.0070 0.0032 ** -0.0428 0.0575  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0024 0.0050  0.0027 0.0031   0.0998 0.0766  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0009 0.0062  0.0017 0.0039   0.0854 0.0660  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0132 0.0162   0.0020 0.0089   -0.3057 0.2330   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0017 0.0007 ** 0.0005 0.0003   0.0090 0.0042 ** 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0013 0.0017  -0.0021 0.0008 ** 0.0058 0.0227  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0474 0.0310  0.0166 0.0074 ** 0.1329 0.1460  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0008 0.0012  -0.0017 0.0006 *** 0.0302 0.0365  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0004 0.0005  -0.0001 0.0002   0.0038 0.0025  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0001 0.0029  -0.0015 0.0022   -0.0442 0.0400  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0003 0.0010  0.0006 0.0003 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0011  0.0003 0.0004      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0016 0.0012  -0.0007 0.0004 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0009 0.0012  -0.0001 0.0004      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0009 0.0012  0.0000 0.0004      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0010 0.0013  0.0000 0.0004      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0009 0.0014  0.0001 0.0004      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0014 0.0014  -0.0001 0.0004      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0030 0.0016 *        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0069 0.0021 ***     -0.0046 0.0016 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.0878 0.1368   0.2214 0.0780 *** -0.2104 0.1648   
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.3342    0.4593    0.1391    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 26: Risk Adjusted Return on Asset (RAROA) Regressions for Regional BHCs      
                     
        Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -16.1969 31.0655  16.8499 32.1958   -120.3745 98.5790  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 24.3230 12.8691 * 40.1485 15.8281 ** 5.0937 23.4451  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 34.9827 19.1800 * 56.1155 24.2368 ** -33.4130 47.7617  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -22.5666 9.6732 ** -23.9513 10.8739 ** -25.5999 22.5903  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 5.2295 3.8494  2.8273 4.7800   -7.4118 7.6514  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -2.3209 6.4956   -0.6017 6.7977   -11.2256 15.0390   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 5.4030 7.0532  7.0776 8.1967   7.2147 7.4551  
Loan Ratio S3 + 26.5418 14.1829 * 22.1842 15.3579   28.6820 41.1003  
Security Ratio S4 + -14.2690 14.0273  -25.8606 16.6105   24.6108 32.8384  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 109.5573 104.4995  51.2938 127.7798   201.2462 867.0170  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.4755 3.1536   0.0644 3.8059   21.2281 6.0880 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -18.9728 12.9311  -24.3355 15.9546   -17.0996 16.1294  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -43.8865 25.4157 * -63.0398 31.6916 ** 15.2538 71.4722  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 135.3170 50.6792 *** 154.0378 56.2095 *** 60.5886 75.6386  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -444.8535 367.3678  -440.7609 492.0932   852.5591 1308.1140  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 3.2524 5.0570   1.1917 6.0362   -24.8881 9.2798 *** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -6.2931 17.6411  -21.2801 22.9967   -53.6617 37.5062  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -12.0818 11.9202  -17.7397 14.0349   39.2008 27.1754  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.8346 10.9411  0.8933 11.8539   35.8968 29.2713  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 8.0610 45.2055   -0.2986 51.8146   2.5476 80.3661   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.8424 3.8492  2.0920 5.7890   0.5024 1.8886  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.2949 3.5030  -5.5483 3.8060   14.5903 12.3123  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 29.0657 24.8926  100.8614 48.5768 ** -6.5593 33.5533  
Asset Growth C3 + -1.5352 1.5297  -1.0619 1.6494   -2.7494 11.3406  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0380 0.6409  0.5495 0.6605   -0.9627 2.1850  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 2.7712 5.1641  -7.1563 3.6064 ** 10.5756 11.6670  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -1.0138 0.8191  0.0643 0.7466      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -3.2837 1.4489 ** -1.0209 1.3640      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -5.9911 1.9723 *** -1.6386 2.2029      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -6.7598 1.9619 *** -1.8750 2.2006      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -7.5156 2.1087 *** -1.6348 2.4545      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -7.3915 2.3373 *** -0.5932 2.5894      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -7.5394 2.3279 *** 0.3220 2.5982      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -9.0260 2.4418 *** -0.3774 2.6724      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -10.2625 2.5094 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -9.5053 2.5504 ***     -3.1017 0.9952 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8696 0.0312 *** 0.8875 0.0347 *** 0.1800 0.2344   
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7943    0.7848    0.6011    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4      
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 27: Return on Equity (ROE) Regressions for Regional BHCs        
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -0.0886 0.1305  0.1981 0.0789 ** -0.3149 2.1800  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.1047 0.0814  -0.0039 0.0382   -0.0598 0.7537  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.1587 0.1498  -0.0411 0.0502   1.7868 1.7709  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0550 0.0721  -0.0217 0.0417   -0.8293 0.7838  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0240 0.0216  0.0277 0.0148 * -0.4243 0.3263  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0023 0.0372   -0.0229 0.0203   -0.5771 0.4365   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0005 0.0568  0.0281 0.0181   -0.3663 0.2600  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.2425 0.1791  -0.0102 0.0385   1.7268 1.5933  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.1867 0.1100 * 0.0321 0.0348   0.2063 0.9654  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 0.0090 0.7903  0.4583 0.5891   -37.2095 51.1764  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0141 0.0130   -0.0158 0.0064 ** -0.2081 0.2126   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.1616 0.1093  -0.0862 0.0571   0.2038 0.6558  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.2199 0.1804  0.0676 0.0712   -2.5832 2.4547  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0699 0.1761  0.0678 0.0907   -0.0751 2.1979  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 3.9281 2.9872  1.5320 1.0823   63.7505 80.0447  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0425 0.0237 * 0.0295 0.0104 *** 0.3847 0.3445   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0433 0.1041  0.0910 0.0400 ** -0.4873 0.7401  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0015 0.0704  0.0368 0.0372   1.1611 1.0037  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0565 0.0896  0.0071 0.0542   1.4273 1.0747  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.1823 0.1816   0.0073 0.0965   -4.7176 3.1163   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0144 0.0087 * 0.0055 0.0041   0.1224 0.0708 * 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0203 0.0254  -0.0228 0.0103 ** -0.0555 0.3262  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.5620 0.5460  -0.2155 0.0918 ** 3.3303 2.6206  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0014 0.0207  -0.0217 0.0080 *** 0.6313 0.5739  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0065 0.0072  -0.0008 0.0025   0.0577 0.0443  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0237 0.0445  -0.0275 0.0350   -0.8265 0.6328  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0102 0.0104  0.0097 0.0052 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0053 0.0113  0.0057 0.0055      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0207 0.0124 * -0.0093 0.0053 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0125 0.0118  -0.0027 0.0054      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0111 0.0127  -0.0012 0.0056      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0115 0.0136  0.0000 0.0058      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0120 0.0144  0.0011 0.0060      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0193 0.0149  -0.0020 0.0063      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0405 0.0172 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0879 0.0266 ***     -0.0546 0.0202 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.0554 0.0981   0.1478 0.0717 ** -0.2222 0.1535   
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2586    0.3962    0.2037    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 28: Risk Adjusted Return on Equity (RAROE) Regressions for Regional BHCs      
                     
       Total period       Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -19.9227 33.9269  -16.2979 36.9625   -37.0956 66.6432  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 32.0934 14.5231 ** 34.6007 19.0184 * -13.5912 20.2473  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 32.6311 21.3575  53.0765 27.3996 * -23.1401 36.9779  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -21.4558 12.2629 * -25.3459 13.7108 * -15.7878 21.2361  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 7.4818 4.6013  5.5229 6.1281   -7.0711 6.1328  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 5.3864 6.7658   5.7980 7.2787   -12.5303 16.2564   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 4.9061 7.5293  6.8437 9.6618   5.8561 6.7590  
Loan Ratio S3 + 32.2078 18.3884 * 31.6849 19.6679   18.2054 29.9474  
Security Ratio S4 + -14.6829 18.9724  -27.2530 21.3732   11.6726 23.8486  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 165.1023 128.2641  83.6498 167.9826   -150.6928 905.2455  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 1.4387 3.1788   2.6568 4.1583   16.3361 4.3633 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -15.9840 13.1170  -15.4061 20.2478   -9.0746 16.7576  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -49.7139 31.6258  -77.1311 40.6434 * 18.5007 53.0236  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 144.3751 57.2575 ** 167.9160 65.1185 ** 34.4160 54.8063  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -239.9717 358.1734  -289.6403 476.6733   924.0254 1383.3530  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.3893 5.0983   -2.7042 6.6825   -17.7129 6.8897 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -6.7573 19.6381  -6.5085 26.4477   -22.5366 24.5929  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -28.0217 14.0551 ** -37.2144 18.3117 ** 45.7748 29.8346  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -8.0373 11.2060  -6.1834 13.0594   23.1043 30.2343  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 20.4965 60.8799   1.0615 75.4521   -35.2080 56.9757   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.1276 5.5632  1.0138 7.6156   1.8019 1.4429  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.1113 3.7392  -1.4318 4.4439   4.3034 8.3272  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 31.0688 30.5368  89.1122 57.8887   5.8245 27.9335  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.3900 1.5426  -0.4901 1.7745   -1.6737 10.7229  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.2349 0.6060  0.6729 0.6874   0.3300 1.6126  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.4403 4.3927  -6.9817 4.2887   1.7681 12.7624  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0014 0.8473  0.8030 0.8850      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -1.1033 1.6351  0.6176 1.7153      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -5.9593 2.3962 ** -1.8355 2.8639      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -6.7598 2.2248 *** -2.3356 2.7460      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -7.3816 2.3312 *** -2.3053 3.0713      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -7.0786 2.4852 *** -1.5549 3.1459      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -6.7028 2.3439 *** -0.5380 3.0437      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -8.0098 2.4116 *** -1.2574 3.0632      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -10.5532 2.5139 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -9.8305 2.4868 ***     -3.3422 0.7172 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8413 0.0532 *** 0.8589 0.0540 *** -0.3495 0.1408 ** 
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7836    0.7674    0.7071    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4      
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 29: Stock Return (SR) Regressions for Regional BHCs         
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.6655 0.6836  -1.3403  0.6680 ** 20.225 5.46251 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.5900 0.3176 * 0.7857 0.3129 ** 1.2203 1.76914  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0883 0.2995  -0.3199 0.3549   -2.29 3.83353  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.2426 0.2506  0.1775 0.2910   2.8186 2.10953  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.2409 0.1264 * 0.3059 0.1119 *** -0.048 0.88474  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0454 0.1564   -0.2004 0.1890   0.4758 1.48611   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.3048 0.1846 * 0.6047 0.1395 *** 0.3655 0.63163  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.8360 0.3200 *** 0.8778 0.3228 *** -3.05 3.6759  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.9209 0.4246 ** 1.08 0.4968 ** 3.8662 2.2153 * 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 9.8659 5.3731 * 11.83 4.5447 *** -26.16 104.006  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0415 0.0724   -0.1074 0.0871   -1.266 0.32119 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.5040 0.4000  -0.9679 0.3511 *** -2.727 1.50885 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.3429 0.3993  0.0394 0.4929   6.4684 5.61648  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.5659 0.7925  -0.5478 0.9001   -12.74 5.50257 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -14.2992 8.8701  -20.831 8.0405 ** 31.079 156.157  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.1716 0.1240   0.3282 0.1438 ** 1.9217 0.5292 *** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0051 0.2736  0.2479 0.2951   5.2748 2.15665 ** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.4984 0.2800 * -0.4588 0.2931   -2.729 2.27002  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0583 0.2895  0.1865 0.3714   -3.247 3.017  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0251 0.6614   -0.3853 0.7101   6.1775 5.49587   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  -0.0153 0.0340  -0.046 0.0344   0.1149 0.16208  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0349 0.0873  0.0498 0.0871   -2.745 0.65838 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.7029 0.7356  -0.101 0.6880   9.7937 3.23695 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.1136 0.0994  0.1168 0.0951   -0.749 0.8599  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0431 0.0354  -0.0746 0.0401 * -0.033 0.13001  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0994 0.2845  0.5518 0.3691   0.844 0.90697  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.1808 0.0473 *** -0.2233  0.0388 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0934 0.0534 * -0.1439  0.0482 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.1873 0.0578 *** -0.2645  0.0455 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.2085 0.0520 *** -0.2688  0.0409 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.1055 0.0535 ** -0.1738  0.0445 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.1726 0.0535 *** -0.2451  0.0451 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.2052 0.0563 *** -0.2945  0.0469 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.1826 0.0586 *** -0.2722  0.0491 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.2874 0.0632 ***         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.3039 0.0851 ***      -0.025 0.03723  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.2936 0.0828 *** -0.1577  0.0684 ** -0.685 0.12687 *** 
Observations   409   329     79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2142    0.1823     0.3913     
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 30: Risk Adjusted Stock Return (RASR) Regressions for Regional BHCs       
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis    During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -6.0397 4.5494  -8.4840  3.9660 ** 134.4 37.9676 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 3.1226 2.2141  5.3683 2.0845 ** 12.535 12.6409  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 1.3072 2.1831  -0.8314 2.2893   -24.15 29.446  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 1.2784 1.6129  1.0967 1.6383   20.368 16.6182  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 1.4488 0.7746 * 1.5178 0.7404 ** 4.3709 4.84839  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.6498 1.0392   -1.1371 1.0646   9.537 10.0734   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 1.7217 1.1605  3.2136 0.9495 *** 3.6584 4.50492  
Loan Ratio S3 + 6.3465 2.0029 *** 6.1661 2.0601 *** -26.22 27.595  
Security Ratio S4 + 6.7411 2.8371 ** 7.891 2.9309 *** 9.2233 19.4973  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 70.3044 36.1496 * 68.833 32.1492 ** 377.58 648.5  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.1557 0.4750   -0.396 0.4948   -7.349 2.57697 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -1.3208 2.6620  -3.9497 2.2903 * -16.67 10.5281  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -3.6929 3.0665  -0.8323 3.1921   53.105 41.9582  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -3.8357 5.3332  -5.2972 5.3692   -50.95 46.9046  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -109.6352 61.6798 * -116.89 54.4211 ** -726.7 1005.42  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 1.1291 0.7971   1.6381 0.8180 ** 10.696 4.16461 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.7466 2.1572  -1.4855 2.1031   40.492 17.1833 ** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -3.4354 1.9329 * -3.3428 1.8958 * -33.05 18.5612 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.6041 1.9614  1.2226 2.0508   -30.02 22.8261  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -2.1067 5.3857   -3.5067 5.1678   57.067 42.8599   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0793 0.2602  -0.3161 0.2400   0.1207 1.27824  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0310 0.5797  0.3117 0.5092   -18.3 5.00802 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 4.1929 5.0187  1.6796 4.6565   60.049 19.6022 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.4192 0.5143  0.7806 0.5178   -4.722 7.06402  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.2112 0.2667  -0.5294 0.2729 * -0.205 0.93159  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -1.2324 2.6527  4.7041 2.5475 * 4.4191 7.41888  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -1.6571 0.2919 *** -1.7978  0.2863 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -1.1948 0.3083 *** -1.3491  0.3001 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -1.7143 0.3347 *** -1.9174  0.3094 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -1.8585 0.3082 *** -2.0097  0.2905 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -1.0875 0.3335 *** -1.2168  0.3134 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -1.5085 0.3435 *** -1.6730  0.3201 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -1.8615 0.3596 *** -2.0870  0.3306 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -1.5137 0.3785 *** -1.7358  0.3597 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -2.7079 0.4090 ***         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -2.5941 0.4906 ***      0.2845 0.27989  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.2032 0.0582 *** -0.2103  0.0590 *** -0.517 0.11262 *** 
Observations   409   329     79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2400    0.2081     0.2934     
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4      
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 31: Net Charge Off (NCO) Regressions for Regional BHCs         
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign NCO Std. Error   NCO Std. Error   NCO Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0004 0.0056  -0.0070 0.0024 *** 0.0352 0.0764  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0001 0.0035  -0.0008 0.0024   0.0015 0.0219  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0055 0.0058  0.0034 0.0012 *** -0.0950 0.0548 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0033 0.0017 * 0.0000 0.0005   0.0071 0.0179  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0012 0.0009  -0.0010 0.0005 ** 0.0092 0.0087  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0006 0.0015   -0.0001 0.0005   0.0123 0.0123   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0016 0.0020  -0.0005 0.0005   0.0107 0.0074  
Loan Ratio S3 ? -0.0065 0.0050  0.0020 0.0011 * -0.0810 0.0435 * 
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0084 0.0034 ** -0.0006 0.0014   0.0145 0.0309  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -0.1005 0.0288 *** -0.0914 0.0254 *** 0.9311 1.2085  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0008 0.0004 * 0.0002 0.0002   0.0073 0.0057   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0002 0.0046  0.0031 0.0023   -0.0243 0.0213  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0094 0.0069  -0.0033 0.0019 * 0.1372 0.0764 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0108 0.0050 ** 0.0037 0.0021 * -0.0157 0.0594  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.2033 0.1075 * 0.1569 0.0450 *** -1.0922 1.9367  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0021 0.0008 *** -0.0003 0.0004   -0.0129 0.0092   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0010 0.0048  -0.0038 0.0013 *** 0.0183 0.0269  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0013 0.0027  0.0020 0.0022   -0.0204 0.0278  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0032 0.0027  0.0004 0.0008   -0.0139 0.0245  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0137 0.0111   -0.0133 0.0076 * 0.1547 0.1060   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0008 0.0004 ** 0.0000 0.0002   -0.0031 0.0017 * 
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0009 0.0010  0.0009 0.0003 *** 0.0005 0.0106  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.0108 0.0184  -0.0032 0.0030   -0.0193 0.0696  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0004 0.0004  -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0244 0.0166  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0019 0.0012  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0011 0.0024  0.0017 0.0012   0.0287 0.0181  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0005 0.0004  0.0000 0.0001      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0005 0.0004  0.0000 0.0001      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0012 0.0005 ** 0.0005 0.0002 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0013 0.0005 *** 0.0006 0.0002 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0011 0.0005 ** 0.0004 0.0002 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0008 0.0005  0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0006 0.0005  -0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0007 0.0006  -0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0015 0.0007 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0033 0.0008 ***     0.0019 0.0007 ** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.2083 0.1219 * 0.3575 0.1118 *** -0.2406 0.1254 * 
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.3576    0.6630    0.2490    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%              
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Appendix 32: Maturity Gap (MG) Regressions for Regional BHCs         
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.6322 0.6045  0.5453 0.7380   -1.5580 1.8332  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.9364 0.2656 *** 0.7678 0.2846 *** 1.0136 0.5786 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.9617 0.2760 *** 1.2797 0.3302 *** 1.1044 0.9130  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.2035 0.1344  0.1295 0.1344   -1.0492 0.7278  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0557 0.0714  0.0308 0.0772   0.2354 0.2127  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0614 0.0975   0.0235 0.1022   -0.5367 0.4962   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.2228 0.1270 * -0.2215 0.1361   -0.2914 0.3163  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.3132 0.2694  0.4683 0.2854   0.8342 0.8014  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.4365 0.2239 * 0.2541 0.2521   0.4130 1.0583  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -3.0147 2.4964  -5.3805 2.9840 * 36.2741 20.7321 * 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0968 0.0584 * -0.0771 0.0608   -0.0096 0.1572   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.2978 0.2355  0.2248 0.3134   0.5219 0.5218  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -1.1174 0.3908 *** -1.6577 0.4990 *** -1.6416 1.2355  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -1.3805 0.5664 ** -0.3570 0.5783   -0.5184 2.2932  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 11.3095 7.7711  18.2519 9.6566 * ###### 32.9244  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.1425 0.0903   0.1328 0.0927   0.0113 0.2403   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -1.3623 0.2879 *** -0.9298 0.3937 ** -2.9281 0.6343 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.6106 0.2016 *** -0.5556 0.2214 ** -0.0621 0.5641  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.1404 0.1653  -0.1062 0.1622   1.4612 0.9391  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 1.1377 0.5388 ** 0.8383 0.6252   2.4150 1.7407   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.1863 0.0493 *** 0.3347 0.0997 *** 0.0346 0.0531  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0898 0.0798  -0.0947 0.0936   0.2218 0.2409  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.4876 0.6029  0.1185 0.7528   -1.3944 1.0370  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0026 0.0249  0.0062 0.0244   -0.0537 0.2623  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0042 0.0080  -0.0019 0.0107   -0.0206 0.0190  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0329 0.0540  -0.0795 0.1327   0.0278 0.2730  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0398 0.0223 * -0.0472 0.0211 **    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0392 0.0302  -0.0470 0.0257 *    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0218 0.0426  -0.0423 0.0400      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0005 0.0471  -0.0307 0.0408      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0160 0.0527  -0.0232 0.0471      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0186 0.0578  -0.0227 0.0513      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0069 0.0617  -0.0325 0.0543      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0051 0.0634  -0.0470 0.0571      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0203 0.0667         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0110 0.0706      0.0282 0.0192  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.7967 0.0483 *** 0.9040 0.0342 *** 0.3487 0.1851 * 
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7743    0.7799    0.7006    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 33: Derivatives Loss (DL) Regressions for Regional BHCs         
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001   0.0000 0.0014  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0001 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000   0.0003 0.0004  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0002 0.0008  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0005  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0002  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0002 0.0003   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000   0.0002 0.0002  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0007  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000   0.0002 0.0007  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -0.0005 0.0008  -0.0002 0.0002   -0.0052 0.0206  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0001   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0001 0.0001 * 0.0000 0.0000   -0.0006 0.0004  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0011  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0001 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0016  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.0003 0.0016  -0.0006 0.0005   0.0118 0.0309  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0002   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000   0.0002 0.0005  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0006  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0006  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0000   -0.0002 0.0014   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0002  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0004 0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0000   0.0018 0.0007 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0002  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0003  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 *    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0000 0.0000         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0000 0.0000      0.0000 0.0000  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.0851 0.0573   0.2591 0.1680   -0.0539 0.1569   
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.0596    0.2539    -0.0693    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 34: Market Beta (MB) Regressions for Regional BHCs         
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   MB 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -0.9318 1.3092  -0.8974  0.6740   12.386 4.91913 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.1583 0.7007  -0.2947 0.2410   -0.6088 2.08755  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -1.4669 0.5879 ** 0.3878 0.3520   -5.8761 3.10325 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0280 0.1585  0.131 0.0819   -0.384 1.82595  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0453 0.1359  0.1252 0.0721 * 0.5456 0.92438  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0531 0.1639   0.1512 0.0928   1.026 1.18523   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.2388 0.1882  -0.0512 0.0822   -1.7568 0.71316 ** 
Loan Ratio S3 ? -0.7313 0.4486  0.0519 0.2702   -7.2854 2.71241 *** 
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.4340 0.2698  -0.1061 0.1836   -3.0703 2.58645  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.6254 3.3820  -0.8019 1.9475   -26.94 104.782  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0144 0.0937   0.0175 0.0638   0.9213 0.44216 ** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.7478 0.8844  -0.0604 0.2362   2.3294 1.69057  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 1.9253 0.8888 ** -0.665 0.4911   10.772 4.44958 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -2.2782 0.6501 *** -0.9215 0.4622 ** -2.0854 6.10119  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -9.3787 8.7055  6.2509 4.3656   -49.307 151.936  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0840 0.1402   0.0379 0.1053   -1.6649 0.69888 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 1.4508 0.6571 ** 0.783 0.3255 ** 2.6647 2.08567  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.5980 0.2975 ** -0.0658 0.1896   -5.2529 3.08391 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0924 0.2324  0.0974 0.1348   -0.4191 2.29372  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.6483 1.0157   -1.4149 0.7215 * 14.374 6.25514 ** 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.1349 0.1032  0.0318 0.0852   -0.2365 0.14322  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.3579 0.1616 ** 0.2099 0.0797 *** -0.7869 0.6247  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -1.8382 1.0992 * 1.3363 0.6041 ** 2.0349 3.60826  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.1126 0.0433 *** -0.0646 0.0250 ** -0.8467 1.22402  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0007 0.0151  0.0062 0.0086   -0.0764 0.10619  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0218 0.1425  -0.1479 0.0723 ** 0.9188 1.30854  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0423 0.0274  -0.0143  0.0158      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.1035 0.0372 *** 0.0176  0.0210      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.1777 0.0549 *** -0.0642  0.0302 **    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.1885 0.0558 *** -0.0725  0.0312 **    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.2123 0.0644 *** -0.1110  0.0338 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.2405 0.0711 *** -0.1181  0.0358 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.2463 0.0786 *** -0.1354  0.0372 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.2995 0.0846 *** -0.1461  0.0391 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.3692 0.0953 ***         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.5530 0.0965 ***      0.4649 0.06827 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8494 0.0423 *** 0.9419  0.0200 *** -0.161 0.17256   
Observations   409   329     79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.8540    0.9586     0.6115     
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 35: Interest Rate Beta (IRB) Regressions for Regional BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.1998 0.6303  0.5704  0.5300   -1.914 3.09852  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.9318 0.2724 *** -0.69725 0.3016 ** -3.075 1.027 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.4108 0.3640  -1.13915 0.3171 *** -2.633 1.70529  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0551 0.1561  -0.04018 0.1102   0.3489 1.22491  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.1006 0.1069  -0.05175 0.0639   -0.785 0.58248  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0728 0.1232   -0.14161 0.1040   0.8432 0.77025   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0049 0.1547  -0.05351 0.0930   -0.303 0.44188  
Loan Ratio S3 ? -0.4039 0.3071  -0.61764 0.2342 *** -1.202 1.49304  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.1722 0.3313  -0.23107 0.2362   -1.284 1.72681  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -4.5917 2.9663  -1.12567 2.1450   -73.16 79.5835  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0426 0.0549   -0.07629 0.0671   0.6522 0.31598 ** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.4568 0.3666  0.31177 0.2994   0.554 1.00724  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.2796 0.5066  1.28076 0.4566 *** 2.6156 2.43662  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.2581 0.6121  0.35799 0.4842   1.8501 3.90762  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 2.7777 6.6376  3.07435 6.2592   79.156 113.197  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0916 0.0875   0.15293 0.0998   -0.843 0.4737 * 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.7850 0.3252 ** 1.07508 0.3463 *** 1.9096 1.19401  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.4185 0.2674  -0.06641 0.2169   2.343 1.37727 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0754 0.1900  0.08335 0.1543   -0.186 1.55039  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.3616 0.6620   0.46752 0.6854   -1.517 3.28246   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.1021 0.0436 ** 0.06544 0.0561   0.0275 0.07258  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.1189 0.0767  0.05296 0.0670   0.4663 0.41216  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -1.4051 0.8046 * -2.81528 0.6533 *** -2.156 2.31878  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0424 0.0276  -0.01412 0.0216   -0.299 0.66937  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0027 0.0151  0.01308 0.0147   0.0183 0.05368  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0135 0.0646  -0.095 0.1241   0.1004 0.69843  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0360 0.0187 * -0.0148  0.0087 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.1100 0.0327 *** -0.0774  0.0269 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.1416 0.0377 *** -0.1038  0.0333 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.1524 0.0381 *** -0.1288  0.0319 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0252 0.0408  -0.0308  0.0344      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0358 0.0411  -0.0370  0.0353      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0848 0.0424 ** -0.0672  0.0344 *    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.1058 0.0388 *** -0.0651  0.0339 *    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.1059 0.0408 ***         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.2080 0.0447 ***      -0.082 0.03122 ** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.6522 0.0835 *** 0.8725  0.0356 *** -0.185 0.17215   
Observations   409   329     79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.6050    0.8026     0.2787     
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 36: Distance to Default (Z-Score) Regressions for Regional BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -1394.20 728.99 * -234.34 821.99   -930.52 1461.50  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 576.24 319.52 * 1217.58 398.93 *** -94.52 460.98  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 817.23 449.54 * 1534.27 563.85 *** -523.70 781.31  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -456.09 197.91 ** -468.46 219.16 ** -545.60 490.61  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 47.28 68.33  -79.86 104.61   -84.13 169.03  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -102.61 138.46   -26.75 149.33   -135.01 279.14   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 171.24 136.86  220.78 151.32   -24.45 166.71  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 643.18 304.09 ** 662.49 337.15 * 690.29 678.82  
Security Ratio S4 ? -450.32 327.43  -788.47 391.42 ** 678.94 907.43  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 1176.00 2240.41  -2267.00 3004.27   -1007.04 14470.52  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -16.02 71.26   10.93 92.15   404.56 113.70 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -458.89 274.18 * -975.76 365.99 *** -52.81 267.42  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -1091.70 561.99 * -1869.44 728.11 ** 261.14 1100.63  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 3157.85 1285.32 ** 3788.70 1382.07 *** 991.94 1905.81  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -13723.74 7196.07 * -5717.51 9969.55   6474.81 21231.95  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 69.49 111.08   0.98 145.96   -476.12 172.83 *** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -163.85 479.99  -651.68 632.82   -438.77 840.71  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -143.95 256.36  -114.71 310.63   293.96 386.17  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 113.97 217.29  51.84 228.96   750.05 576.00  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -528.46 1045.87   -978.07 1182.81   190.36 1256.69   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD - -38.09 99.22  88.38 159.63   -23.24 44.42  
Log Asset C1 ? 143.84 83.33 * -72.60 98.13   93.91 205.43  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 1249.19 516.81 ** 4147.21 1197.56 *** 39.06 546.15  
Asset Growth C3 - 4.42 28.58  22.30 32.20   -34.70 185.45  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.50 13.23  12.68 15.72   -36.06 40.99  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 67.02 101.24  -114.32 82.23   338.09 211.83  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -31.01 14.43 ** -6.66 13.98      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -87.53 35.18 ** -31.02 34.63      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -108.50 45.54 ** 0.53 52.14      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -143.45 46.30 *** -24.47 52.26      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -152.63 48.86 *** -6.85 57.26      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -152.34 52.39 *** 17.98 60.37      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -164.40 53.29 *** 36.43 62.17      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -196.49 56.93 *** 23.93 64.81      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -219.73 58.36 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -236.72 60.25 ***     -50.07 19.78 ** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.92 0.03 *** 0.93 0.02 *** 0.64 0.19 *** 
Observations   409   329    79   
Adjusted R-squared     0.8444    0.8321    0.7321    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 37: Return on Asset (ROA) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
      Total period     Before the Crisis     During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.0156 0.0077 ** 0.0017 0.0070   0.0442 0.0215 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0047 0.0082  0.0077 0.0062   -0.1504 0.0909  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0015 0.0015  -0.0008 0.0017   -0.0225 0.0150  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0051 0.0057  0.0021 0.0042   -0.0102 0.0261  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0019 0.0030  -0.0004 0.0027   -0.0087 0.0093  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0048 0.0048   0.0040 0.0029   -0.0176 0.0188   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -0.0054 0.0027 ** -0.0021 0.0025   -0.0047 0.0088  
Loan Ratio S3 + -0.0022 0.0034  -0.0036 0.0038   -0.0104 0.0119  
Security Ratio S4 + -0.0153 0.0064 ** -0.0020 0.0056   0.0149 0.0179  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -0.5071 0.2873 * -0.0345 0.2312   -0.4972 0.7488  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0001 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0006 0.0003 * 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0002 0.0042  -0.0022 0.0034   0.0604 0.0315 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0056 0.0043  0.0066 0.0049   0.0236 0.0243  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0287 0.0101 *** 0.0031 0.0087   -0.0321 0.0300  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.5657 0.4091  -0.0127 0.3440   0.6522 1.0316  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0002 0.0002   0.0001 0.0002   0.0010 0.0005 * 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0114 0.0083  -0.0118 0.0076   0.0924 0.1328  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0002 0.0045  -0.0002 0.0044   0.0761 0.0429 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0058 0.0090  -0.0084 0.0059   0.0160 0.0407  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0100 0.0102   0.0038 0.0122   0.0393 0.0723   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  -0.0006 0.0007  -0.0006 0.0008   -0.0024 0.0041  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0007 0.0007  0.0002 0.0008   -0.0003 0.0028  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0188 0.0180  0.0248 0.0115 ** -0.0621 0.0483  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0008 0.0008  0.0007 0.0011   -0.0075 0.0042 * 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0001 0.0002  -0.0002 0.0003   0.0008 0.0006  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0019 0.0011 * -0.0009 0.0013   -0.0013 0.0053  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0004 0.0004  0.0001 0.0005      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0009 0.0005 * -0.0003 0.0005      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0018 0.0006 *** -0.0012 0.0007 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0009 0.0007  -0.0004 0.0007      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0012 0.0008  -0.0005 0.0008      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0012 0.0008  -0.0006 0.0009      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0012 0.0008  -0.0005 0.0009      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0009 0.0008  -0.0002 0.0009      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0019 0.0009 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0032 0.0008 ***     -0.0013 0.0004 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.1681 0.0845 ** 0.0423 0.0635   -0.1165 0.1543   
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.4233    0.3300    0.6503    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 38: Risk Adjusted Return on Asset (RAROA) Regressions for Money Center BHCs     
      Total period     Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  17.5244 34.9804  -4.3446 40.1579   183.5274 163.0675  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -26.0506 31.9084  41.7676 26.1902   287.7356 214.7304  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 4.4642 7.3209  0.3024 9.2342   -63.8468 54.8867  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 1.7073 23.9091  12.0343 24.7193   -125.8794 86.0068  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 7.8811 8.1176  -6.9942 9.3385   -12.9160 38.6785  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 7.0662 18.0319   -1.5862 18.7740   -19.6819 95.1729   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 14.5498 11.6563  21.2595 13.9003   -9.5893 31.4839  
Loan Ratio S3 + 3.2653 27.1206  -32.1276 31.9570   -74.1241 70.4696  
Security Ratio S4 + -20.3378 17.2408  -49.7327 22.9170 ** -103.8229 75.4135  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 512.7511 512.1356  924.3728 721.9704   -1677.1120 1900.8010  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.2897 0.2384   -1.0085 0.3825 *** -0.4753 0.7966   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 26.0848 16.1852  7.7702 16.8286   79.8028 108.0813  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -24.2375 41.8409  55.6553 45.4616   139.5090 107.3364  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 18.7024 29.1570  67.5535 37.2677 * 78.1472 142.7040  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -589.7878 840.9409  -934.4741 1203.9930   2806.4300 2628.1670  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.3096 0.4071   0.7864 0.5572   1.9233 1.5321   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 24.4750 45.9402  -116.0786 35.5435 *** -554.9807 389.4705  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -4.2374 14.3487  13.7177 15.8155   -23.4742 114.6434  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 1.3483 35.7670  -22.2902 36.7310   154.4129 133.7668  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 26.1761 37.1250   59.8337 37.9941   69.2659 282.4360   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 1.2663 5.3310  10.4244 6.5627   2.0682 19.2159  
Log Asset C1 ? -2.1328 4.2011  0.8460 5.0613   -11.1532 16.5159  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 28.5401 39.9407  21.6711 58.5141   -58.2606 102.2462  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.9776 1.4154  -0.7450 1.2194   -4.4561 13.6026  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.2270 0.5389  -0.1460 0.5824   1.4057 1.5290  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -1.7677 2.7171  -4.0576 3.3016   2.6689 15.1532  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -2.2044 1.2876 * -0.9941 1.1701      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -4.0153 1.4821 *** -1.3326 1.3898      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -8.3316 2.6886 *** -1.7744 2.6253      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -8.7578 2.6999 *** -1.1664 2.6538      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -9.5760 2.8688 *** -0.2782 2.8512      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -9.1002 2.9148 *** 1.9138 3.0309      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -7.3528 3.0906 ** 5.0026 3.2275      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -7.4335 3.1567 ** 6.0949 3.1780 *    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -10.6834 3.3925 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -10.7339 3.4610 ***     -5.4722 2.5633 ** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8881 0.0461 *** 0.9157 0.0242 *** 0.8523 0.0834 *** 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7518    0.7606    0.4265    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 39: Return on Equity (ROE) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
                     
      Total period      
 Before the Crisis        During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.3541 0.1195 *** 0.0985 0.0724   0.5009 0.2406 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0050 0.1111  0.0675 0.0891   -2.0301 1.1052 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0206 0.0220  -0.0019 0.0206   -0.2286 0.1831  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0923 0.0686  -0.0082 0.0708   -0.1116 0.3039  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0485 0.0429  -0.0175 0.0413   -0.1288 0.1061  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0634 0.0569   0.0256 0.0633   -0.1478 0.2112   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -0.0921 0.0383 ** -0.0172 0.0276   -0.0735 0.0941  
Loan Ratio S3 + -0.0064 0.0433  -0.0196 0.0418   -0.0702 0.1440  
Security Ratio S4 + -0.2686 0.0959 *** -0.0489 0.0567   0.0901 0.1765  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -10.3776 5.0521 ** -0.7798 3.1289   -9.5336 9.5409  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0023 0.0016   -0.0012 0.0014   -0.0050 0.0032   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0293 0.0598  -0.0388 0.0455   0.5878 0.3216 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0516 0.0567  0.0438 0.0501   0.2304 0.3003  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.4663 0.1538 *** 0.0663 0.0896   -0.1783 0.2966  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 13.0321 6.8897 * 0.8227 4.8991   13.7287 12.9423  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0047 0.0027 * 0.0013 0.0024   0.0085 0.0057   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.1065 0.1093  -0.0996 0.0944   1.1817 1.6364  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0277 0.0625  0.0170 0.0521   1.2153 0.4752 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0596 0.1064  -0.0541 0.1148   0.1302 0.4655  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.1319 0.1446   0.0131 0.0982   0.4217 0.7829   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0039 0.0105  -0.0013 0.0090   -0.0192 0.0439  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0202 0.0110 * -0.0012 0.0086   -0.0049 0.0298  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.1491 0.2337  -0.1928 0.1917   -0.9083 0.5142 * 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0155 0.0108  0.0124 0.0146   -0.0671 0.0451  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0022 0.0026  -0.0016 0.0022   0.0080 0.0063  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0235 0.0144  -0.0088 0.0172   -0.0190 0.0584  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0038 0.0053  0.0039 0.0051      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0117 0.0063 * -0.0020 0.0051      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0236 0.0088 *** -0.0128 0.0079      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0103 0.0092  -0.0019 0.0083      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0142 0.0107  -0.0027 0.0098      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0159 0.0109  -0.0046 0.0099      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0148 0.0114  -0.0027 0.0106      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0116 0.0111  0.0011 0.0092      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0250 0.0125 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0378 0.0115 ***     -0.0134 0.0046 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.2818 0.0888 *** 0.0760 0.0743   -0.0776 0.1785   
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.3998    0.2068    0.7313    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
  
 
331 
Appendix 40: Risk Adjusted Return on Equity (RAROE) Regressions for Money Center BHCs     
       Total period     Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  95.3758 33.8037 *** -1.1592 53.4169   -155.6100 200.3431  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -7.8519 27.3619  73.3471 30.9507 ** 391.0233 422.5203  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 18.1356 14.5238  21.8210 17.8140   -79.6327 70.3949  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 6.6566 23.9567  14.9084 23.9302   -101.0285 109.9443  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 3.3933 6.0494  0.3387 9.2094   -20.2250 43.5292  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 12.2180 17.7978   20.6355 20.1781   185.4393 138.1701   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -1.7703 8.2319  4.8459 12.2901   20.4787 42.0697  
Loan Ratio S3 + 28.1825 30.1804  -14.4040 31.4116   -96.8069 103.7810  
Security Ratio S4 + -22.0552 25.3956  -95.4521 37.0066 ** -299.7360 151.4618 * 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -76.1496 510.8467  462.7386 864.4708   -3455.3760 2467.2360  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.2122 0.2676   -0.9897 0.4242 ** 1.3916 1.1378   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 23.1115 13.6660 * -9.8904 17.9109   333.0149 207.4410  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -28.0148 41.8867  19.2555 43.1532   180.7225 146.9739  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 2.0036 42.0398  105.0286 52.4810 ** 463.6028 203.6408 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 281.0057 838.8792  -517.2755 1358.5600   5782.3430 3448.8240  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.2357 0.4474   0.7032 0.6172   -0.6109 1.9456   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 1.0062 38.3890  -127.3256 43.9893 *** -736.3820 779.6397  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -12.1270 12.0825  -5.7773 14.4825   -290.0451 178.2823  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -7.9815 35.8112  -37.8250 35.4689   28.9556 166.2771  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 45.8348 32.4705   50.2091 34.0833   732.8598 464.9916   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 11.9200 5.3335 ** 6.2813 5.6084   -4.7820 27.4763  
Log Asset C1 ? -13.2047 4.1661 *** -0.2042 6.4885   16.8215 22.1608  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -53.3545 41.1047  -79.9451 58.4289   -193.8715 140.7233  
Asset Growth C3 + 2.7602 1.9373  -5.5735 4.1103   2.0010 21.7782  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0662 0.4243  -0.4664 0.5082   0.2898 2.5868  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -1.2594 2.4076  4.6854 4.9454   -15.7646 20.5153  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.1202 0.8978  0.6896 1.2705      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -1.3104 1.1702  0.1897 1.5815      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -3.8677 1.9507 ** -0.3299 2.4861      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -4.1041 2.1052 * 0.1818 2.5468      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -4.4061 2.3258 * 1.1439 2.7811      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -3.7836 2.5386  3.3488 3.0159      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  1.2445 4.6408  9.4166 4.8780 *    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.1882 4.0878  9.4003 4.2719 **    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  1.3678 3.8347         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  1.3194 3.5797      -7.0568 2.9487 ** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9052 0.0716 *** 0.8978 0.0293 *** 0.8909 0.0593 *** 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7881    0.8072    0.4871    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 41: Stock Return (SR) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
      Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.4135 0.5706  -0.0530 0.5899   4.3265 2.7563  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.8567 0.4280 ** 1.0403 0.4361 ** 13.0542 8.1934  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.1704 0.1202  -0.0854 0.1245   -3.1628 1.4365 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.2208 0.2783  -0.1952 0.3138   5.6179 2.5926 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.4247 0.2142 ** 0.4824 0.2265 ** 2.1498 1.0978 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.3423 0.1897 * 0.0609 0.2316   3.3744 1.4783 ** 
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -0.2835 0.1881  -0.0403 0.2130   1.5138 0.9668  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0515 0.2903  0.1369 0.2781   -1.9620 1.3656  
Security Ratio S4 + -0.1433 0.4391  0.3136 0.4840   -3.0968 1.7885 * 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 19.6689 20.0900  44.2724 20.0952 ** 113.0497 70.5727  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0115 0.0078   0.0023 0.0083   -0.0555 0.0290 * 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.2102 0.2416  -0.4766 0.2870 * -3.7295 3.0290  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0963 0.3467  -0.1618 0.3340   5.8509 2.8019 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.3985 0.6548  -0.4677 0.7081   3.9675 2.3797  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -42.8288 27.7754  -68.4760 28.3754 ** -165.9905 100.7655  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0166 0.0132   -0.0002 0.0136   0.1186 0.0516 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.7449 0.5288  -0.5367 0.5123   -20.9437 13.6727  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.6034 0.2869 ** -0.7594 0.3052 ** 0.3726 4.1243  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.1570 0.3743  0.2208 0.4504   -10.8434 3.9134 *** 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.3185 0.8272   -0.0807 0.7838   11.5173 7.5760   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  -0.0371 0.0635  -0.0098 0.0722   0.3304 0.3161  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0392 0.0617  -0.0107 0.0670   -0.6346 0.3093 ** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.3907 0.8700  1.0242 0.8413   -20.6284 4.4395 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0297 0.0972  -0.0344 0.1079   -0.2261 0.3889  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0678 0.0328 ** 0.0497 0.0271 * 0.1782 0.1339  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0971 0.1279  -0.0451 0.1352   -0.3373 0.5848  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.1421 0.0590 ** -0.2222 0.0510 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0962 0.0589  -0.1637 0.0521 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.1744 0.0677 ** -0.2394 0.0627 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.2101 0.0684 *** -0.2813 0.0634 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.1051 0.0728  -0.1745 0.0720 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.1872 0.0745 ** -0.2598 0.0736 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.1996 0.0767 *** -0.2731 0.0774 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.1491 0.0769 * -0.2285 0.0776 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.2346 0.0797 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.2468 0.0934 ***     -0.0294 0.0371  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.3926 0.0749 *** -0.2400 0.0679 *** -0.6814 0.1177 *** 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2159    0.1348    0.4975    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 42: Risk Adjusted Stock Return (RASR) Regressions for Money Center BHCs      
       Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.4837 4.0659  -0.5994 3.6782   15.8041 20.0183  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 6.2490 3.0604 ** 5.5274 2.7619 ** 146.5109 65.4651 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.8841 0.8142  -0.4073 0.7657   -13.5514 11.5694  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -1.0938 1.9237  -0.5654 2.0482   31.7158 21.2873  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 2.1143 1.5974  2.6929 1.4451 * 12.2434 8.9153  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 2.4766 1.3083 * 1.0753 1.5198   22.2708 12.6758 * 
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + -0.9608 1.3316  -0.3517 1.3187   12.2711 8.6428  
Loan Ratio S3 + -0.8253 1.7994  0.8217 1.7649   -11.3509 10.7169  
Security Ratio S4 + -1.2643 2.9951  1.8455 2.9978   -21.7416 13.4576  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 114.1771 151.4683  245.0754 121.3881 ** 771.6585 622.2104  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0703 0.0493   0.0190 0.0544   -0.3728 0.2176 * 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -1.2359 1.7698  -2.1258 1.7766   -36.8169 23.9100  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 1.3453 2.2654  -0.7507 2.3128   28.9226 22.6241  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 3.5539 4.5943  -3.2993 4.5026   34.1975 18.7365 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -274.9377 214.8600  -402.3415 177.1837 ** -1216.1930 894.1685  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.1049 0.0835   -0.0199 0.0894   0.8292 0.3834 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -7.0782 3.6071 * -2.9107 3.3661   -233.3023 113.6958 ** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -3.4317 2.0895  -4.1821 2.0666 ** 3.1287 33.1027  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -1.4494 2.5867  0.4728 2.9394   -66.0235 30.7011 ** 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 3.8393 5.9664   -1.7674 5.8407   75.9651 58.6009   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.3071 0.4466  0.0763 0.4378   1.0310 2.8702  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0366 0.4309  -0.0431 0.4220   -2.9522 2.2836  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.1045 6.0627  5.9970 5.6793   -119.2002 31.0218 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0437 0.7052  -0.3031 0.7018   -1.7180 3.2818  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.4507 0.2373 * 0.4244 0.2063 ** 0.4579 0.9992  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.4008 0.8847  -0.1973 0.8688   -0.0286 4.7217  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -1.2381 0.4294 *** -1.6323 0.3732 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.9054 0.4167 ** -1.2328 0.3678 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -1.3344 0.4786 *** -1.6183 0.4229 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -1.6232 0.4895 *** -1.8817 0.4335 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.8800 0.5309 * -1.0825 0.4884 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -1.3711 0.5457 ** -1.6072 0.4969 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -1.4959 0.5664 *** -1.7178 0.5221 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.8579 0.5689  -1.0734 0.5310 **    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -1.9635 0.5883 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -2.0741 0.6571 ***     -0.2354 0.3125  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.3753 0.0604 *** -0.3154 0.0599 *** -0.5802 0.1190 *** 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2458    0.1945    0.3027    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 43: Net Charge Off (NCO) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign NCO Std. Error   NCO Std. Error   NCO Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0082 0.0029 *** -0.0071 0.0041 * -0.0264 0.0077 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0039 0.0047  0.0050 0.0045   -0.0241 0.0134 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0016 0.0007 ** -0.0017 0.0008 ** -0.0003 0.0030  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0010 0.0014  0.0004 0.0016   0.0045 0.0052  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0028 0.0013 ** 0.0026 0.0013 ** -0.0004 0.0020  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0003 0.0012   0.0013 0.0018   -0.0033 0.0046   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.0007 0.0015  -0.0003 0.0014   0.0022 0.0017  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0006 0.0014  -0.0014 0.0015   -0.0022 0.0046  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0002 0.0019  -0.0038 0.0023 * 0.0091 0.0055  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.2006 0.1077 * 0.1066 0.1286   0.0987 0.0939  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0000   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0031 0.0026  -0.0036 0.0027   0.0082 0.0060  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0021 0.0016  0.0030 0.0016 * 0.0015 0.0064  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0006 0.0030  0.0077 0.0037 ** -0.0095 0.0089  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.1430 0.1511  -0.0486 0.1927   -0.1074 0.1201  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0000 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0003 0.0041  -0.0027 0.0042   0.0247 0.0220  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.0034 0.0023  -0.0024 0.0020   0.0084 0.0065  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0032 0.0019  -0.0045 0.0026 * -0.0053 0.0086  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0017 0.0057   0.0013 0.0061   -0.0146 0.0151   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0005 0.0003  -0.0006 0.0003 * -0.0024 0.0009 ** 
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0010 0.0003 *** 0.0010 0.0004 ** 0.0032 0.0009 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0037 0.0104  0.0054 0.0094   0.0094 0.0062  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0002 0.0004  -0.0003 0.0004   -0.0011 0.0008  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0001 * 0.0002 0.0001  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0008 0.0008  0.0014 0.0011   -0.0006 0.0009  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0006 0.0004 * -0.0006 0.0003 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0008 0.0004 ** -0.0008 0.0004 **    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0007 0.0005  -0.0008 0.0004 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0010 0.0005 ** -0.0011 0.0005 **    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0013 0.0005 ** -0.0015 0.0005 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0017 0.0006 *** -0.0019 0.0006 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0018 0.0006 *** -0.0020 0.0006 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0019 0.0005 *** -0.0021 0.0005 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0019 0.0006 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0011 0.0006 *     0.0004 0.0001 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.0898 0.1031   -0.0090 0.0645   1.0458 0.0453 *** 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.4359    0.3820    0.8599    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 44: Maturity Gap (MG) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.4693 0.3289  0.6419 0.3854 * -0.2369 0.7443  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.4228 0.2923  -0.2268 0.3034   -2.5801 1.0963 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.1688 0.1395  0.3044 0.1577 * 0.4279 0.4234  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.6013 0.2030 *** -0.6971 0.2458 *** 0.2576 0.4542  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0627 0.1273  -0.0160 0.1911   0.0242 0.1935  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.2735 0.1142 ** -0.3379 0.1283 *** 0.0748 0.2859   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.3527 0.1222 *** 0.4377 0.1264 *** -0.0918 0.2273  
Loan Ratio S3 ? -0.7191 0.1895 *** -0.8324 0.2573 *** -0.1045 0.5265  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.6082 0.2910 ** -0.9582 0.3630 *** 0.6692 0.4258  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -12.9188 11.8205  -6.2183 20.1693   -3.1867 8.7192  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0066 0.0036 * 0.0017 0.0049   0.0061 0.0043   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.3992 0.1706 ** 0.3610 0.1913 * 1.8465 0.7579 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.6492 0.2617 ** 0.6193 0.3220 * 0.1254 0.7704  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.5191 0.5242  0.8767 0.6868   -1.6011 0.6237 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 15.6622 16.5817  2.4816 27.6636   7.6249 12.1108  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0202 0.0060 *** -0.0131 0.0080   -0.0198 0.0078 ** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.4216 0.3208  0.2533 0.3449   1.9426 1.6863  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0579 0.1780  -0.1011 0.2151   0.7816 0.6178  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.7665 0.2640 *** 0.8667 0.2980 *** 0.0461 0.6974  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.4191 0.4061   -0.0801 0.4122   -1.5809 1.2804   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0605 0.0420  0.0471 0.0509   0.1709 0.0721 ** 
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0111 0.0362  -0.0063 0.0434   0.0036 0.0697  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -1.0332 0.4749 ** -1.2534 0.6605 * -0.1334 0.8010  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0733 0.0338 ** 0.0574 0.0464   0.1281 0.0920  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0036 0.0065  -0.0044 0.0087   0.0007 0.0125  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0206 0.0364  0.0041 0.0498   -0.0569 0.1046  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0101 0.0156  -0.0181 0.0186      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0161 0.0207  -0.0225 0.0249      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0178 0.0274  0.0268 0.0334      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0403 0.0297  0.0502 0.0361      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0274 0.0328  0.0480 0.0365      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0382 0.0296  0.0672 0.0371 *    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0318 0.0326  0.0668 0.0408      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0084 0.0312  0.0347 0.0386      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0015 0.0322         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0112 0.0327      0.0302 0.0105 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.6285 0.0873 *** 0.5689 0.1027 *** 0.5058 0.1749 *** 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7821    0.7450    0.8899    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
  
 
336 
Appendix 45: Derivatives Loss (DL) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   DL 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0003 0.0002 * 0.0000 0.0002   -0.0007 0.0006  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0002 0.0002  0.0001 0.0002   0.0003 0.0030  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0002 0.0004  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0000 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001   0.0004 0.0011  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   -0.0005 0.0003  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0006   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0001 0.0001 ** 0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0002  
Loan Ratio S3 ? -0.0001 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0003 0.0003  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0002 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0013 0.0006 * 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0025 0.0051  0.0003 0.0058   -0.0019 0.0163  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0001 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0009 0.0008  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0009 0.0007  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0002 0.0002  0.0000 0.0002   -0.0025 0.0013 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.0022 0.0077  -0.0051 0.0087   0.0175 0.0247  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0001 0.0002   -0.0028 0.0043  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0001 * 0.0007 0.0013  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0002   0.0001 0.0014  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0006 0.0003 * 0.0007 0.0003 ** 0.0016 0.0026   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0001  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0001  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.0001 0.0003  -0.0004 0.0003   0.0009 0.0011  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 * -0.0001 0.0001  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0002  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0000 0.0000         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0000 0.0000      0.0000 0.0000  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.1641 0.0603 *** 0.2635 0.0628 *** -0.4473 0.2259 * 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.0653    0.0822    0.1527    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 46: Market Beta (MB) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -1.5737 0.7708 ** 0.9544 0.5109 * 0.1864 3.7041  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.4019 0.5949  -0.0958 0.3985   13.1079 12.9218  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0364 0.1311  0.1311 0.1307   -0.9341 2.3800  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.4255 0.3447  0.2060 0.2332   3.7892 3.4879  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.1593 0.1878  0.1894 0.1193   -0.8514 1.6013  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.2763 0.2520   0.0603 0.1743   2.5034 2.3634   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0199 0.1765  -0.3961 0.1432 *** 0.7368 1.2891  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.8107 0.6417  0.4148 0.3323   0.3093 2.4601  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.4199 0.5354  0.2388 0.3252   -0.6758 2.7325  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 4.9098 15.2661  -3.4394 10.2796   -54.8265 110.8962  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0046 0.0079   -0.0042 0.0071   0.0094 0.0340   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.1253 0.3679  -0.0105 0.2437   -5.4568 4.1221  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.6684 0.9174  -0.4575 0.4767   -0.1701 4.3920  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.5767 0.8681  -0.2346 0.5284   1.5394 3.8170  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -3.9693 24.0976  1.5516 15.1781   71.3576 142.6850  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0028 0.0127   0.0085 0.0116   0.0059 0.0631   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 1.0536 0.8059  0.6987 0.4621   -16.1543 20.7832  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.1177 0.3267  -0.3925 0.2016 * -0.8954 4.2727  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.4394 0.4347  -0.1169 0.3081   -5.9295 5.5033  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.6639 0.8874   0.1155 0.5034   -0.7918 9.0872   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.2760 0.1387 ** 0.0991 0.0792   -0.0049 0.4577  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.2663 0.0834 *** -0.0109 0.0605   0.0179 0.3696  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -2.4611 1.0711 ** 0.5809 0.5459   -3.9320 4.8280  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0160 0.0235  0.0185 0.0215   -0.0940 0.5959  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0193 0.0183  0.0077 0.0094   0.0627 0.0962  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0376 0.0505  -0.0017 0.0362   0.2402 0.6669  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0119 0.0138  -0.0143 0.0122      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0174 0.0246  -0.0256 0.0199      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0132 0.0462  -0.0867 0.0310 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0014 0.0495  -0.1001 0.0324 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0239 0.0556  -0.1453 0.0358 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0346 0.0593  -0.1752 0.0394 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0469 0.0623  -0.2080 0.0417 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0291 0.0690  -0.2491 0.0460 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0100 0.0742         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.1271 0.0774      0.3547 0.0612 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9462 0.0183 *** 0.9654 0.0191 *** 0.1792 0.2194   
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.8983    0.9647    0.5849    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%           
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Appendix 47: Interest Rate Beta (IRB) Regressions for Money Center BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   IRB 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.6306 0.6645  0.4949 0.6504   5.4123 1.4421 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.6100 0.3985  -0.4553 0.4280   -0.7599 5.0563  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.1072 0.1461  -0.1030 0.1575   -0.7620 0.8082  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.3300 0.3131  -0.3022 0.2911   -6.0019 1.5783 *** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.3695 0.1626 ** -0.3629 0.1590 ** -0.4232 0.6536  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.2646 0.1869   -0.0579 0.1938   -3.7632 0.8644 *** 
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.1651 0.1543  -0.0553 0.1575   -0.6750 0.5235  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.2918 0.3887  -0.0659 0.3445   -1.4815 0.7165 ** 
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.1900 0.4368  -0.4224 0.4757   1.3331 1.0389  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -14.6477 15.7233  -30.9448 14.2532 ** -125.9803 43.6867 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0020 0.0060   0.0070 0.0061   -0.0083 0.0168   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.4176 0.2528 * 0.1822 0.2712   3.4411 1.8378 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.2709 0.5441  0.2943 0.5138   2.5802 1.5879  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.3617 0.7004  0.5712 0.7413   -2.3056 1.4125  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 21.8684 22.5413  41.1594 21.3482 * 159.2641 63.2331 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0003 0.0109   -0.0100 0.0103   0.0048 0.0288   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.2066 0.5060  0.1888 0.5588   6.0082 8.1556  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.4288 0.2769  0.3988 0.3035   -4.6397 2.2403 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.5809 0.3897  0.1381 0.3654   10.0336 2.3846 *** 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0543 0.8250   0.2162 0.8912   -7.0632 4.5175   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0400 0.0817  -0.0295 0.0770   0.5900 0.1922 *** 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0573 0.0745  -0.0025 0.0716   -0.3240 0.1727 * 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 2.0341 0.9028 ** -0.8856 0.9729   6.1787 2.2611 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0379 0.0261  0.0421 0.0316   -0.2569 0.2204  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0056 0.0171  0.0080 0.0149   0.0105 0.0687  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0075 0.0401  -0.0269 0.0480   0.3073 0.3472  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0162 0.0198  0.0086 0.0172      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0079 0.0263  0.0363 0.0275      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0024 0.0418  0.0583 0.0426      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0177 0.0459  0.0460 0.0456      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0390 0.0538  0.0970 0.0508 *    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0275 0.0550  0.0885 0.0510 *    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0097 0.0570  0.0691 0.0524      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0089 0.0579  0.0641 0.0534      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0067 0.0626         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.1198 0.0661 *     -0.1207 0.0210 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.7375 0.0514 *** 0.8248 0.0452 *** -0.4561 0.1453 *** 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.6118    0.6720    0.7168    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 48: Value at Risk (VaR) Regressions for the Whole Sample BHCs       
                     
     Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign VaR Std. Error   VaR Std. Error   VaR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0003 0.0002 * 0.0003 0.0002   1.1372 25576.7200  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0003 0.0009  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0003  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0002 0.0001 * 0.0001 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0004  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0002 0.0001  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0001 ** -0.0001 0.0002   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0001 0.0000 ** 0.0001 0.0000   0.0001 0.0001  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001   0.0000 0.0004  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0001 0.0001  0.0002 0.0001   0.0004 0.0003  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0049 0.0028 * -0.0063 0.0048   -0.0005 0.0081  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0001 0.0001  0.0002 0.0001 * -0.0004 0.0004  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0002 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0001 * -0.0001 0.0005  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0004 0.0001 ** -0.0005 0.0004  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.0058 0.0039  0.0091 0.0068   0.0005 0.0112  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0003 0.0002  0.0001 0.0002   -0.0003 0.0014  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0000 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001   0.0009 0.0004 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0001 0.0001   0.0003 0.0006  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0002 0.0002   0.0003 0.0003   -0.0016 0.0009 * 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0001 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0001 * 
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0000  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0003 0.0002  0.0006 0.0003 ** 0.0007 0.0005  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0001  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000   -0.0001 0.0001  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 **    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0001 0.0000 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0000 0.0000 **     0.0000 0.0000  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9548 0.0209 *** 0.9491 0.0235 *** 1.0000 0.0666 *** 
Observations   295   240    54   
Adjusted R-squared     0.9254    0.9487    0.8252    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 49: Distance to Default (Z-Score) Regressions for Money Center BHCs       
       Total period       Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -267.08 772.80  -650.90 894.27   3167.03 3146.62  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -1039.93 751.57  -722.12 695.80   2317.54 5531.60  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 202.45 184.96  24.70 231.03   -1311.52 1474.71  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 158.35 488.10  249.74 503.46   -2933.73 1879.03  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 132.69 222.24  -287.10 232.44   -434.86 829.09  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 152.35 362.77   -94.57 381.80   -2267.60 1894.87   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 320.80 221.91  615.29 283.49 ** -699.61 865.29  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 468.22 651.92  65.51 699.90   -1495.04 1739.00  
Security Ratio S4 ? 33.99 366.17  -488.40 524.36   -2006.25 1917.63  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 15121.70 11440.38  32147.47 17273.09 * -13066.25 48494.85  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -3.58 4.93   -12.86 8.67   -25.60 24.51   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 821.82 368.71 ** 1036.01 503.46 ** 654.97 2596.24  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -1175.09 992.72  291.02 1022.69   1386.79 2456.32  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -299.77 686.89  616.49 862.94   512.38 2948.46  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -20768.17 19148.35  -35648.08 27972.50   8664.51 69239.03  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 2.59 8.38   4.32 12.64   40.55 45.49   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 1090.54 1061.15  -791.15 824.06   -7464.05 9208.86  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -31.29 347.66  769.86 391.21 * 2622.75 3036.02  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 39.88 720.62  -256.19 757.61   4105.91 3080.67  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 228.91 761.42   169.31 909.05   -5828.76 9046.95   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD - 37.62 128.45  297.32 160.08 * -411.40 375.13  
Log Asset C1 ? 3.75 101.95  52.13 116.71   107.11 275.63  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 2006.28 1023.66 * 1147.45 1588.63   1677.31 2541.52  
Asset Growth C3 - 7.66 28.71  -21.88 34.35   -139.20 399.04  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.76 11.12  2.83 13.37   25.95 63.61  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -24.87 59.30  -62.99 72.20   4.47 391.82  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -52.08 33.69  -18.39 29.14      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -74.83 35.00 ** -17.65 31.68      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -140.65 58.73 ** 16.70 55.64      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -163.60 59.65 *** 14.98 56.26      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -176.37 62.19 *** 37.55 61.41      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -169.69 63.31 *** 81.66 67.12      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -140.33 66.19 ** 142.64 73.06 *    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -136.92 68.79 ** 179.92 74.36 **    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -200.55 72.29 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -219.05 74.25 ***     -134.27 60.52 ** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.90 0.05 *** 0.93 0.02 *** 0.47 0.25 * 
Observations   368   296    71   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7893    0.8106    0.3130    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 50: Return on Asset (ROA) Regressions for International BHCs              
        
     Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.0210 0.0073 *** 0.0015 0.0085   0.0296 0.0369  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? -0.0162 0.0068 ** -0.0033 0.0080   -0.0335 0.0196  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0067 0.0142  -0.0066 0.0100   -0.0920 0.0783  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0292 0.0078 *** -0.0057 0.0115   -0.0450 0.0330  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0037 0.0035  -0.0039 0.0038   -0.0369 0.0189 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0019 0.0048  -0.0060 0.0042   -0.0093 0.0164  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0011 0.0024   0.0017 0.0019   -0.0200 0.0119   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0004  
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0024 0.0019  0.0036 0.0019 * 0.0008 0.0125  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0092 0.0080  0.0114 0.0064 * 0.0456 0.0385  
Security Ratio S4 + -0.0184 0.0046 *** -0.0108 0.0029 *** -0.0320 0.0224  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -0.6376 0.2555 ** -0.3890 0.2296 * -0.8747 0.7461  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0001   -0.0005 0.0003 * 
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0001 0.0010  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0105 0.0044 ** -0.0116 0.0040 *** -0.0986 0.1327  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0233 0.0132 * -0.0203 0.0100 ** -0.0377 0.0659  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0326 0.0076 *** 0.0196 0.0045 *** 0.0583 0.0373  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.9803 0.3914 ** 0.9656 0.4290 ** 1.1397 1.0958  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0000 0.0001   -0.0001 0.0002   0.0011 0.0005 ** 
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? 0.0365 0.0104 *** 0.0068 0.0146   0.0423 0.0531  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? -0.0048 0.0052  0.0013 0.0039   0.0133 0.0303  
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0109 0.0199  0.0162 0.0141   0.0473 0.1524  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0071 0.0074  0.0069 0.0062   0.1653 0.1010  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0062 0.0053  -0.0013 0.0054   0.0741 0.0306 ** 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0074 0.0230   -0.0221 0.0158   -0.5482 0.1779 *** 
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0002 0.0005  0.0009 0.0003 *** 0.0018 0.0034  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0066 0.0112  -0.0049 0.0104   -0.1518 0.0514 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0007 0.0008  -0.0002 0.0006   -0.0042 0.0045  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0003 0.0004  0.0000 0.0004   0.0722 0.0383 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0004 0.0010  0.0012 0.0011   -0.2791 0.1508 * 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0001 0.0003  0.0005 0.0004      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0003 0.0004  0.0001 0.0004      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0016 0.0007 ** -0.0008 0.0006      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0016 0.0007 ** -0.0004 0.0006      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0022 0.0008 *** -0.0009 0.0008      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0026 0.0008 *** -0.0013 0.0008      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0024 0.0009 *** -0.0010 0.0008      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0019 0.0008 ** -0.0006 0.0007      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0031 0.0009 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0040 0.0010 ***     0.0000 0.0007  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.3455 0.1025 *** 0.1113 0.1029   -0.6592 0.1984 *** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.5512    0.5103    0.8423    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 51: Risk Adjusted Return on Asset (RAROA) Regressions for International BHCs      
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  119.3283 17.7816 *** 75.3186 25.3028 *** 37.1736 34.2768  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? -78.2784 17.8270 *** -100.6305 30.5298 *** -9.4731 31.7766  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 31.5109 27.0126  48.0678 29.1967   -329.6981 130.9980 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -55.1982 20.4345 *** -74.4565 44.6517 * 73.1070 47.3587  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -1.9705 12.9009  5.8776 14.8714   -65.5245 26.7107 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -33.6704 11.2097 *** -44.6512 14.6439 *** -10.8848 14.4623  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -2.1564 6.6365   -2.1850 7.1364   -36.3439 13.6108 ** 
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 + 0.0876 0.2346  -0.0053 0.2225   0.2457 0.2789  
Deposit Ratio S2 + 4.2092 5.7324  15.1309 7.3031 ** -0.6421 11.8787  
Loan Ratio S3 + -12.1124 13.6355  -17.9572 19.7011   122.4148 37.2789 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + -32.8711 15.7402 ** -26.9761 15.2661 * -70.5716 33.9105 * 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -1.4295 303.2079  235.2050 314.5678   -635.0402 869.8991  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.2522 0.1910   -0.3918 0.2529   -0.0815 0.2905   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? -0.1498 0.3650  0.0713 0.3457   -1.5457 0.6054 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 6.8660 9.4356  0.4081 10.1195   314.4680 200.2617  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -6.8971 23.7175  -6.1347 33.5933   -171.7180 68.7554 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 36.1438 24.4910  26.7493 26.3460   158.9234 50.6275 *** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 314.2651 471.6959  178.8989 557.1382   1257.4300 1386.7150  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.3377 0.3537   0.3051 0.4632   0.4506 0.5136   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? 81.6928 28.7511 *** 107.7094 57.7059 * -171.0714 84.1364 * 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? 52.4429 15.1058 *** 63.8254 17.7796 *** 148.6763 35.2530 *** 
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -36.1433 37.8469  -58.0576 41.7545   834.4693 245.0767 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -29.5276 12.4740 ** -29.0974 12.7191 ** -440.8123 158.5297 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -10.3230 16.9491  -17.4557 20.7133   101.9944 43.6947 ** 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 83.7005 41.6718 ** 66.5073 41.1465   393.5016 256.7306   
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? -6.0389 1.9609 *** 0.7056 2.2410   -5.4890 4.1671  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 38.2318 26.7190  71.7530 35.5822 ** -172.0002 84.9548 * 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.2452 0.6033  -0.7874 0.7757   8.4649 6.2981  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0809 0.6848  -1.0738 0.9747   167.8971 64.4416 ** 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.9807 1.8877  1.2749 1.9594   -665.3232 254.1395 ** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.6574 1.0170  0.7118 1.2214      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0810 1.1304  0.1314 1.2589      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -3.6472 1.7296 ** -3.2710 1.9671 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -3.5796 1.8048 ** -3.0301 2.0908      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -3.7566 2.0944 * -2.9082 2.3905      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -3.6563 2.1246 * -2.7283 2.3961      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -3.4032 2.1630  -1.8817 2.4437      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -2.9461 1.9253  -0.3358 2.0660      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -3.7480 2.1424 *        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -3.8958 2.1998 *     0.3991 0.8842  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9268 0.0356 *** 0.8594 0.0508 *** -0.7407 0.2363 *** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7845    0.7695    0.9148    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 52: Return on Equity (ROE) Regressions for International BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   ROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.2517 0.1056 ** 0.0233 0.1446   0.3155 0.4595  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? -0.1248 0.0996  -0.0113 0.1309   -0.3210 0.2370  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.1616 0.1987  -0.1286 0.1382   -1.6017 1.0182  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.3174 0.1139 *** -0.0641 0.1885   -0.3771 0.4146  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0158 0.0511  -0.0158 0.0561   -0.4877 0.2384 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0355 0.0703  -0.0753 0.0628   -0.1342 0.2165  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0277 0.0341   0.0311 0.0267   -0.2679 0.1522 * 
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 + 0.0002 0.0007  0.0007 0.0006   0.0008 0.0052  
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0283 0.0296  0.0513 0.0294 * -0.0112 0.1599  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.1610 0.1192  0.1732 0.0950 * 0.7457 0.4961  
Security Ratio S4 + -0.2425 0.0719 *** -0.1333 0.0440 *** -0.4381 0.2803  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -11.7287 4.6621 ** -5.9734 3.7376   -15.1127 9.5861  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0011   0.0001 0.0019   -0.0053 0.0035   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 0.0005 0.0011  0.0000 0.0010   0.0010 0.0139  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.1202 0.0652 * -0.1594 0.0605 *** -1.2207 1.6066  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.3904 0.1995 * -0.3100 0.1428 ** -0.7184 0.8446  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.4503 0.1242 *** 0.2446 0.0684 *** 0.8626 0.4749 * 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 18.0231 6.7488 *** 14.7023 6.7711 ** 22.1181 14.1156  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0004 0.0019   -0.0008 0.0029   0.0110 0.0061 * 
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? 0.3814 0.1518 ** 0.0724 0.2384   0.4000 0.6606  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? -0.1196 0.0787  -0.0161 0.0536   0.1263 0.3984  
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.1824 0.2738  0.2528 0.1997   0.9853 1.9821  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.1383 0.1051  0.1238 0.0939   2.3271 1.2335 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.1430 0.0786 * -0.0731 0.0804   0.9784 0.3827 ** 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0176 0.3348   -0.2854 0.2346   -6.8405 2.2140 *** 
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0044 0.0063  0.0132 0.0045 *** 0.0177 0.0413  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.2095 0.1861  -0.4659 0.1648 *** -2.0194 0.6343 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0019 0.0099  0.0037 0.0114   -0.0141 0.0568  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0037 0.0053  -0.0007 0.0058   0.8322 0.4703 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0005 0.0154  0.0165 0.0182   -3.2590 1.8507 * 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0024 0.0044  0.0080 0.0056      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0056 0.0063  0.0005 0.0058      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0280 0.0102 *** -0.0130 0.0091      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0297 0.0113 *** -0.0075 0.0092      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0400 0.0138 *** -0.0149 0.0119      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0471 0.0141 *** -0.0223 0.0125 *    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0441 0.0144 *** -0.0171 0.0126      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0362 0.0129 *** -0.0110 0.0110      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0538 0.0154 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0640 0.0149 ***     0.0038 0.0094  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.3623 0.1076 *** 0.1211 0.1133   -0.6232 0.2187 ** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.5414    0.4519    0.8778    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 53: Risk Adjusted Return on Equity (RAROE) Regressions for International BHCs      
                     
       Total period       Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  133.4877 26.2312 *** 159.7129 46.9507 *** 24.2227 37.6369  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? -134.3897 34.8354 *** -214.7809 67.0308 *** -4.2220 35.6924  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 51.3010 33.6200  79.1227 38.3799 ** -451.5756 147.1622 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -71.8340 37.6892 * -156.4724 84.6912 * 113.5199 52.3019 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 10.0235 17.7552  21.2101 21.6300   -83.8278 31.0228 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -65.4190 26.4165 ** -88.1935 36.2300 ** -20.0719 15.9988  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 3.8203 8.9138   0.2679 10.9895   -42.6804 15.9869 ** 
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 + -0.0723 0.3121  -0.4554 0.2352 * 0.3211 0.2909  
Deposit Ratio S2 + 2.4877 6.8588  14.9117 7.4050 ** 0.5646 13.0681  
Loan Ratio S3 + 1.7370 23.5837  -21.9392 29.6438   150.7680 41.3441 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + -39.2505 18.8173 ** -22.9936 25.9705   -84.2989 38.6429 ** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 417.6116 488.3546  1141.5160 523.7615 ** -970.1462 1021.3070  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.4149 0.2700   -0.6356 0.3667 * 0.1293 0.3414   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 0.0130 0.4953  0.5870 0.3724   -2.1174 0.6005 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 6.5113 10.5712  -11.5352 10.3874   427.9980 227.2780 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -30.2902 38.2794  1.5693 49.9609   -209.7732 76.6416 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 39.2769 32.4849  12.7593 49.4052   200.9623 59.0355 *** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -274.2126 806.9729  -1252.9180 992.6846   2133.6400 1645.6000  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.4530 0.4553   0.6155 0.6135   0.1151 0.6008   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? 115.9632 53.7685 ** 225.9622 112.5761 ** -230.1052 91.4157 ** 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? 100.0126 34.8912 *** 128.2177 41.8492 *** 184.7261 37.9968 *** 
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -63.2292 44.8141  -89.4125 51.0604 * 1081.3990 271.3418 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -43.1060 19.1393 ** -41.6736 20.1218 ** -553.2227 178.0379 *** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -35.9845 23.9255  -44.0375 27.5508   129.2267 51.2624 ** 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 140.5912 53.1689 *** 87.6894 50.2933 * 589.7629 293.8019 * 
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? -3.0415 2.3501  0.6610 2.1965   -5.4882 4.4950  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -4.1970 40.2560  -10.7034 40.1445   -228.8636 97.6488 ** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.1791 1.2371  -0.8386 1.1086   14.3931 7.2908 * 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.8156 0.6352  0.2435 0.6174   197.4068 77.0659 ** 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -4.6536 2.7556 * -1.1249 2.7176   -786.8271 303.4011 ** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.1557 1.6715  0.6882 1.7602      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0670 2.0303  0.5797 1.8428      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -5.8662 2.5696 ** -3.6366 2.5141      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -5.6532 2.8011 ** -3.2971 2.7224      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -5.7484 3.3363 * -2.8881 3.2747      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -5.6649 3.6523  -3.0802 3.4380      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -5.6363 3.8407  -2.7357 3.6559      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -5.5548 3.2320 * -1.4510 3.1268      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -4.9066 3.5162         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -5.7620 3.6671      0.7570 1.0136  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.7609 0.1296 *** 0.7125 0.1628 *** -0.7609 0.2261 *** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7945    0.8151    0.8895    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 54: Stock Return (SR) Regressions for International BHCs         
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.4545 0.7195  -2.2631 0.9725 ** 11.1143 2.8023 *** 
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? 0.0965 0.6447  1.2705 0.9091   6.2288 2.7726 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 1.0005 1.1192  1.3404 1.1489   2.7008 12.0316  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.2091 0.8722  2.3886 1.3328 * 8.1589 4.3268 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.5776 0.3904  1.1470 0.4835 ** -0.0513 2.5449  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.6004 0.4295  0.6810 0.5082   -1.4718 2.6351  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.8241 0.2603 *** 1.0575 0.2829 *** -0.1561 1.5317   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 + 0.0121 0.0054 ** 0.0222 0.0053 *** -0.0171 0.0439  
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.3601 0.2334  0.3651 0.2643   -3.5758 1.0964 *** 
Loan Ratio S3 + 1.1067 0.6285 * 1.0116 0.6494   2.1909 4.3543  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.8859 0.4832 * 1.4010 0.5127 *** -3.1787 3.3502  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 23.5706 25.9189  64.8164 36.0502 * -5.7962 76.9782  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0027 0.0087   -0.0078 0.0134   -0.0361 0.0306   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? -0.0228 0.0092 ** -0.0359 0.0088 *** -0.1099 0.1164  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.6524 0.4758  -0.7886 0.5106   14.9320 13.3595  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -2.6280 1.0058 *** -2.3551 1.0438 ** -7.1852 7.7659  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -1.0331 0.7046  -1.7564 0.7788 ** -2.9879 5.4594  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -31.4298 42.1759  -94.0090 64.9007   -78.2420 122.6853  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0095 0.0142   0.0178 0.0216   0.0641 0.0590   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? -0.3402 1.1745  -3.1786 1.7290 * -14.6372 6.3671 ** 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? 0.3411 0.4730  0.8498 0.4554 * 4.1345 3.1547  
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.4002 1.6228  0.6350 1.6081   -8.0618 21.7745  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -1.3718 0.6392 ** -1.8330 0.7453 ** -1.3451 11.6124  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.8673 0.5491  -1.3643 0.6567 ** -1.3185 4.0055  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.2012 2.1679   -1.0067 2.0642   0.3471 18.0582   
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0529 0.0324  -0.0201 0.0334   -1.2336 0.3684 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 1.3012 0.9279  3.4372 1.1903 *** -6.6950 6.1954  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0214 0.1217  -0.0143 0.1326   0.4576 0.7766  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0773 0.0712  -0.0037 0.0485   -1.1637 4.0606  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.1386 0.2121  -0.0887 0.1915   5.6090 16.0306  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.2313 0.0955 ** -0.3592 0.0915 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.1874 0.0925 ** -0.3070 0.0870 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.3609 0.1026 *** -0.5220 0.1061 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.4318 0.0997 *** -0.5717 0.1059 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.3535 0.1156 *** -0.4939 0.1272 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.4505 0.1168 *** -0.6090 0.1284 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.4446 0.1195 *** -0.6052 0.1295 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.3868 0.1109 *** -0.5608 0.1210 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.4695 0.1160 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.5284 0.1311 ***     -0.0222 0.0997  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.4540 0.0870 *** -0.3733 0.0726 *** -0.7325 0.2495 ** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2790    0.2492    0.6836    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 55: Risk Adjusted Stock Return (RASR) Regressions for International BHCs      
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -3.1397 4.9304  -14.7510 6.1895 ** 72.4340 31.8549 ** 
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? 1.4961 4.5812  8.1308 5.8661   64.4689 21.6881 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 9.1357 6.4651  9.9712 6.1720   50.0620 108.8743  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.2695 6.5180  13.6030 8.6039   74.9838 37.6232 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 1.4590 2.6827  5.3929 3.2033 * 0.9327 25.8531  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 4.6606 3.1163  5.5852 2.9244 * -8.8499 30.6604  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 3.0290 1.6827 * 4.7303 1.6378 *** -2.3687 17.2487   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 + 0.0788 0.0451 * 0.1373 0.0404 *** 0.0258 0.6854  
Deposit Ratio S2 + 2.4929 1.6433  1.7054 1.6660   -23.7526 13.2374 * 
Loan Ratio S3 + 5.9127 4.0048  4.8265 3.8019   -5.9224 47.6806  
Security Ratio S4 + 2.3501 3.1628  6.8627 3.1003 ** -8.7378 29.6657  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 87.7082 194.0487  426.9273 216.5276 * -180.6748 773.9004  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0242 0.0585   -0.0578 0.0849   -0.0941 0.2315   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? -0.1460 0.0782 * -0.2107 0.0728 *** -1.3782 1.9582  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -1.6706 3.1688  -2.0721 3.3437   66.8035 115.2613  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -15.3783 6.4014 ** -12.1785 6.0170 ** -19.6326 85.1237  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -1.1694 4.8364  -8.1406 4.8771 * -38.9573 50.2273  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -115.2279 309.5788  -704.1505 377.9077 * -77.5614 1137.9410  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0650 0.0955   0.1203 0.1372   0.1190 0.4343   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? -0.6685 8.5349  -18.3714 11.1236   -115.6986 51.7999 ** 
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? -0.4410 3.4871  3.4491 2.8502   14.9106 38.3838  
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -4.1165 9.2497  -1.2054 8.3373   -104.0713 184.2015  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -10.2076 3.8744 *** -12.7469 4.3671 *** -1.7488 89.2982  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -3.3151 3.9410  -6.7245 4.5025   -12.8182 39.9025  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 14.3611 13.7091   4.6273 11.6893   37.3833 144.0850   
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? -0.1056 0.2390  0.1352 0.2553   -9.9533 3.3309 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 8.9286 7.6132  24.2201 7.6998 *** 10.0704 51.1295  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.4924 0.8505  0.0025 0.7098   5.0691 6.2055  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.7528 0.5291  0.2386 0.4267   -50.3955 34.2320  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.6235 1.3309  -0.9362 1.1055   202.5134 135.9317  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -1.2375 0.4254 *** -2.0906 0.4584 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.9804 0.4176 ** -1.7619 0.4347 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -1.9275 0.4668 *** -2.8952 0.5212 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -2.4940 0.4649 *** -3.3308 0.5345 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -1.9466 0.5600 *** -2.7462 0.6363 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -2.4457 0.5742 *** -3.3947 0.6531 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -2.4753 0.6023 *** -3.4598 0.6719 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -1.8868 0.5561 *** -2.9214 0.6383 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -2.8789 0.6175 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -3.1721 0.7126 ***     0.1243 0.8987  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.4123 0.0697 *** -0.4028 0.0631 *** -0.5137 0.3494   
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.2663    0.2429    0.4354    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 56: Net Charge Off (NCO) Regressions for International BHCs        
                     
      Total period     Before the Crisis  During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign NCO Std. Error   NCO 
Std. 
Error   NCO 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -0.0088 0.0027 *** -0.0058 0.0032 * -0.0282 0.0148 * 
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? 0.0055 0.0021 ** 0.0035 0.0035   0.0083 0.0053  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0000 0.0050  0.0046 0.0048   0.0072 0.0264  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0027 0.0032  -0.0025 0.0049   0.0115 0.0085  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0035 0.0024  0.0055 0.0026 ** 0.0085 0.0069  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0070 0.0020 *** 0.0098 0.0021 *** 0.0047 0.0059  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0004 0.0024   0.0012 0.0030   0.0042 0.0027   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 - 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 * -0.0001 0.0002  
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.0031 0.0012 ** -0.0038 0.0014 *** 0.0037 0.0040  
Loan Ratio S3 + -0.0022 0.0036  -0.0049 0.0041   0.0028 0.0078  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0030 0.0030  0.0027 0.0035   0.0143 0.0064 ** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 0.1576 0.0852 * 0.1393 0.1871   0.1776 0.2475  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0001 0.0000 ** -0.0001 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 0.0001 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000   0.0008 0.0012  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0005 0.0024  0.0007 0.0026   0.0049 0.0510  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0093 0.0055 * 0.0130 0.0069 * -0.0052 0.0128  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0043 0.0044  -0.0034 0.0050   -0.0118 0.0093  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.1152 0.1853  -0.1345 0.3860   -0.2352 0.3227  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0001 0.0001 ** 0.0001 0.0001 * 0.0000 0.0001   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? -0.0036 0.0043  0.0027 0.0064   -0.0210 0.0126  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? -0.0056 0.0028 ** -0.0081 0.0027 *** 0.0023 0.0061  
DGD * LD H2*H3 + 0.0033 0.0083  -0.0036 0.0076   0.0323 0.0395  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + 0.0006 0.0028  -0.0024 0.0028   -0.0419 0.0244  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 + -0.0048 0.0033  -0.0094 0.0040 ** -0.0139 0.0102  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + -0.0165 0.0152   -0.0064 0.0131   0.0928 0.0753   
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0002 0.0004  0.0001 0.0004   0.0013 0.0014  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0052 0.0038  0.0059 0.0054   0.0264 0.0087 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0003 0.0003  0.0003 0.0003   -0.0002 0.0013  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0001 0.0002   0.0038 0.0053  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0000 0.0006  -0.0001 0.0007   -0.0150 0.0212  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0002  0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0002 0.0002  0.0003 0.0002      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0002 0.0003  0.0002 0.0004      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0007 0.0004 * 0.0006 0.0005      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0004 0.0004  0.0004 0.0006      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0001 0.0004  0.0001 0.0006      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0000 0.0004  -0.0001 0.0006      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0004 0.0004  -0.0004 0.0006      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0004 0.0004         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0004 0.0004      0.0004 0.0002 * 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.0499 0.0903   -0.1344 0.0805 * 0.3186 0.3608   
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.5036    0.4595    0.8630    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 57: Maturity Gap (MG) Regressions for International BHCs         
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -1.1682 0.4155 *** -0.3304 0.9359   -1.2111 0.7779  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? 0.8216 0.3368 ** 0.1573 0.7518   0.0064 0.4873  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -1.7115 0.3780 *** -1.5258 0.3298 *** 2.6796 2.1433  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 1.6223 0.4359 *** 0.5985 1.0922   -0.3822 0.5703  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.1237 0.1816  -0.1009 0.2644   0.6440 0.4263  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.3501 0.2647  -0.2572 0.3346   0.4072 0.5591  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.1587 0.1114   -0.0203 0.1154   0.1947 0.1849   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 - 0.0044 0.0044  -0.0017 0.0041   0.0242 0.0098 ** 
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.2951 0.0945 *** 0.3919 0.1112 *** 0.0508 0.2845  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.1996 0.3101  0.0098 0.3631   -3.4095 1.5363 ** 
Security Ratio S4 + -0.1585 0.2092  -0.4156 0.1887 ** 1.1218 0.7943  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -12.3066 16.3404  -12.3784 26.8252   4.7157 16.6718  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0017 0.0045   0.0003 0.0083   -0.0054 0.0032   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? -0.0049 0.0072  0.0024 0.0065   -0.0293 0.0234  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.1464 0.1646  -0.0254 0.2506   0.1046 3.1572  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.9589 0.4802 * -0.7645 0.4783   5.6413 2.4496 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0446 0.3194  0.2018 0.3389   -1.6829 1.0678  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 10.1759 23.0271  14.4234 39.4401   -4.5507 21.1398  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0074 0.0076   -0.0064 0.0139   -0.0011 0.0074   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? -1.8756 0.5406 *** -0.4310 1.3649   0.7054 0.9455  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? 0.0642 0.1960  -0.1226 0.1752   -0.8751 0.5755  
DGD * LD H2*H3 + 1.7536 0.5114 *** 1.6140 0.5605 *** -7.2756 3.3953 ** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + 0.7095 0.3232 ** 0.7174 0.4254 * 1.7252 1.9063  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 + -0.3869 0.2474  -0.0675 0.3397   -0.9870 0.6235  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + -0.1917 0.6868   -0.3321 0.6415   -0.1028 3.5545   
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? 0.1107 0.0154 *** 0.0879 0.0167 *** 0.1536 0.0915  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 1.7183 0.4662 *** 1.0632 0.5224 ** 1.1174 1.3256  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.1353 0.0708 * 0.0451 0.0464   0.0258 0.1188  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0093 0.0158  0.0090 0.0122   -0.7358 1.0121  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.1825 0.0729 ** -0.0943 0.0534 * 2.8660 3.9867  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0529 0.0157 *** -0.0536 0.0131 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0712 0.0176 *** -0.0685 0.0170 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0680 0.0272 ** -0.0538 0.0258 **    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0711 0.0343 ** -0.0550 0.0298 *    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.1206 0.0305 *** -0.0928 0.0313 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.1298 0.0291 *** -0.0892 0.0316 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.1388 0.0311 *** -0.0951 0.0327 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.1688 0.0298 *** -0.1285 0.0308 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.1834 0.0340 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.1809 0.0329 ***     0.0034 0.0212  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.2342 0.0776 *** 0.1433 0.0730 * -0.6135 0.3351 * 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7803    0.7720    0.9330    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 58: Derivatives Loss (DL) Regressions for International BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   DL 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0003 0.0001 * 0.0000 0.0003   -0.0003 0.0009  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? 0.0002 0.0002  -0.0001 0.0004   -0.0005 0.0006  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0002 0.0003  0.0002 0.0004   -0.0079 0.0047  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0004 0.0002 * -0.0001 0.0005   -0.0019 0.0011  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0002   0.0000 0.0008  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0002   -0.0007 0.0007  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0001   0.0001 0.0005   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 - 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001   0.0007 0.0004 * 
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0001 0.0002  0.0000 0.0003   -0.0024 0.0014 * 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0002   0.0016 0.0011  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + -0.0052 0.0084  0.0001 0.0088   -0.0486 0.0257 * 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0002   0.0147 0.0039 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0002 0.0003  -0.0002 0.0004   0.0051 0.0024 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0001 0.0002  0.0000 0.0004   -0.0020 0.0018  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.0098 0.0190  -0.0115 0.0156   0.0975 0.0420 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? -0.0005 0.0003 * 0.0001 0.0007   0.0007 0.0018  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? 0.0001 0.0001  0.0000 0.0002   -0.0001 0.0010  
DGD * LD H2*H3 + -0.0003 0.0004  -0.0002 0.0006   0.0084 0.0086  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + -0.0001 0.0002  -0.0002 0.0002   -0.0079 0.0034 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 + 0.0001 0.0002  0.0000 0.0003   0.0012 0.0013  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + 0.0007 0.0006   0.0009 0.0007   0.0315 0.0056 *** 
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000   0.0001 0.0001  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.0005 0.0004  -0.0006 0.0005   -0.0032 0.0018 * 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0004 0.0002 * 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0039 0.0015 ** 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001   -0.0153 0.0060 ** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0000 0.0000         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0000 0.0000      0.0000 0.0000  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.1697 0.1769   0.2828 0.0837 *** -0.7897 0.2161 *** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.0134    0.0694    0.4558    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 59: Market Beta (MB) Regressions for International BHCs         
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -3.0311 0.7580 *** 1.0542 0.6273 * 17.6366 46.5330  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? 0.5281 0.4316  -0.5079 0.6790   1.3415 2.8090  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.9384 0.9245  0.7505 0.6504   -4.7187 15.0382  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.8251 0.6473  -0.4643 1.1082   2.5271 3.9975  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.6125 0.3385 * -0.2823 0.3472   9.2622 4.3244 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.2151 0.3814  -0.0451 0.3435   -1.0775 2.1204  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.1103 0.1996   0.0514 0.1394   2.2256 1.7024   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 - -0.0117 0.0051 ** -0.0007 0.0038   -0.0649 0.0400  
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.1079 0.2878  -0.3681 0.1558 ** -1.6490 1.5293  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.3297 0.8727  -0.5549 0.4098   6.8867 7.9288  
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0353 0.5066  -0.3092 0.3486   5.6830 4.3155  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 1.8512 13.3797  1.6443 9.6903   -27.0433 65.9860  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0120 0.0083   0.0003 0.0086   -0.0470 0.0311   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 0.0126 0.0076 * -0.0041 0.0078   0.0627 0.0683  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.2831 0.3112  -0.3495 0.2270   27.8847 15.1399 * 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0263 1.6339  0.6333 0.7020   -16.6265 13.0294  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.6757 0.8723  0.6580 0.5390   -15.4522 9.7856  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -8.6907 23.2567  -2.7504 18.6520   26.8198 91.4321  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0122 0.0142   -0.0040 0.0146   0.1305 0.0596 ** 
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? -1.5262 0.8854 * 0.7271 1.4148   -3.0028 7.9670  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? 0.2129 0.4455  0.1690 0.3530   1.5516 4.0453  
DGD * LD H2*H3 + -1.6307 1.3439  -0.9204 0.9868   -0.6376 24.9086  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + 0.2346 0.4970  0.0149 0.3422   -8.7048 13.5806  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 + -1.0092 0.4692 ** 0.3635 0.4697   -13.3629 5.9356 ** 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + 0.4119 1.6182   -0.1105 1.3023   26.4672 34.7167   
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? 0.5044 0.0859 *** 0.0892 0.0418 ** -0.8025 0.6701  
Equity Ratio C2 ? -3.8648 1.2634 *** -0.3306 0.9118   4.9725 6.8231  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0227 0.0245  -0.0112 0.0162   -0.0572 0.5486  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0521 0.0355  0.0214 0.0375   -2.3755 1.8756  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0798 0.1007  -0.0682 0.0777   10.5913 7.2094  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0004 0.0162  -0.0241 0.0138 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0100 0.0342  -0.0247 0.0281      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0095 0.0633  -0.0664 0.0384 *    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0314 0.0712  -0.0670 0.0404 *    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0052 0.0848  -0.0997 0.0473 **    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0378 0.0904  -0.1274 0.0492 **    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0830 0.0986  -0.1694 0.0493 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0688 0.0855  -0.2180 0.0440 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0352 0.1051         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.1024 0.1085      -0.0130 0.1078  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9656 0.0221 *** 0.9697 0.0237 *** 0.9932 0.0303 *** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.9327    0.9755    0.7419    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 60: Interest Rate Beta (IRB) Regressions for International BHCs        
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.1649 0.7521  -0.2262 1.1538   -1.1689 2.9281  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? -0.6526 0.4869  -1.6622 1.1870   -0.8252 1.2122  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.3350 0.8155  -0.1069 0.7977   10.1879 10.8782  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -1.1887 0.6644 * -2.7747 1.7480   -2.3679 2.6152  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.5784 0.4882  -0.6377 0.6177   1.4143 1.7547  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.2588 0.2753  0.3918 0.3441   0.6799 2.4275  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.1899 0.2108   -0.3893 0.2103 * 0.5069 1.2664   
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 - 0.0061 0.0041  -0.0044 0.0046   -0.0286 0.0433  
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.1729 0.2312  0.4776 0.2267 ** 0.5181 1.1141  
Loan Ratio S3 + -0.5728 0.7154  -0.0454 0.6571   -4.8932 3.6311  
Security Ratio S4 + -0.6260 0.4837  -0.9052 0.5378 * 1.8644 2.0865  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 1.9670 13.4893  10.4457 15.1530   -21.7151 80.2465  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0028 0.0075   0.0026 0.0112   -0.0214 0.0215   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 0.0010 0.0069  0.0158 0.0075 ** 0.0666 0.1241  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.2383 0.4569  0.0516 0.4987   -14.6748 10.8636  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.6864 1.2759  -0.0854 1.0929   8.0723 6.4439  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.9499 0.7842  1.5817 0.9003 * -1.1760 3.5611  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 1.8102 21.5796  -27.1390 26.6483   29.4918 114.2248  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0031 0.0130   -0.0002 0.0190   0.0269 0.0357   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? 1.4633 0.8929  3.2498 2.2440   0.1361 3.7028  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? -0.4211 0.3405  -0.4235 0.3651   1.3149 2.9368  
DGD * LD H2*H3 + 0.5605 1.1665  0.2107 1.0865   -2.0407 18.4596  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 + -0.0929 0.4747  0.0700 0.4923   -2.8176 7.3356  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 + 0.7566 0.6503  0.6847 0.8416   -2.7690 2.7297  
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 + -0.5327 1.6449   -0.6161 1.7273   -18.3530 15.2025   
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0919 0.0684  0.2178 0.0682 *** 0.1330 0.2438  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 2.5555 1.0282 ** -0.5839 1.1196   4.0107 3.9654  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0201 0.0293  0.0373 0.0289   -0.3809 0.4570  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0694 0.0324 ** -0.0195 0.0362   2.0154 2.8242  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0778 0.0861  0.0201 0.0753   -7.8017 11.1765  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0421 0.0261  -0.0115 0.0217      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0238 0.0351  0.0218 0.0336      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0575 0.0585  0.0207 0.0527      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0768 0.0606  0.0004 0.0551      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0611 0.0743  0.0092 0.0642      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0853 0.0769  -0.0370 0.0645      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0802 0.0795  -0.0458 0.0640      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.1004 0.0702  -0.0174 0.0552      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0816 0.0787         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.1796 0.0808 **     -0.0885 0.0766  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8032 0.0567 *** 0.9019 0.0393 *** -0.5468 0.3487   
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.6462    0.7326    0.6174    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 61: Distance to Default (Z-Score) Regressions for International BHCs        
                     
       Total period       Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  1623.40 351.31 *** 860.82 559.05   135.29 666.94  
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1 ? -1395.75 381.11 *** -1760.68 663.35 *** 518.72 684.78  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 689.57 426.48  747.54 473.01   -6594.94 2441.46 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -821.88 433.93 * -1083.24 925.78   1694.82 1026.08  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 214.93 269.31  341.48 298.68   -1341.74 583.77 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -467.28 222.19 ** -701.84 284.06 ** 369.30 264.82  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 33.20 127.78   33.87 149.35   -780.29 296.77 ** 
Scale variables              
Cross-border Loan Exposure Ratio S1 + -2.42 4.18  -2.26 4.30   -7.39 4.24  
Deposit Ratio S2 + 136.54 101.23  254.42 119.51 ** -109.91 217.02  
Loan Ratio S3 ? -145.13 252.83  -153.84 348.56   2244.68 712.98 *** 
Security Ratio S4 ? -477.51 321.26  -257.82 304.34   -1656.17 704.94 ** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 11737.15 5401.95 ** 17086.71 5761.06 *** -9299.58 15730.47  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -5.61 3.54   -8.88 5.23 * 2.90 5.15   
Scale interaction              
International Geographic Div. (IGD) H1*S1 ? 3.56 5.71  4.10 5.97   -1.83 9.69  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 193.64 161.30  179.60 175.91   6725.02 4049.03  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -452.72 428.95  -458.98 621.05   -3584.68 1344.50 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 346.44 504.92  125.36 536.45   3209.13 1095.25 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -18100.27 9075.98 ** -24075.22 10283.44 ** 11018.99 25517.57  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 7.42 6.71   8.67 9.67   -3.84 9.23   
Activity interaction              
IGD*LD H1*H3 ? 1409.05 660.37 ** 1725.50 1234.76   -3013.57 1812.88  
IGD*NIID H1*H5 ? 909.63 297.00 *** 1211.33 346.96 *** 1680.43 729.96 ** 
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -806.65 610.00  -814.79 688.83   15317.57 4740.39 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -675.30 238.80 *** -698.24 251.57 *** -8299.36 3285.53 ** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -533.44 347.21  -591.73 401.31   1855.05 955.24 * 
All Activities H1*H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 1987.77 792.14 ** 1471.16 723.61 ** 9834.97 4762.92 * 
Control variables              
Log Asset C1 ? -71.29 42.46 * 37.00 50.42   -65.69 84.94  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 1824.73 493.62 *** 2752.34 674.91 *** -1678.13 1810.91  
Asset Growth C3 - 2.17 12.02  -17.46 15.39   223.23 129.53  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.60 15.83  -23.00 24.06   2669.09 1345.57 * 
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -74.01 38.27 * -25.83 39.28   -10634.91 5289.33 * 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  6.15 22.43  5.35 26.68      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  2.82 21.87  0.52 25.66      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -58.70 33.90 * -60.80 39.89      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -66.67 34.52 * -66.01 43.30      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -65.12 37.10 * -60.21 46.71      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -67.93 38.79 * -60.60 47.19      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -67.80 41.26  -48.84 49.64      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -53.87 34.43  -22.16 40.29      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -45.48 39.57         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -76.88 41.61 *     1.26 17.10  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.91 0.04 *** 0.86 0.05 *** -0.74 0.24 *** 
Observations   245   197    47   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7942    0.8008    0.8675    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%             
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Appendix 62: Return on Asset (ROA) Regressions for All BHCs       
                     
       Total period     Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   ROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0061 0.0012 *** -0.0069 0.0015 *** -0.0140 0.0035 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0116 0.0041 *** -0.0118 0.0039 *** -0.0106 0.0089  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0064 0.0025 ** 0.0079 0.0029 *** 0.0128 0.0034 *** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0015 0.0004 *** -0.0014 0.0005 *** -0.0011 0.0012  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0024 0.0010 ** 0.0025 0.0008 *** 0.0026 0.0010 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0007 0.0004   -0.0006 0.0004   -0.0014 0.0012   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0004 0.0009  -0.0001 0.0013   0.0000 0.0008  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0105 0.0022 *** 0.0108 0.0023 *** 0.0171 0.0037 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0036 0.0007 *** 0.0028 0.0009 *** 0.0120 0.0034 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 0.4718 0.1155 *** 0.5450 0.1088 *** 0.2739 0.0853 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0002 0.0002   0.0000 0.0003   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0051 0.0034  0.0048 0.0037   0.0066 0.0103  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0102 0.0038 *** -0.0136 0.0043 *** -0.0149 0.0048 *** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0048 0.0012 *** 0.0030 0.0015 ** 0.0031 0.0038  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.3824 0.2131 * -0.3742 0.1764 ** -0.2042 0.2049  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0002 0.0002   0.0003 0.0002   0.0001 0.0005   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0087 0.0031 *** 0.0108 0.0036 *** 0.0024 0.0062  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0052 0.0020 *** 0.0033 0.0019 * 0.0066 0.0065  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0001 0.0008  -0.0005 0.0009   0.0014 0.0022  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0004 0.0062   0.0072 0.0072   -0.0096 0.0201   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0014 0.0003 *** 0.0008 0.0003 ** 0.0022 0.0006 *** 
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001   -0.0006 0.0002 ** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0241 0.0061 *** 0.0211 0.0098 ** 0.0365 0.0051 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0005 0.0010  -0.0006 0.0009   0.0092 0.0019 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0001 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0003 0.0004  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0017 0.0010  -0.0009 0.0009   -0.0091 0.0021 *** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0005 0.0002 *** 0.0000 0.0001      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0006 0.0002 *** -0.0001 0.0001      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0024 0.0004 *** -0.0017 0.0003 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0020 0.0004 *** -0.0013 0.0003 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0022 0.0004 *** -0.0015 0.0003 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0022 0.0004 *** -0.0015 0.0003 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0022 0.0004 *** -0.0015 0.0003 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0023 0.0004 *** -0.0015 0.0003 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0030 0.0005 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0043 0.0005 ***     -0.0017 0.0001 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.4255 0.0611 *** 0.5880 0.0734 *** 0.2110 0.0335 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.5478    0.6412    0.3539    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 63: Risk Adjusted Return on Asset (RAROA) Regressions for All BHCs     
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   RAROA Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  1.9899 3.6546  -22.5534 4.3878 *** -13.8979 6.4850 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -2.2761 3.8429  1.7911 4.9502   16.1598 7.8481 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0902 3.6876  9.4096 4.3128 ** 12.7155 6.0577 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.2913 0.5894  -0.3095 0.6900   4.3269 2.1736 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 1.0896 0.4141 *** 1.7480 0.5125 *** 0.5507 1.0368  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -0.0697 0.9002   0.0376 1.0169   1.2425 2.0658   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 3.2100 1.1123 *** 3.6243 1.3117 *** 3.8530 1.8011 ** 
Loan Ratio S3 + 3.3997 2.8792  12.0162 3.4803 *** 10.9775 4.7185 ** 
Security Ratio S4 + 2.7640 1.4386 * 1.9622 1.5853   14.3437 4.7621 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0964 8.6921  3.4078 6.5029   -125.3711 30.8078 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0906 0.0641   -0.0573 0.0661   -0.0392 0.3532   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -2.6013 3.3508  -3.8201 4.5775   -13.7208 8.7288  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.3675 6.0878  -16.1682 6.9690 ** -13.7836 8.4741  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 4.9704 2.9026 * 2.1600 3.3962   -5.4338 7.4573  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 31.9750 25.5066  4.7555 18.5382   308.7365 102.9043 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0867 0.1496   -0.2581 0.1628   0.0616 0.6171   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 10.0537 6.1938  -0.1406 7.3815   -15.7133 11.4865  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -1.7736 2.8312  -1.9682 3.0280   1.6946 5.5065  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.2449 1.5698  -0.1795 1.7460   -4.5204 3.6562  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -5.4162 15.2478   -15.8665 15.4067   -31.4638 32.7300   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 1.3652 1.5834  0.3070 1.9932   2.0028 2.0049  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.1065 0.4611  3.1392 0.5635 *** 0.1593 0.6170  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 19.0642 5.0188 *** 14.6998 4.8288 *** 32.8549 5.7797 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -1.3668 0.3936 *** -1.7193 0.4300 *** -0.6707 1.1281  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.2643 0.1524 * 0.0443 0.2042   -0.0542 0.5177  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -1.1502 0.9819  -3.8013 1.3167 *** -0.4806 1.6464  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.6150 0.1210 *** -0.2977 0.1259 **    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -1.0971 0.1825 *** -0.5233 0.1912 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -2.8219 0.3695 *** -1.7544 0.3627 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -3.1650 0.4007 *** -1.8762 0.3929 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -3.6026 0.4300 *** -2.1447 0.4240 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -3.4022 0.4576 *** -1.7652 0.4493 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -3.5848 0.4788 *** -1.7685 0.4714 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -4.3037 0.4946 *** -2.2129 0.4873 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -5.3333 0.5144 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -6.0996 0.5315 ***     -2.4089 0.1815 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8890 0.0073 *** 0.8863 0.0082 *** 0.7341 0.0222 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7958    0.7956    0.5877    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 64: Return on Equity (ROE) Regressions for All BHCs      
                     
       Total period    Before the Crisis    During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign ROE Std. Error   ROE 
Std. 
Error   ROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  -0.0175 0.0112  -0.0171 0.0090 * -0.1891 0.0735 ** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0380 0.0266  -0.0101 0.0139   -0.1047 0.1199  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0250 0.0161  0.0182 0.0099 * 0.1891 0.0702 *** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0062 0.0029 ** -0.0017 0.0022   -0.0141 0.0220  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0021 0.0033  -0.0007 0.0023   0.0147 0.0166  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0053 0.0052   -0.0017 0.0033   0.0109 0.0243   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0158 0.0041 *** 0.0132 0.0035 *** 0.0107 0.0152  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0495 0.0139 *** 0.0357 0.0078 *** 0.2596 0.0847 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0238 0.0060 *** 0.0118 0.0047 ** 0.1816 0.0692 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 0.9302 0.1447 *** 1.1289 0.1437 *** -0.1161 0.4149  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0013 0.0009   -0.0008 0.0006   0.0034 0.0035   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0147 0.0200  -0.0318 0.0140 ** 0.0008 0.1049  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0405 0.0244 * -0.0431 0.0160 *** -0.2304 0.1001 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0279 0.0116 ** -0.0028 0.0084   0.0638 0.0672  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.3216 0.4818  -0.0323 0.4380   4.2226 1.7064 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0023 0.0016   0.0008 0.0011   -0.0043 0.0062   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0557 0.0266 ** 0.0404 0.0133 *** 0.0930 0.0960  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0279 0.0146 * 0.0141 0.0100   0.0788 0.0895  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0121 0.0089  -0.0064 0.0054   -0.0102 0.0407  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0141 0.0535   -0.0052 0.0352   -0.0038 0.2209   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0182 0.0041 *** 0.0078 0.0025 *** 0.0383 0.0117 *** 
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0007 0.0012  0.0044 0.0008 *** -0.0113 0.0039 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0355 0.0302  -0.0639 0.0207 *** 0.3417 0.1132 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0413 0.0092 *** 0.0046 0.0052   0.2137 0.0524 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0009 0.0017  -0.0005 0.0008   0.0035 0.0084  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0527 0.0111 *** -0.0189 0.0070 *** -0.2024 0.0557 *** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0025 0.0016  0.0012 0.0010      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0041 0.0018 ** 0.0000 0.0012      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0130 0.0021 *** -0.0044 0.0015 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0110 0.0023 *** -0.0026 0.0016 *    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0116 0.0023 *** -0.0028 0.0016 *    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0121 0.0022 *** -0.0035 0.0016 **    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0112 0.0023 *** -0.0034 0.0017 **    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0115 0.0023 *** -0.0034 0.0015 **    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0186 0.0024 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0411 0.0037 ***     -0.0245 0.0023 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.2646 0.0591 *** 0.4408 0.0753 *** 0.1488 0.0571 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1537    0.2696    0.1189    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 65: Risk Adjusted Rreturn on Equity (RAROE) Regressions for All BHCs    
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   RAROE Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  3.3819 3.8134  -19.7731 4.7055 *** -10.1586 5.9616 * 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -1.8230 3.9707  4.1397 4.7380   9.8950 6.7746  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 3.7395 4.1148  14.2404 4.9231 *** 12.4603 6.0574 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.4060 0.7341  0.3724 0.8342   3.0769 1.9044  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 1.2280 0.4749 *** 1.7325 0.5787 *** 0.8047 0.9818  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0450 1.0853   0.4469 1.2885   0.6351 1.8461   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 2.7215 1.3752 ** 3.2119 1.4966 ** 3.4165 1.4873 ** 
Loan Ratio S3 + 3.9577 2.9403  14.0015 3.6781 *** 11.7424 4.4324 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + 1.8895 1.5554  0.9886 1.8535   12.8131 4.5391 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 11.7278 5.3237 ** 17.5221 5.7138 *** -108.2209 47.9504 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0944 0.0726   -0.0557 0.0804   -0.3608 0.4625   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.6343 4.2499  -4.7755 5.0885   -10.6622 8.0649  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -5.2828 6.1850  -22.8082 7.4515 *** -14.2012 8.4322 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 4.8115 3.2758  2.4806 3.8188   -0.7461 7.1401  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 28.7158 24.3376  2.6623 18.8225   309.3526 127.0547 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0570 0.1599   -0.2702 0.1796   0.6061 0.8043   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 2.6939 5.4967  -1.6486 6.2703   -5.9795 9.5343  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.8409 3.1756  -1.9128 3.1773   2.5696 5.4682  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.1478 1.7084  -0.8919 2.0117   -3.9246 3.4405  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -15.4982 18.3173   -27.7844 19.1322   -40.7812 27.1793   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 1.7923 1.6645  0.1448 2.1741   2.8996 1.9014  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.1028 0.4415  2.7775 0.6595 *** -0.2733 0.5818  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 2.2486 4.3009  -3.8244 4.4529   21.7329 5.1473 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.3515 0.4154  -0.7313 0.4734   0.6809 1.1227  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.2375 0.1388 * -0.1213 0.1968   0.0292 0.4936  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -2.6540 1.0865 ** -4.5319 1.5123 *** -2.5105 1.6268  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.5512 0.1510 *** -0.2443 0.1508      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -1.0616 0.2035 *** -0.5190 0.2084 **    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -3.1907 0.4256 *** -2.1409 0.4370 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -3.4239 0.4582 *** -2.1745 0.4704 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -3.8058 0.4870 *** -2.4008 0.5017 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -3.8772 0.5190 *** -2.3220 0.5352 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -4.0056 0.5461 *** -2.2988 0.5588 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -4.7660 0.5658 *** -2.8212 0.5819 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -5.8752 0.5872 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -6.6565 0.6083 ***     -2.2735 0.1900 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8800 0.0096 *** 0.8761 0.0102 *** 0.7094 0.0317 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7835    0.7788    0.555171    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 66: Stock Return (SR) Regressions for All BHCs        
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   SR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0826 0.0500 * -0.0598 0.0496   -0.8811 0.2682 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.1245 0.0918  0.0118 0.0849   0.7304 0.3078 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0596 0.0598  0.0607 0.0602   0.3682 0.2051 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0488 0.0187 *** 0.0596 0.0185 *** 0.0214 0.0892  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0166 0.0192  0.0154 0.0190   0.1883 0.0999 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0155 0.0197   0.0344 0.0197 * -0.1051 0.0747   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.0538 0.0247 ** 0.0677 0.0252 *** 0.0406 0.0872  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.0386 0.0510  0.0751 0.0506   0.4300 0.2180 ** 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.0987 0.0392 ** 0.0541 0.0398   0.7438 0.2122 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 + 1.7212 2.7149  4.5353 2.6114 * 0.4285 12.4275  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0029 0.0053   -0.0046 0.0051   -0.0001 0.0142   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.1055 0.0781  -0.0578 0.0774   -0.3951 0.3302  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.0684 0.0924  -0.1437 0.0930   -0.3180 0.3118  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0856 0.0669  -0.1065 0.0695   -0.1551 0.2605  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -1.0301 4.9748  -10.4155 4.6790 ** 8.9079 19.5945  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0058 0.0091   0.0086 0.0090   0.0042 0.0246   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0691 0.1011  0.0611 0.0853   -0.0958 0.3171  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.0134 0.0705  0.0000 0.0674   -0.5275 0.2875 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0464 0.0382  -0.0690 0.0374 * 0.0706 0.1433  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.3048 0.2330   -0.1960 0.2252   -1.1246 0.7690   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD  0.0151 0.0103  0.0198 0.0117 * -0.0255 0.0298  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0013 0.0049  0.0033 0.0048   0.0074 0.0169  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.1302 0.1163  -0.0730 0.1101   1.1866 0.3596 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.1877 0.0465 *** 0.1684 0.0451 *** 0.1472 0.1251  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0029 0.0094  -0.0018 0.0094   0.0098 0.0348  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.1995 0.0592 *** -0.1683 0.0611 *** -0.1487 0.1435  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0551 0.0164 *** -0.0973 0.0146 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0037 0.0160  -0.0466 0.0148 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0235 0.0170  -0.0092 0.0155      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.0150 0.0167  -0.0440 0.0153 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0367 0.0166 ** 0.0061 0.0151      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0085 0.0164  -0.0384 0.0149 **    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.0377 0.0163 ** -0.0735 0.0147 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0076 0.0163  -0.0417 0.0148 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.1033 0.0166 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0799 0.0226 ***     0.0404 0.0126 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.2188 0.0254 *** -0.1319  *** -0.3673 0.0468 *** 
Observations   4878   3926    951   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1273    0.0880    0.1607    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 67: Risk Adjusted Stoak Return (RASR) Regressions for All BHCs     
                     
       Total period     Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   RASR Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.6488 0.3353 * -0.5410 0.3384   -5.9600 1.6509 *** 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.7192 0.5819  -0.0535 0.5808   4.9388 1.8202 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.8153 0.4195 * 0.5844 0.4246   3.9194 1.4592 *** 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.2790 0.1234 ** 0.3971 0.1269 *** -0.3016 0.5019  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0188 0.1279  0.0322 0.1298   0.9895 0.5493 * 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0815 0.1361   0.2234 0.1380   -0.8343 0.4489 * 
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 0.4103 0.1588 *** 0.4633 0.1619 *** 0.6525 0.5664  
Loan Ratio S3 + 0.5332 0.3107 * 0.5995 0.3167 * 3.2873 1.2544 *** 
Security Ratio S4 + 0.7734 0.2682 *** 0.5137 0.2745 * 4.0571 1.2995 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 11.9267 15.7058  24.4016 15.8614   22.0335 60.0917  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0239 0.0320   -0.0362 0.0326   -0.0076 0.0915   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.7375 0.5050  -0.4121 0.4985   -1.9954 2.1899  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.9732 0.6331  -1.0478 0.6426   -4.3765 2.1425 ** 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.4661 0.4830  -0.7757 0.5026   0.1617 1.7664  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -3.2739 29.4612  -57.5344 28.6459 ** 49.2194 99.5909  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0452 0.0551   0.0650 0.0561   0.0334 0.1612   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.3023 0.6213  0.4247 0.6229   0.0550 1.9011  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.1781 0.4627  0.4107 0.4865   -4.6560 2.0337 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.2269 0.2709  -0.4104 0.2688   0.7194 0.8884  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -3.1407 1.5296 ** -2.5655 1.5458 * -7.4393 5.0568   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.1158 0.0783  0.1190 0.0801   -0.0511 0.2328  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0107 0.0327  0.0261 0.0329   0.0138 0.1124  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.9697 0.7074  -0.0499 0.7145   7.5539 2.0720 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + 0.8510 0.2641 *** 0.7982 0.2567 *** 0.4457 0.7611  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0425 0.0717  -0.0090 0.0732   0.1744 0.2468  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -1.0270 0.3795 *** -0.8502 0.4014 ** -0.4909 0.9570  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.5203 0.0996 *** -0.7032 0.0958 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.1726 0.0999 * -0.3609 0.0980 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0467 0.1042  -0.0850 0.1018      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.2055 0.1033 ** -0.3202 0.1010 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.2268 0.1036 ** 0.1093 0.1015      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0325 0.1037  -0.1520 0.1014      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.3481 0.1031 *** -0.5040 0.1007 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0071 0.1040  -0.1353 0.1036      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -1.0574 0.1067 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.7241 0.1304 ***     0.4157 0.0797 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.1859 0.0165 *** -0.1360 0.0164 *** -0.3187 0.0329 *** 
Observations   4878   3926    951   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1653    0.0968    0.1466    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 68: Net Charge Off  (NCO) Regressions for All BHCs       
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis     During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign NCO Std. Error   NCO Std. Error   NCO 
Std. 
Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -0.0036 0.0010 *** -0.0030 0.0011 *** -0.0005 0.0023  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.0015 0.0017  -0.0017 0.0016   -0.0036 0.0045  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0004 0.0013  -0.0005 0.0013   -0.0048 0.0026 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0003 0.0003  0.0002 0.0003   0.0000 0.0008  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0006 0.0004 * -0.0006 0.0003 * 0.0001 0.0005  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0006 0.0003 ** 0.0005 0.0002 ** 0.0011 0.0007   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0003 0.0006  0.0006 0.0007   0.0002 0.0006  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0016 0.0010  0.0010 0.0010   -0.0023 0.0028  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0000 0.0004  -0.0001 0.0005   -0.0035 0.0023  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0848 0.0445 * 0.0643 0.0398   0.2359 0.0353 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000   -0.0002 0.0001   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0008 0.0018  -0.0004 0.0018   -0.0025 0.0051  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0005 0.0018  0.0015 0.0019   0.0058 0.0035 * 
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0012 0.0010  0.0000 0.0009   -0.0009 0.0024  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.0279 0.1208  -0.0297 0.1296   -0.4803 0.0843 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0002 0.0001 ** 0.0001 0.0001   0.0003 0.0002   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0023 0.0015  0.0026 0.0015 * -0.0019 0.0032  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0012 0.0009  0.0011 0.0009   0.0095 0.0037 *** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0014 0.0005 *** -0.0010 0.0005 ** -0.0015 0.0013  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.0008 0.0038   -0.0015 0.0039   -0.0024 0.0108   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0003 0.0003  0.0002 0.0002   -0.0008 0.0004 * 
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0004 0.0001 *** 0.0003 0.0001 ** 0.0006 0.0001 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0045 0.0031  0.0070 0.0039 * -0.0010 0.0023  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0002 0.0003  0.0005 0.0003 * -0.0028 0.0008 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0003  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0001 0.0004  0.0002 0.0004   0.0017 0.0011  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0002 0.0001 *** -0.0001 0.0001      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0003 0.0001 *** -0.0001 0.0001      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0006 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0005 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0004 0.0002 ** 0.0000 0.0002      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0004 0.0002 * -0.0001 0.0002      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0003 0.0002  -0.0002 0.0002      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0003 0.0002  -0.0002 0.0001 *    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0006 0.0002 **        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0011 0.0002 ***     0.0009 0.0001 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.5674 0.1171 *** 0.6392 0.1776 *** 0.3184 0.0439 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.4932    0.5434    0.3975    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
  
 
360 
Appendix 69: Maturity Gap (MG) Regressions for All BHCs        
                     
        Total period     Before the Crisis   During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   MG Std. Error   
Activity diversification              
 C  0.0434 0.0820  -0.0273 0.0846   -0.0241 0.1596  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.1234 0.0939  -0.1351 0.1175   -0.2723 0.1777  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0742 0.1067  0.1375 0.1143   0.0873 0.1678  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0149 0.0161  0.0085 0.0181   0.0043 0.0721  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0074 0.0107  0.0027 0.0120   -0.0081 0.0271  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0579 0.0231 ** 0.0500 0.0272 * 0.0927 0.0581   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - -0.0442 0.0322  -0.0402 0.0370   -0.0481 0.0545  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0378 0.0780  0.0934 0.0842   0.1602 0.1424  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0450 0.0390  -0.0086 0.0417   -0.0241 0.1365  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.5643 0.1645 *** 0.4830 0.1492 *** 2.7772 1.2895 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0047 0.0025 * 0.0045 0.0028   0.0257 0.0095 *** 
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.0120 0.0996  0.0300 0.1418   -0.0823 0.1937  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.1252 0.1499  -0.2486 0.1648   -0.1344 0.2323  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.0950 0.0702  -0.1650 0.0818 ** 0.0021 0.2199  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -1.5069 0.4297 *** -1.3185 0.4178 *** -4.0238 2.9469  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0123 0.0048 ** -0.0118 0.0055 ** -0.0473 0.0156 *** 
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.1814 0.1139  0.1513 0.1300   0.5756 0.2200 *** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0991 0.0632  0.1491 0.0698 ** 0.0811 0.1408  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.0730 0.0396 * -0.0585 0.0475   -0.1816 0.1010 * 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.4227 0.2565 * -0.6580 0.3183 ** 0.2583 0.6443   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0336 0.0415  0.0254 0.0478   0.0311 0.0283  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0193 0.0084 ** 0.0244 0.0088 *** 0.0147 0.0120  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.1187 0.1055  0.2013 0.1195 * 0.0928 0.1649  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0403 0.0109 *** 0.0397 0.0118 *** 0.0874 0.0291 *** 
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0016 0.0030  0.0005 0.0040   0.0026 0.0067  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -0.0495 0.0190 *** -0.0701 0.0251 *** -0.0770 0.0380 ** 
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0080 0.0034 ** -0.0086 0.0035 **    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0114 0.0049 ** -0.0122 0.0050 **    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0086 0.0088  0.0078 0.0098      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0107 0.0092  0.0095 0.0102      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0194 0.0097 ** 0.0174 0.0107      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0202 0.0100 ** 0.0179 0.0110      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0206 0.0102 ** 0.0180 0.0113      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0091 0.0103  0.0067 0.0114      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0023 0.0106         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.0082 0.0107      -0.0063 0.0041  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.8504 0.0061 *** 0.8422 0.0070 *** 0.7802 0.0152 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.7385    0.7251    0.6347    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 70: Derivatives Loss (DL) Regressions for All BHCs       
                     
       Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis 
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   DL Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0000  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000 ** 0.0001 0.0001 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0000  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 *** 
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0000  
Security Ratio S4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000 * 0.0001 0.0000 ** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001   0.0000 0.0003  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000 ** -0.0004 0.0001 *** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0000 0.0002  0.0000 0.0002   0.0000 0.0001  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000 * -0.0001 0.0001  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 0.0004 0.0004  0.0003 0.0005   0.0012 0.0011  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001 ** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0003 0.0001 *** 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -0.0003 0.0001 * -0.0001 0.0001   -0.0010 0.0002 *** 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Asset Growth C3 + 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger Dummy C4 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000      
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.0000 0.0000         
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.0000 0.0000      0.0000 0.0000  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   -0.3214 0.1806 * -0.3341 0.1844 * 0.1088 0.0168 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.1031    0.1111    0.0391    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 71: Market Beta (MB) Regressions for All BHCs        
                     
        Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   MB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -3.0517 0.4143 *** -2.2648 0.4928 *** -1.5958 1.4298  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? 0.3536 0.4237  0.0012 0.5945   -0.3207 1.0208  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? -0.0454 0.2629  -0.0695 0.3962   -0.7266 1.0473  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0092 0.0720  0.2180 0.0947 ** 0.5744 0.4378  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.1249 0.0667 * -0.0740 0.0912   -0.5022 0.2424 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0292 0.0766   -0.0688 0.1108   0.0339 0.4102   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.1270 0.1068  0.2688 0.1508 * 0.1395 0.4121  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.1752 0.2314  0.2337 0.3186   -0.2437 0.9353  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.0838 0.1528  -0.1769 0.1951   0.1912 0.9267  
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -4.1935 3.6098  -2.0355 4.1213   -32.6438 19.7500 ** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0016 0.0036   0.0014 0.0049   0.0501 0.0355   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -0.2790 0.4259  -0.1606 0.5772   -0.3318 1.0830  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? 0.0065 0.4622  -0.2011 0.6798   1.4686 1.6741  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? -0.2415 0.2639  0.1315 0.3980   0.0904 1.4183  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 6.7332 5.9316  3.5510 6.5747   23.1467 33.2070  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.0217 0.0110 ** -0.0234 0.0134 * -0.0876 0.0597   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? -0.0037 0.5186  0.6307 0.7045   -0.3293 1.4128  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? -0.2322 0.1915  -0.1204 0.2686   1.5594 0.8114 * 
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 0.1285 0.1214  0.1680 0.1893   -0.1971 0.8003  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -1.6055 0.7916 ** -2.1294 1.1199 * -5.8925 3.3787 * 
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0150 0.1333  0.0615 0.1602   -0.1602 0.1774  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.5116 0.0530 *** 0.3531 0.0636   0.4087 0.1179 *** 
Equity Ratio C2 ? 0.2930 0.6012  0.1507 0.8001 *** 0.4247 1.2697  
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0659 0.0263 ** -0.0309 0.0386   -0.0896 0.1461  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0069 0.0074  -0.0151 0.0117   -0.0449 0.0328  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0082 0.0514  0.1014 0.0815   0.1127 0.1817  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  0.0187 0.0075 ** 0.0431 0.0110 ***    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  0.0564 0.0128 *** 0.0961 0.0194 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  0.1370 0.0253 *** 0.1148 0.0364 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  0.1735 0.0278 *** 0.1696 0.0411 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  0.2046 0.0317 *** 0.2235 0.0471 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  0.2434 0.0349 *** 0.2839 0.0516 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  0.2889 0.0381 *** 0.3510 0.0560 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  0.4534 0.0407 *** 0.5317 0.0596 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  0.4967 0.0445 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  0.5469 0.0470 ***     0.0389 0.0270  
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.9558 0.0064 *** 0.9101 0.0150 *** 0.8679 0.0164 *** 
Observations   4878   3926    951   
Adjusted R-squared     0.9528    0.9179    0.7667    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 72: Interest Rate Beta (IRB) Regressions for All BHCs      
                     
      Total period      Before the Crisis      During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   IRB Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  0.2400 0.1211 ** 0.3695 0.1194 *** 0.6942 0.4068 * 
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -0.2842 0.1883  -0.2498 0.1698   -0.3251 0.4130  
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 0.0765 0.1310  -0.0087 0.2148   0.1799 0.3949  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -0.0117 0.0336  -0.0207 0.0273   0.0302 0.1635  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? -0.0094 0.0330  -0.0229 0.0250   -0.0160 0.1229  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? 0.0718 0.0352 ** 0.0757 0.0396 * 0.3434 0.1166 *** 
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 - 0.0271 0.0527  -0.0302 0.0562   -0.1207 0.1320  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 0.0136 0.1075  -0.1268 0.1608   -0.1141 0.3731  
Security Ratio S4 ? -0.2791 0.0853 *** -0.2389 0.0964 ** -1.0763 0.3966 *** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? 0.3286 2.1157  -2.3968 1.4429 * 1.6741 10.3818  
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.0004 0.0026   0.0002 0.0027   0.0076 0.0167   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? 0.0105 0.1679  0.1394 0.1449   0.0201 0.4844  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -0.3174 0.2003  0.0405 0.3058   -0.3223 0.5830  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 0.3686 0.1454 ** 0.3074 0.1568 * 1.2236 0.6145 ** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? -0.8657 3.5819  3.4042 2.4568   -11.7163 16.9428  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? 0.0019 0.0053   0.0011 0.0050   -0.0119 0.0290   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 0.2820 0.2257  0.1341 0.1993   -0.1630 0.4990  
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 0.1841 0.0994 * 0.1503 0.0948   0.3710 0.3294  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? -0.1279 0.0640 ** -0.1050 0.0547 * -0.4790 0.2160 ** 
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? 0.1447 0.3376   -0.0822 0.3235   1.4882 1.0030   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD + -0.0250 0.0257  -0.0161 0.0284   0.0439 0.0473  
Log Asset C1 ? -0.0042 0.0127  -0.0220 0.0168   -0.0483 0.0281 * 
Equity Ratio C2 ? -0.7796 0.2639 *** -0.0790 0.2313   -1.6262 0.5262 *** 
Asset Growth C3 + -0.0184 0.0162  -0.0085 0.0138   0.0000 0.0847  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -0.0025 0.0056  0.0003 0.0055   0.0217 0.0210  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? 0.0072 0.0247  -0.0112 0.0235   -0.0809 0.0959  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -0.0002 0.0077  -0.0025 0.0049      
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -0.0497 0.0121 *** -0.0499 0.0082 ***    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -0.0925 0.0159 *** -0.0867 0.0137 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -0.1333 0.0170 *** -0.1336 0.0147 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -0.0460 0.0186 ** -0.0558 0.0151 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -0.0639 0.0193 *** -0.0759 0.0151 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -0.1038 0.0200 *** -0.1052 0.0154 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -0.0843 0.0195 *** -0.0794 0.0156 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -0.0898 0.0198 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -0.2284 0.0181 ***     -0.1287 0.0134 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.7498 0.0171 *** 0.8198 0.0167 *** 0.5137 0.0391 *** 
Observations   4878   3926    951   
Adjusted R-squared     0.6468    0.7199    0.3795    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
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Appendix 73: Distance to Default (Z-Score) Regressions for All BHCs      
                     
        Total period      Before the Crisis       During the Crisis  
Variables Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   Z Std. Error   
Activity diversification               
 C  -18.98 107.05  -665.97 138.81 *** -215.86 193.13  
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2 ? -21.85 100.39  51.19 145.16   528.53 225.78 ** 
Loan Div. (LD) H3 ? 63.28 109.00  260.66 136.39 * 293.60 192.67  
Security Div. (SD) H4 ? -6.86 15.97  -12.77 18.91   168.02 64.63 *** 
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5 ? 26.27 11.65 ** 42.92 14.81 *** -3.17 30.05  
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6 ? -10.85 21.45   2.64 24.21   43.21 66.51   
Scale variables              
Deposit Ratio S2 + 114.08 32.44 *** 136.37 44.08 *** 46.59 72.03  
Loan Ratio S3 ? 153.87 95.50  345.98 118.50 *** 201.21 150.76  
Security Ratio S4 ? 30.53 38.31  -19.91 46.19   339.70 147.80 ** 
Non-interest-income Ratio S5 ? -806.28 472.34 * -779.12 436.11 * -6698.94 939.75 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Ratio S6 ? -0.18 1.31   -0.62 1.62   -0.84 8.20   
Scale interaction              
Domestic Geographic Div. (DGD) H2*S2 ? -116.18 85.10  -132.23 127.97   -372.36 229.44  
Loan Div. (LD) H3*S3 ? -152.29 192.25  -506.07 224.35 ** -274.70 261.17  
Security Div. (SD) H4*S4 ? 183.37 79.74 ** 193.60 99.99 * -174.90 231.96  
Non-interest-income Div. (NIID) H5*S5 ? 187.47 664.36  -110.23 621.57   7672.01 2884.02 *** 
Off-balance-sheet Div. (OBSD) H6*S6 ? -0.07 3.58   -6.02 3.76   2.53 14.34   
Activity interaction              
DGD * LD H2*H3 ? 230.20 163.18  11.34 205.24   -761.11 346.17 ** 
DGD * NIID H2*H5 ? 21.17 68.61  17.65 78.15   162.07 149.30  
SD * OBSD H4*H6 ? 18.71 37.03  -27.54 42.29   -160.37 111.04  
All Activities H2*H3*H4*H5*H6 ? -539.62 351.64   -571.25 387.63   -873.59 969.73   
Control variables              
International Loan Activity Dummy ILAD - 20.84 40.21  -55.81 46.48   24.81 40.78  
Log Asset C1 ? 0.67 13.99  84.18 18.05 *** -4.42 18.37  
Equity Ratio C2 ? 1171.91 186.86 *** 1109.31 197.15 *** 1564.75 200.65 *** 
Asset Growth C3 - -6.11 11.10  -18.23 11.89   7.96 33.92  
Merger Dummy C4 ? -3.16 3.81  5.42 4.82   -2.77 11.66  
Merger * Asset Growth C4*C3 ? -29.82 24.71  -95.67 28.06 *** 4.11 47.90  
Year 1999 Dummy Y99  -11.12 2.83 *** -5.35 3.12 *    
Year 2000 Dummy Y00  -22.04 4.51 *** -11.12 5.06 **    
Year 2001 Dummy Y01  -57.11 9.49 *** -35.27 9.42 ***    
Year 2002 Dummy Y02  -74.41 10.49 *** -47.76 10.42 ***    
Year 2003 Dummy Y03  -84.57 11.48 *** -54.17 11.48 ***    
Year 2004 Dummy Y04  -77.86 12.50 *** -43.40 12.44 ***    
Year 2005 Dummy Y05  -82.71 13.31 *** -44.39 13.37 ***    
Year 2006 Dummy Y06  -94.70 13.88 *** -50.53 13.99 ***    
Year 2007 Dummy Y07  -108.00 14.72 ***        
Year 2008 Dummy Y08  -126.68 15.47 ***     -55.67 5.13 *** 
First-order Coefficient of Autocorrelation AR(1)   0.91 0.01 *** 0.90 0.01 *** 0.80 0.02 *** 
Observations   18121   14585    3535   
Adjusted R-squared     0.8387    0.8277    0.6823    
Total period: 1998 Q4 - 2008 Q4        Before the crisis: 1998 Q4 - 2006 Q4         During the crisis: 2007 Q1 - 2008 Q4     
*** Significance level at 1%          ** Significance level at 5%         * Significance level at 10%            
 
